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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The Greek translation of the book of Exodus has long been recognized as an outlier when it 
comes to the general rigidity and stereotypical translation practices found in other books within 
the LXX corpus. The general freedom exhibited by the translator, though expressed within 
careful limits, is well-documented when it comes to grammatical, syntactical, and 
lexicographical evaluations. This thesis, while engaging in the descriptive analysis of these 
topics, is also directed towards a new type of synthesis: a comparison of the translation with 
Ptolemaic legal norms. It is due to the idiosyncrasies and anomalies arising from a translation-
technical analysis that the question is asked, “Could these differences be accounted for by 
consulting Greek legal and societal standards?” With respect to Exodus 21.1-32, the answer in 
many cases is a cautious, “Yes.” This study delineates and demarcates these potential influences 
on a verse by verse basis after briefly identifying the broader legal structures and forces at play 
in Ptolemaic Egypt.  
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SIGLA AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
 
Sigla 
 
1o, 2o, etc.  the first appearance, second appearance, etc.  
2x, 3x, etc. item appears two or three times in a verse, etc., contingent upon the numeral 
preceding x. Usually marked in brackets.  
* indicates that the following sentence has been composed by the author and is not 
reflected in any source materials. 
[ ] contained letter(s) or word(s) are not found in the given manuscript 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
fr. fragment 
Gen translator of Greek Genesis 
Ex translator of Greek Exodus 
Lev translator of Greek Leviticus 
Dt translator of Greek Deuteronomy 
 
Text Abbreviations 
 
Abbreviations for papyri are in accordance with the designations found online at  
http://library.duke.edu/rubenstein/scriptorium/papyrus/texts/clist.html. 
All papyri cited are from Egypt, unless otherwise stated.  
 
Literary sources are cited and abbreviated based on the titling found online at  
http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/ 
 
The following abbreviations are used for major contributing sources: 
 
MT Masoretic Text, as found in Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia  
BHS Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (Electronic ed.; Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 
2003) 
LSJ Henry George Liddel, Robert Scott, Henry Stuart Jones, and Roderick McKenzie, 
The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones Greek-English Lexicon (Irvine: University of 
California, 2011), online at http://www.tlg.uci.edu/lsj 
TLG Thesaurus Linguae Graecae® Digital Library, ed. Maria C. Pantelia (University 
of California) online at http://www.tlg.uci.edu 
SamP Samaritan Pentateuch, as found in August Freiherrn von Gall, Der Hebräische 
Pentateuch der Samaritaner (Berlin: Alfred Töpelmann, 1966).  
NT New Testament 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1. Statement of Purpose 
The primary purpose of this study is to evaluate the translation technique evidenced in Greek 
Exodus 21.1-32. The goal is to contribute to a longstanding debate having to do with the divide 
in Septuagint studies regarding interpretive influence. On the one hand, certain groups link the 
parent Hebrew text to the Greek source text with a measure of restraint with regard to any claims 
that the Greek translator has ‘done away’ with the Hebrew meaning and instead adopted a new 
interpretive lens.1 On the other hand, some are more inclined to see frequent and expansive 
departures from the parent text as the norm rather than the exception.2 The research presented in 
this work aims to walk the line between these two approaches and not to presuppose either as the 
appropriate paradigm to approach the text.3 The goal is to accept the Greek translation as the 
product of a conscientious attempt to represent the Hebrew source text, while at the same time 
reading the translation in the light of contemporaneous cultural mores. If there happen to be 
resonances between the two, these aspects of the text will be explored in hopes of gaining new 
perspectives on a section of Greek Exodus that has seldom been the subject of careful study on 
its own merits. 
                                                          
1 For examples of this approach see Cameron Boyd-Taylor, Reading Between the Lines: The Interlinear Paradigm for 
Septuagint Studies (Leuven: Peeters, 2011); Claude E. Cox, “Schaper's Eschatology Meets Kraus's Theology of the Psalms,” in 
The Old Greek Psalter Studies in Honour of Albert Pietersma (eds. Robert J. V. Hiebert, Claude E. Cox, and Peter J. Gentry; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 2001), 289-311; Harry Meyer Orlinsky, “Studies in the Septuagint of the book of Job [Pt 
4.1],” Hebrew Union College Annual 32 (1961): 239-268; idem., “Studies in the Septuagint I Book of Job,” Journal Of Biblical 
Literature 67, no. 4 (December 1948): 381-390; and Albert Pietersma, “Exegesis in the Septuagint: Possibilities and Limits (The 
Psalter as a Case in Point),” in Septuagint Research (eds. W. Kraus and R. G. Wooden; Atlanta: SBL, 2006), 33-46. 
2 Examples of this approach can be found in Donald H. Gard, “The Concept of the Future Life according to the Greek 
Translator of the Book of Job,” Journal Of Biblical Literature 73, no. 3 (September 1954): 137-143; idem., The Exegetical 
Method of the Greek Translator of the Book of Job (Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 1952); Henry S. Gehman,“The 
Theological Approach of the Greek Translator of Job 1-15,”Journal Of Biblical Literature 68, no. 3 (1949): 231-240; Gillis 
Gerleman, Studies in the Septuagint (Lund: Gleerup, 1946); and Joachim Schaper, Eschatology in the Greek Psalter (WUNT 
2.76: Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995).  
3 A similar approach can be found in Bénédicte Lemmelijn, A Plague of Texts? A Text-Critical Study of the So-Called 
‘Plagues Narrative’ in Exodus 7:14–11:10 (OTS 56; Leiden: Brill, 2009); John William Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of 
Exodus (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2013); idem., Text History of the Greek Exodus (Göttingen: Vandenhoek & Ruprecht, 1992). 
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Where evidence points to a different Hebrew Vorlage than the MT behind the Greek 
translation, or when the translator may have read the consonantal text differently than the pointed 
MT, these factors will be taken into consideration. This study will involve a verse-by-verse 
analysis of the above-mentioned passage in Exodus with a view to elucidating the intentions and 
incentives of the translator and the translation technique employed in rendering this text.  
1.2. Statement of Research Question 
There is one question that underlies the entirety of this project: What accounts for the 
idiosyncrasies that appear when the text of the Greek translation of Exodus is compared with 
corresponding MT Hebrew text of Exodus 21.1-32? From this question two more emerge: 1) Are 
there linguistic answers to the apparent differences between the source and target texts? 2) Can 
the discrepancies be explained by ‘outside influences,’ particularly Ptolemaic legal norms, given 
that Exodus 21 is itself a legal text? 
1.3. Statement of Method 
There are two methodological components of this project. The first will involve the 
comparison and contrast between each Greek lexeme and syntactical structure and its Hebrew 
counterpart4 in Exodus 21.1-32. Furthermore, these Greek terms and constructions will be 
investigated elsewhere in Exodus where there are different underlying Hebrew equivalents. It 
goes without saying that these are the first steps in any thorough translation-technical analysis. 
Differences between the Greek and Hebrew may be due, in the first place, to a non-MT Vorlage 
or to dissimilar modes of expression in the two languages, whether syntactical or 
                                                          
4 This will include all the derivatives of a given Hebrew or Greek root.  
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idiomatic/conceptual.5 The work in this phase of analysis is detailed, and will therefore only be 
documented in the thesis when it is key to the argument.  
The second aspect of this project will involve the comparison of the casuistic and 
apodictic laws of the Covenant Code with the Ptolemaic legal regulations found in the literary 
and papyrological documentary sources. Since not much work has heretofore been done along 
these lines, it is hoped that the research associated with the present thesis will shed new light on 
the context out of which this Greek translation arose. The above-mentioned comparison will not 
be restricted to actual rules and guidelines (or what we know or can infer regarding them), but 
will also include consideration of the categories of law that existed (e.g., royal, civil, native),6 as 
well as of the actual forms and syntactical speech patterns in the laws. In addition to this, 
Ptolemaic cultural norms which may not actually have been codified in legislation will also be 
investigated. If no Ptolemaic documentation is available, then in certain instances the sources 
prior to that period will be consulted. In addition, this aspect of the present study will delineate, 
where applicable, not only the convergences involving, but also the divergences between the 
Septuagint text and Ptolemaic legislation.7  
It should also be noted that there is, in many cases, overlap in the two aspects of this 
investigation. Often different motives and reasons for a translation choice might be suggested. 
This project will examine only Exodus 21.1-32. This limitation is in part arbitrary, but it 
also finds its rationale in the decision to deal with the laws that specifically deal with persons 
(free and slave). Exodus 21.33 begins a section on animal laws. Covering that topic would 
                                                          
5 This study refrains from using the term “literal” when referring to a translation choice, since “literalness” exists on a 
spectrum and the term is used very differently by various commentators. For an exploration of this topic, see James Barr, The 
Typology of Literalism in Ancient Biblical Translations (MSU XV; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979). 
6 See 3.1. 
7 These differences are, of course, in large part due to the constraint of a source text on Ex’s behalf. 
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require another branch of research, which would require going beyond the prescribed length for a 
thesis of this kind. Moreover, the formal start of what is called the Covenant Code is 21.1,8 and it 
is the central section in Greek Exodus containing casuistic laws.  
The primary source texts used are those contained in BHS9 and in the Göttingen edition 
of Exodus.10 These editions will be assumed to contain the original text unless otherwise noted.  
English translations of papyrological and literary sources are not included in citations 
which only aim to demonstrate the presence of a particular grammatical construction. When an 
argument is based on the precise definition of a citation’s lexical and syntactic information, a 
translation is given. 
While some reference will be made to the Greek version of the Tabernacle Account (in 
Exodus 35-40 usually involving Greek grammatical or lexical information), little effort will be 
devoted to establishing the relationship between the Hebrew and Greek texts in that portion of 
the book.11 Understanding that relationship is a project in and of itself, and that being the case, 
no significant argument will be based on that section of Exodus. Where verse numbering differs 
between the standard Greek and Hebrew editions, the Hebrew number will be cited first, 
followed by the Greek number in parentheses.12 
 
 
                                                          
8 Cf. John I. Durham, Word Biblical Commentary: Volume 3, Exodus (Waco: Word Books, 1986), 317. Some scholars 
think it begins at 20.23 (e.g., David P. Wright, “The Origin, Development, and Context of the Covenant Code [Exodus 20:23-
23:19],” in The Book of Exodus: Composition, Reception, and Interpretation, [ed. Thomas B. Dozeman, Craig A. Evans, and Joel 
N. Lohr; SVT 164; Leiden: Brill, 2014], 220-224, here 221.  
9 Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia: SESB Version (Electronic ed; Stuttgart: German Bible Society, 2003) 
10 John William Wevers, ed., Exodus, vol. 2, Vetus Testamentum Graecum (Auctoritate Academiae Scientiarum 
Gottingensis Editum; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991). 
11 For specific work on this problem see Martha Lynn Wade, Consistency of Translation Techniques in the Tabernacle 
Accounts of Exodus in the Old Greek (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003) and Wevers, Text History, 117-146. 
12 Logos Bible Software has provided the correlations between which particular Hebrew verse matches with its 
respective Greek counterpart.  
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1.4. Justification for Commentary Method 
 The methodology described in the previous section presupposes a conviction on which 
not all Septuagint scholars agree. This conviction is that the translator’s original intent and 
purpose in translating the text can only be discerned by examining both the Hebrew and the 
Greek texts. In other words, analysing the text-linguistic relationship between the source and 
target texts is the only way to know what the translator was intending to accomplish in the 
translation. An alternative method is to read the Greek text as a document in and of itself, 
without any recourse to the ostensible Hebrew source text. These two approaches to discerning 
the meaning of a text have been differentiated on the basis of their respective focuses on the “text 
as produced” and the “text as received.”13 This thesis is based on the former methodological 
approach, since it is considered to be the only way of accessing the thought process behind each 
translation choice. While commenting on the Septuagint text as though it is a strictly Greek 
composition is the method of some commentators,14 such an approach downplays the possibility 
of interference from the Hebrew source text. Source text interference has the potential to stifle 
colloquial Greek expression, or even to create Greek expressions that are byproducts only of a 
formal representation of the Hebrew text and not of the translator’s intent to formulate a Greek 
idiom.15 For this reason, the meaning of the translation must be bound to the interaction between 
the translator and the Hebrew text, since a host of factors could be the reason for each translation 
choice. This thesis analyses those factors in its investigation of Exodus 21.1-32.  
                                                          
13 These labels are found in Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright, “To the Reader of NETS,” in A New English 
Translation of the Septuagint and the Other Greek Translations Traditionally Included under That Title (ed. Albert Pietersma and 
Benjamin G. Wright; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), xiii-xx, here xvi-xviii; cf. the principles for Septuagint 
commentary found at “A Prospectus for a Commentary on the Septuagint” at http://ccat.sas.upenn.edu/nets/principles.html 
(accessed March 5, 2018).  
14 E.g., Daniel M Gurtner, Exodus: A Commentary on the Greek Text of Codex Vaticanus (Leiden: Brill, 2013), and, to 
a degree, Alain Le Boulluec, and P. Sandevoir, La Bible D'Alexandrie: L’Exode (Paris: Cerf, 1989). 
15 For a case in point with respect to the problem of reading the text only at the Greek level, see Pietersma, “Exegesis in 
the Septuagint.” 
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1.5. Literature Survey 
 A challenging aspect of doing research for this project was finding any resources with 
which to compare the data. As it stands, there are only a few commentaries on Greek Exodus.16 
More detailed analyses exist with respect to the particularities of the Greek Pentateuch, but no 
detailed work has been done in Greek Exodus 21 (or the Covenant Code for that matter).17 The 
present study interacts with those materials that inform an understanding of Exodus 21. This 
thesis therefore makes a contribution toward a thorough and comprehensive evaluation of the 
text. For the conclusions here to be bolstered, a study would need to be extended to the end of 
the Covenant Code (23.19) and include as well a look at the Decalogue and its surrounding 
materials. In addition to this, other laws that appear elsewhere in the books of the Pentateuch 
would need to be investigated. 
 Septuagint scholars are generally agreed that the Greek Pentateuch is a product of 
Alexandrian Egypt in the middle of the third century BCE.18 The present study is predicated on 
that assumption. 
                                                          
16 E.g., Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode; Zacharias Frankel, Ueber den Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese auf die 
alexandrinische Hermeneutik (Leipzig: J. A. Barth, 1851); idem., Vorstudien Zu Der Septuaginta (reprint; Nabu Press, 2012); 
Gurtner, Exodus; Larry J. Perkins, “Exodus: To the Reader,” in A New English Translation of the Septuagint and the Other Greek 
Translations Traditionally Included under That Title (ed. Albert Pietersma and Benjamin G. Wright; Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 43-51; John Screnock, Traductor Scriptor: The Old Greek Translation of Exodus 1-14 As Scribal Activity (Leiden: 
Brill, 2017); Wevers, Notes; idem., Text History. 
17 To this author’s knowledge. See e.g., Anneli Aejmelaeus, Parataxis in the Septuagint: A Study of the Renderings of 
the Hebrew Coordinate Clauses in the Greek Pentateuch (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1982); idem., “The 
Significance of Clause Connectors in the Syntactical and Translation-Technical Study of the Septuagint,” in On the Trail of the 
Septuagint Translators: Collected Essays (Rev. ed.; CBET 50; Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 44-57; T. V. Evans, Verbal Syntax in the 
Greek Pentateuch: Natural Greek Usage and Hebrew Interference (Oxford: Oxford, 2001); Leonard J. Greenspoon, “Textual and 
Translation Issues in Greek Exodus” in The Book of Exodus: Composition, Reception, and Interpretation, ed. Thomas B. 
Dozeman, Craig A. Evans, and Joel N. Lohr (SVT 164; Leiden: Brill, 2014), 322-348; John A. L. Lee, A Lexical Study of the 
Septuagint Version of the Pentateuch (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983); Raija Sollamo, Repetition of the Possessive Pronouns in the 
Septuagint (Atlanta, Ga: Scholars Press, 1995); James Sterenberg, “The Use of Conditional Sentences in the Alexandrian Version 
of the Pentateuch” (PhD diss., University of Munich, 1908); Anwar Tjen, On Conditionals in the Greek Pentateuch: A Study of 
Translation Syntax (New York: T & T Clark International, 2010); John Zhu-En Wee, “Hebrew Syntax in the Organization of 
Laws and its Adaptation in the Septuagint,” Biblica 85, no. 4 (2004): 523-544; more broadly, Takamitsu Muraoka, A Syntax of 
Septuagint Greek (Leuven: Peeters, 2016); Emmanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research 
(Jerusalem: Simor, 1981).  
18 Cf. e.g., James K. Aitken, The T & T Clark Companion to the Septuagint (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 3; Jennifer 
M. Dines, and Michael A. Knibb, The Septuagint (London: T & T Clark, 2005), 41-44; Peter Marshall Fraser, Ptolemaic 
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 There have been few comprehensive studies on Ptolemaic law. Research for this thesis 
has included investigations of journal articles on judicial papyri,19 and of the seminal and 
detailed work of Raphael Taubenschlag.20 His monograph provides the only synthetic analysis of 
all the papyri that have been published in English.21 For the most part, there is a consensus 
among scholars regarding norms that are documented in the papyri. These include the protocols 
regarding legal inquiry and judicial process, the hierarchy of various legal authorities, the kinds 
of laws in existence, and the content of these laws. When there is debate or uncertainty regarding 
these matters, references will be made to the varying perspectives.  
Chapter 2: Ptolemaic Egypt: legal sources & influences 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 The translation of Exodus did not occur in a vacuum. The life setting in which the book 
was translated was very different from the original context out of which the Hebrew law 
emerged. In certain periods of time in ancient Israel, its citizens lived in relative independence 
from foreign powers. In Ptolemaic Egypt, the Jewish population was under the authority of the 
Lagides. In the discussion that follows, the Ptolemaic legal traditions will be described and then 
a brief comparison between them and the laws in Exodus will be made. This will provide 
background for some of the discussion that will appear in chapter 4 of this thesis. On this basis it 
will be argued that the evidence suggests that Egyptian Jews in the third century BCE were full 
participants in these Graeco-Egyptian legal traditions. These conclusions will serve to buttress 
                                                          
Alexandria: Volume 1 (2 vol.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 689; Natalio Fernández Marcos, The Septuagint in Context: 
Introduction to the Greek Version of the Bible (Boston: Brill Academic, 2001), 40; H. J. Thackeray, The Septuagint and Jewish 
Worship: A Study in Origins (Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2006), 9-15; Henry Barclay Swete, H. J. Thackeray, and Richard Rusden 
Ottley, An Introduction to the Old Testament in Greek (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 9-28. 
19 Noted throughout the study.  
20 Raphael Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light of the Papyri 332 BC - 640 AD (Milano: Cisalpino-
Goliardica, 1972). Where others disagree with Taubenschlag’s results, this study aims to note these differences.  
21 Papyri available after the publication of his work are included in this thesis and are interpreted with the help of other 
papyrological scholars.  
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the commentary that ensues in which it will be argued that there is evidence for some Ptolemaic 
legal influence on the legislation that is found in Septuagint Exodus 21.  
2.2. Law in Ptolemaic Egypt 
There were essentially three sources of influence when it came to Alexandrian and 
Ptolemaic law. First, before the Ptolemaic period, Egypt had its own indigenous legal tradition, 
and even after the political regimes of both the Persians and Ptolemies, these laws “were not 
substantially altered.”22 Most of the populace was subject to them.23 Second, as was typical for a 
Greek city, Ptolemaic municipalities established their own laws.24 Third, there were διαγράμματα 
(general edicts) and προστάγματα (special topic ordinances) that were issued by the king, which 
superseded and overrode the other two types of authority.25 Rulers had this power because “the 
Ptolemaic king was the sole source of law in the country,” and, “every other law…could be 
acknowledged as such only by the goodwill and the permission of the king.”26 The διαγράμματα 
and προστάγματα were so all-encompassing with respect to Greek law that they covered 
everything from slavery to the process and rules associated with capital punishment.27 In situations 
in which none of these legal jurisdictions had an applicable law “the decision was left to judicial 
                                                          
22 Fraser, Ptolemaic, 107; J. Modrzejewski, “La Règle de Droit dans L’Egypte Ptolemaique (Etat des questions et 
perspectives de recherches),” in American Studies in Papyrology, Vol. 1, Essays in Honor of C. Bradford Wells (New Haven: The 
American Society of Papyrologists, 1966), 139; Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 2, 7-8, 27; Dorothy J. Thompson, “Literacy 
and Power in Ptolemaic Egypt,” in Literacy and Power in the Ancient World, ed. Bowman, Alan K., and Greg Woolf 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 67-83, here 80-81; more evidence for this is seen in the ineptitude of Egyptian 
scribes to write in Greek in the first half of the 3rd century, showing that Greek life and law was slowly taking over (see ibid., 74-
75).  
23 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 107. 
24 Ibid., 107; Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 9-11. 
25 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 107; Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 12-14; see P. Lille 29, 1. 10ff. (257 BCE) and P. 
Gurob 2. 42 for this correcting documented; cf. J. Modrzejewski, “La Règle de Droit,” 130. 
26 Victor Tcherikover, Alexander Fuks, David M. Lewis, and Menahem Stern, eds. Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum, 
vol. 1 (3 vol; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), 5-6. 
27 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 14; M. Rostovtzeff, “Ptolemaic Egypt,” in The Cambridge Ancient History, 
vol. 7, ed. F. W. Walbank (12 vol; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 119. 
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discretion.”28 The order of authority was, therefore,  royal decree, civic law, judicial arbitration.29 
Ptolemaic and Alexandrian law was also influenced by Athenian law as well as by the legal 
traditions of other Greek cities.30 
2.3. Jewish Ptolemaic Legal Recourse 
If this was the state of legal administraton for all of Ptolemaic Egypt, were the Jews 
somehow exempt? Did they live in a separate world according to Mosaic legislation? Probably 
not. The degree to which even the most privileged Jews had legal freedom was probably only in 
spheres such as “religion, matrimony, and national customs.”31 Even if the Jews could abide by 
Mosaic law in some instances, “in criminal cases…where members of various nationalities were 
involved, it was the Greek law that exclusively applied.”32  
If the Egyptian Jews used Torah in their legal dealings, the papyri are “rather 
disappointing” in demonstrating this.33 Instead, they “contain rich evidence of Jews using freely 
the common Hellenistic law.”34 Jewish legal documents included a prescript with the title of 
deified Ptolemaic kings.35 Jews had Ptolemaic notary offices draw up forms.36 The court to which 
Jews most often brought legal disputes was Greek.37 Victor Tcherikover sums up the situation: “If 
the contract, the office, the court, were Greek, so were the laws and regulations, and thus we are 
                                                          
28 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 14. 
29 Joseph M. Modrzejewski, and Robert Cornman, The Jews of Egypt: From Rameses II to Emperor Hadrian 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 107-108. 
30 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 110-112; Modrzejewski, “La Règle de Droit,” 134; Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 8-
9. 
31 Aryeh Kasher, The Jews in Hellenistic and Roman Egypt: The Struggle for Equal Rights (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 
1985), 32; for an even more cautious approach see Hans Julius Wolff, “Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” in Essays in Honor of C. 
Bradford Wells (New Haven: The American Society of Papyrologists, 1966), 67-77, here 68. 
32 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 20; Wolff, “Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 75-76, claims that juristic officials could 
hold multiple laws side by side, and base their decision on that which is most fitting. 
33 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 33. 
34 Ibid.; idem., Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1959), 349. 
35 P. Hib. 96 (260 BCE); P. Tebt. 820 (201 BCE); P. Tebt. 817 (182 BCE); P. Tebt. 818 (174 BCE). 
36 P. Tebt. 817 (182 BCE); P. Freib. 12b (172 BCE). 
37 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 33; P. Petr. 3.21g (226 BCE), notably, the Jewess brings a πρόσταγμα to the court for the 
ruling (line 8). 
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faced with the likelihood that Egyptian Jews lived not according to the precepts of the Bible but 
according to the principles of Hellenistic common law.”38 The papyri even provide evidence that 
some Jews lent at an interest rate of 24% when Ex. 22.24(25)/Dt. 23.20 prohibit the charging of 
interest to fellow Israelites.39 The reason for this kind of evidence of Jewish adherence to 
Hellenistic law in Egypt was probably due to the strong influence of Hellenistic culture in general, 
to weak social structures within the Jews communities,40 and to the fact that certain laws were 
absolutely binding on the entire population (e.g., slave registration; see 3.3.6.2.5.).  
The only early41 reference to Jewish law is P. Enteux. 23. 3-4 (218 BCE), which mentions 
[τὸν νόμον π]ολιτικὸν τῶν [Ἰου]δαίων.42 The function of this law in that society is uncertain, and 
any references to specific legal matters that it may have included have been lost because of the 
fragmentary state of this papyrus.43  
All of this suggests that the Egyptian Jews adopted Greek law into their lives. This point 
provides context for the investigation that follows. If Ex adjusts some of the casuistic laws in the 
Hebrew source text of ch. 21 to fit with Ptolemaic legal norms, those changes may only reflect the 
codification of what was already commonplace. Moreover, the temptation to alter the text to fit 
with these already prevailing standards would be effectively understandable. Such changes to the 
text could reflect the translator’s purpose in translating these laws, namely, to create a less 
                                                          
38 Ibid., 34; idem., Hellenistic Civilization, 348-350; cf. Martin Hengel, Jews, Greeks, and Barbarians: Aspects of the 
Hellenization of Judaism in the Pre-Christian Period (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), 90. 
39 P. Tebt. 815, fr. 2, recto, 2. 17-22 (228 BCE); P. Tebt. 818 (174 BCE); Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 35; idem., 
Hellenistic Civilization, 350; Modrzejewski, The Jews, 114-119. 
40 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 9; idem., Hellenistic Civilization, 302. 
41 This is the only reference in the third century. P. Pol. Iud. contains references in the second century:  see Rob Kugler, 
“Uncovering Echoes of LXX Legal Norms in Hellenistic Egyptian Documentary Papyri: The Case of the Second-Century 
Herakleopolite Nome” in XIV Congress of the International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies (ed. Melvin K. H. 
Peters; Helsinki, 2010), 142-153, and Sylvie Honigman, The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria A Study in the 
Narrative of the Letter of Aristeas (London: Routledge, 2012), 109-111. 
42 For the ongoing debate on this phrase see ibid., 111; Modrzejewski, The Jews, 111; Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-
Roman, 608; Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 36; idem., Hellenistic Civilization, 303. For the alternative reading “[πρὸς τὸ ἀρχεῖον 
π]ολιτικὸν...”, see Kasher, The Jews, 150 and Tcherkikover’s comments in Corpus, 36.  
43 As an aside, Ex. 21.10 is the same subject as the petition and would fit in the lacunae well.  
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‘frictional’ set of regulations in relation to Graeco-Egyptian laws so that the Jewish legal traditions 
could be welcomed for their own use within the society at large. This assumes, of course, that the 
Jews would be able to use their own law in legal situations in the Ptolemaic context. Perhaps this 
translation was one of the first steps in the process to do just that. Another purpose for the changes 
could be more philosophical. Perhaps the unification of the legal traditions would have garnered 
more respect from the Hellenistic world at large, which would help the Jewish population to ‘fit 
in’ to that society with less controversy.  
2.4. The Royal Decrees and Greek Exodus 
2.4.1. Royal Decrees: διάγραμμα and πρόσταγμα 
We return to the two highest forms of legal authority in Ptolemaic Egypt: the διάγραμμα 
and the πρόσταγμα. 
 The διαγράμματα were probably published yearly and consisted of two sorts: “Those 
dealing with the courts, especially those defining the methods of execution upon property; and 
those of an economic character, dealing with the relations between officials and subjects.”44 
Tcherikover describes a διάγραμμα as “a proclamation of the king regulating some juridicial or 
administrative question on a grand scale.”45 William Westermann lists the known διαγράμματα 
and it is evident that they cover issues that have very little to do with the more personal and 
interrelational matters found in Ex.46 This is not so with the other form of royal decree, the 
πρόσταγμα.  
                                                          
44 William Linn Westermann, Upon Slavery in Ptolemaic Egypt (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), 31-32. 
Westermann suggests the annual dissemination of this kind of decree. Cf. Friedrich Bechtel, Otto Kern, Karl Praechter, Carl 
Robert, Ernst von Stern, Ulrich Wilcken, and Georg Wissowa, Dikaiomata: Auszüge aus alexandrinischen Gesetzen und 
Verordnungen in einem Papyrus des Philologischen Seminars der Universität Halle (Pap. Hal. 1): mit einem Anhang weiterer 
Papyri derselben Sammlung (Milano: Cisalpino-Goliardica, 1972), 42, for more on the function of the διαγράμματα. 
45 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 164, emphasis mine. 
46 Upon Slavery, 30-33, notes examples about court proceedings, broad economic structures, land execution, and rules 
for officials. 
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The word πρόσταγμα is a specific legal term for “royal decree” that came to be used in 
the Ptolemaic legal sense in about 286 BCE in the reign of Philadelphus.47 It continued to be 
employed in this specific royal sense into the Roman era.48 In contrast to the διάγραμμα, the 
πρόσταγμα could refer to individual matters as well as to general issues.49 The πρόσταγμα could 
also be epistolary or non-epistolary in form.50 In these royal decrees, when casuistic legal forms 
are employed, the protasis is almost always a third class conditional sentence with ἐάν + a verb 
in the subjunctive mood, and the apodosis can contain either the imperative,51 the infinitive52 or 
the indicative future forms.53 The infinitive is often used alongside the imperative or the future, 
but not the future with the imperative.54 When this syntactical norm is compared to what is 
conventional in the articulation of a city law, there is one big difference: in a city law the jussive, 
otherwise known as the third person imperative (e.g., θανατούσθω),55 is employed in the 
apodosis. The primary documentary source for Alexandrian city law is Papyrus Halensis. This 
document represents part of the city civil code56 and is the “only really extensive selection from 
the Alexandrian city laws.”57 In every single casuistic conditional, the apodosis contains a jussive 
                                                          
47 Wolff, “Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 69; however, see Rostovtzeff, “Ptolemaic Egypt,” 127, who dates the related 
διάγραμμα to the very end of the 4th century under Soter. Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 43, also comment that this term is 
specific with respect to Ptolemaic governance.  
48 Cf. Józef Modrzejewski, “The πρόσταγμα in the Papyri,” Journal of Juristic Papyri 5 (1951): 187-206, here 201. 
49 Cf. ibid., 196-197. 
50 Ibid., 187; Betchtel et al, Dikaiomata, 43. This is important for the argumentation in 3.2.1. 
51 E.g., P. Petr. 3. 20, 4. 7-10 (first half of 3rd BCE); P. Hal. 1, 8. 166-185 (259 BCE). 
52 E.g., BGU 4 1185 (60-61 BCE). 
53 P. Hibeh 2, 1. 37, 48; P. Amh. 2 29. 3, 8, 12 (262/261 BCE); See Bechtel et al, Dikaiomata, 44 for these syntactical 
forms. This thesis does not discuss things like contracts which do not govern the people, and which also do not seem to have 
stable rules like these; cf. P. Tebt. 3.1 815, fr. 6, r3. 58ff. (3rd BCE). 
54 Cf. Westermann, Upon Slavery, 34; Gerhard Plaumann, and Otto Gradenwitz, Griechische papyri der Sammlung 
Gradenwitz (Heidelberg: C. Winter, 1978), 20; as to the actual meaning of this distinction, Westermann’s comments are apt: 
“hard and fast rules cannot as yet be made regarding the forms of speech employed in diagrammata and laws (nomoi)” (Upon 
Slavery, 30). It seems that the infinitive has the same function and meaning as the other apodotic tense form (either future or 
imperative). Preliminary research suggests that it is used to variegate repetitious syntax, or to express certain phrases in a clearer 
colloquial manner.  
55 The third person imperative and the jussive will be used synonymously for the remainder of this thesis.  
56 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 109; Modrzejewski, “La Règle de Droit,” 131. 
57 Roger S. Bagnall, and Peter Derow, The Hellenistic Period Historical Sources in Translation (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 2008), 206. 
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verb form.58 This suggests that the future tense in an apodosis was a characteristic of royal 
decrees and not of city laws. This conclusion must remain tentative, because while we have 
many royal decrees in the papyri, “the civic laws and institutions of Alexandria and the other 
Greek cities of Egypt, on the other hand, are poorly known.”59  
2.4.2. Law in Exodus as a Royal Decree 
 The reason for the preceding discussion is that Greek Exodus employs the future tense 
almost exclusively in its legal materials. This is, no doubt, due to the fact that this legislation is a 
translation of the Hebrew source text in which the verbal counterpart is typically in the imperfect 
or prefixed conjugation.60 At the same time, however, it is fascinating that Greek Exodus 
articulates a royal law from Israel’s ‘King’ and refers to the constituent directives as 
προστάγματα: Ex. 18.16 translates ויתרות־תאו םיהלאה יקח תא as τὰ προστάγματα τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τὸν 
νόμον αὐτοῦ. Note that the second noun is singular in the Greek, which could imply that τὰ 
προστάγματα are what comprise the totality of τὸν νόμον (cf. 18.20; 20.6).61 However, in a 
parallel phrase in v. 20 SamP reads the singular הרותה, which suggests that Ex could have had a 
Vorlage in v. 16 with the singular.62  
Ex also departs from the typical translation of וצמת  in the Ten Words (20.6) and renders it 
as τὰ προστάγματά instead of ἐντολαί.63 Sheldon Blank suggests that there must be some 
explanation for this.64 Perhaps Ex uses προστάγματα because that term was most closely 
                                                          
58 The imperative is not used in these apodoses. From the research done in this study, it has been noted that the 
imperative is almost never used in the apodosis of casuistic items.  
59 Ibid., 206. 
60 Biblical Hebrew legislation does not have complex conditionals based on genre like Hellenistic Greek law. The 
imperfect and the weqatal forms comprise most apodoses.  
61 Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 42, note that πρόσταγμα is a more specific legal term compared to νόμος. 
62 Additionally, Ex includes τὰ προστάγματα τοῦ θεοῦ in v. 20 which reflects a harmonization with v. 16. It is uncertain 
if this harmonization occured at the Hebrew or Greek level.  
63 Τhere was, however, a close association with these terms at the time. See Bechtel et al, Dikaiomata, 43-44 and P. 
Tebt. 6. 10, and the references in ibid., 44. Cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 15. 
64 Sheldon H. Blank, “The LXX renderings of Old Testament Terms for Law,” Hebrew Union College Annual 7 
(1930): 259-283, here 262. 
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associated with the general content of the Exodus legal materials and it was considered to 
provide the appropriate legal framework within which these laws were to be understood. As 
noted above, the legal genre of Ptolemaic royal decree was new and would so be ubiquitously 
recognized as the Ptolemies established their law in the land.  
Further pursuit of this line of inquiry is a project in and of itself. It is mentioned here 
because it might point to the form of law that the Septuagint Covenant Code could most 
resemble in the Ptolemaic Greek context. Furthermore, if the style of laws in Greek Exodus can 
be considered to be at least analogous in part to Ptolemaic royal decrees, then there may finally 
be an explanation for the heretofore unexplained apodotic jussives that appear a few times in the 
text. The presence of these jussives may indicate the positioning of these laws within the realm 
of civic jurisprudence, rather than within that of royal decree. For more on this see 3.5.2. below 
and the discussion regarding the formula θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. In addition, the term δικαιώμα, 
which can denote “decree,” is also common to both Ptolemaic legal and Greek Exodus 
nomenclature.65 This connection is discussed at length in 3.2. below.  
Chapter 3: Commentary on Exodus 21.1-32 
3.1. Introduction 
 In a project with as much material to work through as this, one must be selective in 
regard to what parts of the text will be discussed. While there are many translation-technical 
aspects of this text that would be worth investigating, this study will focus only on those that 
have the potential to bring to light Ptolemaic legal influence that may have affected the text-
linguistic make-up of the translation. Both linguistic and semantic interference will be noted.  
 
 
 
                                                          
65 This lexeme is found in Exodus 15.25-26; 21.1, 9, 31; 24.3. It is discussed in the following chapter.  
19 
 
3.2. Verse 1: Heading 
 
Καὶ ταῦτα τὰ δικαιώματα, ἃ παραθήσεις ἐνώπιον αὐτῶν. 
םהינפל םישת רשא םיטפשמה הלאו 
 
τὰ δικαιώματα. The underlying Hebrew term טפשמ is rendered variously in Ex.66 Because of this 
semantic differentiation, the reader of Ex will not know what Hebrew word was in the source 
text. In general, טפשמ can denote anything from “judgement” to “custom” to “right.”67 The plural 
םיטפשמ in this casuistic/legal setting can be taken to mean “court decisions” or “legal 
precedents.”68 Some opt for a more general translation like “guiding decisions.”69 Ex’s rendering 
as δικαιώματα fits the general idea of “legal precedents,” but further discussion is required.  
The term δικαιώματα is the counterpart to קח in the singular in 15.25 and the same term 
in the plural in the following verse (15.26).70 In 15.25, the counterpart to the singular term טפשמ 
is also plural in the Greek (κρίσεις). This pluralization may reflect a desire for conformity with 
the plural terms in the next verse (ויתוצמ and ויקח in v. 26). These occur in a non-legal context, 
and δικαιώματα here seems to mean something like “decrees” based on the situation in which 
God issues regulations either for the consumption of water discussed just previously (15.24-25) 
or for the gathering and consumption of “bread from heaven” in the wilderness described in the 
following chapter. Emanuel Tov includes this denotation in a helpful list of the meanings 
suggested for δικαίωμα in the LXX:71 
1) Legal right, justification (2 Sam. 19.29); legal case, cause (2 Chr. 6.35; Jer. 18.19) 
                                                          
66 κρίσις 15.25; 28.15, 29, 30(2x); δικαίωμα 21.1; 21.9. 21.31. 24.3; κρίμα 23.6; τὸ εἶδος 26.30 
67 Francis Brown, Samuel Rolles Driver, and Charles Augustus Briggs, Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs Hebrew and 
English Lexicon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 1047; cf. Durham, Exodus, 311; J. van der Ploeg, “Šapat et Mišpāt,” 
Oudtestamentische Studiën 2 (1943), 144-155, here 151-155. 
68 William Henry Covici Propp, Exodus 19-40 (New York: Doubleday, 2006), 185. 
69 Durham, Exodus, 311.  
70 It is not at all clear why Ex chose to render this singular verb plural. Blank, “The LXX,” here 270, claims it is 
“clearly” due to the nouns being collective. That is not entirely discernable in Ex 15, especially since טפשמ is pluralized and is not 
a collective in this instance. 
71 Taken from Emanuel Tov, “Greek Words and Hebrew Meanings,” in The Greek and Hebrew Bible: Collected Essays 
on the Septuagint (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 109-128, here 114-115. When Tov writes “= טפשמ,” he means to indicate that these 
examples represent the Hebrew meaning and not a meaning in line with any normal definition of δικαίωμα. 
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2) Justice (1 Kgs. 3.28; Prov. 8.20) 
3)  plural: righteous deeds (Bar. 2.19) 
The following meanings, Tov claims, are attested in the LXX only 
4) Decree, ordinance, regulation (Gen. 26.5; Ex. 15.25), from God (Lev. 25.18; 
Num. 36.13) 
5) = טפשמ custom, manner (1 Sam. 27.11; possibly Ex. 21.9; 21.31) 
6) = טפשמ (rightful) due (1 Sam. 2.13) 
 
Tov claims that category 4) is a component of meaning that is attested only in the LXX,72 though 
it does seem to be found once in a text by Aristotle (4th BCE) who refers to the 
“decrees/regulations of the Hellenistic cities” (δικαιώματα Ἑλληνίδων πόλεων).73 Should 21.1, 
likewise, be translated as “decree,” or “regulation,” or is there evidence suggesting otherwise? 
The evidence in the papyri suggests that the definitions in that categories 1 and 4 are far more 
closely related than Tov admits. In fact, they provide an indication that δικαιώματα fits as a 
translation both here and in 21.1ff.74  
 Before turning to the papyri, the first observation to make is that Ex is drawing on legal 
terminology that is specific to the Ptolemaic period. The term δικαιώμα, according to Peter 
Fraser, was not used in Attic legal documents, and he suggests that it therefore became a legal 
term sometime in the third century.75 Henry Swete goes so far as to claim that the term is 
specifically Egyptian and Alexandrian.76 This means that when δικαίωμα is used in a legal 
context in Ex, it suggests a narrower definition in accordance with Ptolemaic jurisprudence. Note 
the following usages of the term: 
 
 
                                                          
72 Though he admits that the absence of other evidence “may be coincidental”; ibid., 112. 
73 Fragmenta varia 8, 46, fr. n. 4. The context strongly suggests this meaning, since the phrase refers to Alexander’s 
orders for these specific ships to move out to a particular location. However, LSJ, δικαίωμα, b., gloss this instance as 
“justification, plea of right.’ 
74 Like Tov, Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 43, comment that the Greek meaning of δικαίωμα nearly does not fit 
its use in Exodus. 
75 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 201. 
76 Swete, An Introduction, 292. 
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1 P. Hal. 1.38 (259BCE Alexandrian set of laws) 
τὰ δὲ δικαιώ[μα]τα της δίκης ἐφʼ ἧς ἄν τις μαρτυρίας ἐπιλάβη[τα]ι  
The justifications77 of the legal trial on the basis of which someone might receive 
testimony/legal recourse 
 
2 P.Lille 1 29, 1. 25 (3rd BCE) 
ἐὰ[[ν]] μὴ ἐκ τῶν τεθέντων δικαιωμάτων δύνωνται κρίνειν. 
If they are not able to decide based on the previously produced justifications. 
 
3 UPZ 1 162, 5. 24-25 (2nd BCE) 
τὰ τοῦ ἀντιδίκου δικαιώματα 
The justifications of the [legal] opposition 
 
These examples suffice to associate the term δικαίωμα with the legal grounds on which a case 
could be made within the courtroom. This is Tov’s definition 1 above. Yet there is more to be 
considered. 
4 P.Gurob 2. 40-41 (226 BC) 
τὸ διάγραμμα ὃ κ[αὶ παρέδοτο ἐν] τοῖς δικαιώμ[ασιν]...συνσ[τ]ῆσαι καὶ δικάζει[ν 
The royal decree which [the defendant]78 embodied79 in justifications…to establish 
[justice] and to arbitrate  
 
What is essential to grasp here is that the decree is expressed in δικαιώματα.80 The only 
difference between a royal decree and its rearrangement for use in the courtroom was the 
syntactical form in which a lawyer would present the content of the royal decree in. The content 
of the royal decree remained the same, but the lawyer could draw out the implications of the 
decree in places where its jurisdiction was not obvious. This is widely acknowledged among the 
scholars in the field of Graeco-Egyptian legal studies.81 The reason royal decrees were 
                                                          
77 This translation will be used for now. Another recommendation can be found below.  
78 Cf. Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 198. 
79 see LSJ, παραδίδωμι, I.4. Perhaps “transmitted” would also fit the translation here.  
80 Another example is UPZ 1 162 (2nd BCE) col. 3, line 33: included in this compiling of δικαιώματα is the ἀναφορὰν 
τοῦ βασιλικοῦ γραμματέως (“legal recourse of the royal decree”). Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 43, note the close 
association between the royal decree and δικαιώματα. 
81 Cf., e.g., Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 198-200 for instances of royal laws rearranged into city legislation; see P. Tebt. 5 
and Friedrich Bechtel et al, Dikaiomata: 44, as well as, 84, lines 124-165 in tandem with Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 200, for 
examples of rewritten πρόσταγμα; for all allusions to decrees in the laws see Józef Modrzejewski, “The πρόσταγμα in the 
Papyri,” Journal of Juristic Papyri 5 (1951): 187-206, here 190-196. Hélène Cadell, “Vocabulaire de la Législation ptolémaïque: 
Problème du sens de dikaiôma dans le Pentateuque,” in Κατὰ τοῦς ὁ: Selon les Septante; Trent études sur la Bible grecque des 
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rearranged like this was because the king’s word was binding.82 In other words, if the king made 
a statement, that statement was legally authoritative, and thus, as is, could serve in legal 
matters.83 This is why letters of the king are found in the collection of legal materials of 
Alexandrian lawyers.84 In Ptolemaic law “δικαιώματα” in court were largely made up of these 
statements/decrees of various types and forms.85 The former (“δικαιώματα”) were just barely 
‘down stream’ from the latter (“πρόσταγμα/διάγραμμα”). This could suggest of why Ex so easily 
uses δικαιώματα in both 15.25-26, as well as 21.1ff. It is hard to find an appropriate translation 
for the term given this connection. Perhaps a translation for δικαίωμα could be, “[legally] 
binding86 statement” or “[legally] binding action,” depending on the context, so that the term can 
fit both the contexts of a royal dictate as well as that word being turned into a law in court. 
Overall, the main idea being conveyed in the term is that it refers to a specific demand placed 
upon a person or group—a demand which may not have been precisely clear in certain forms or 
statements of the royal πρόσταγμα or διάγραμμα.  
21.1 contains an added element that situates its use of δικαιώματα within an even more 
clear Ptolemaic legal setting. This can be seen in Ex’s translation choice of the verb παρατίθημι. 
 
ἃ παραθήσεις. םיש is translated by thirteen different Greek words in this book based on fifty 
Hebrew occurrences. Certain contexts led the translator to choose one lexeme or another.87 Two 
                                                          
Septante; en hommage à Marguerite Harl (ed. Gilles Dorival and Olivier Munnich; Paris: Cerf, 1995), 207-221, argues that 
δικαίωμα always represents a document presented by humans for justification in court, and that it does not ever mean “decree” in 
the papyri. The sense of “decree” is, to her, out of line with the documentary evidence.  
82 Cf. Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 5-6. 
83 Taubenschlag states that, “[the word of the king in] the III cent. B.C., had juristic force and the reopening of the case 
was forbidden under the threat of penalty” (Law of Greco-Roman, 522-523). 
84 E.g., P. Hal. 16, 17, and particularly 18v (3rd BCE). Cf. Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 109 and Bechtel et al, Dikaiomata, 
25-31 for Halensis being a lawyer’s collection.  
85 See footnote 25. 
 86 I use “binding” in the sense of “the right thing that should be done,” i.e., the “righteous” part of δικαί-ωμα. 
87 For example, ἐπιτίθημι is used in contexts with לע: 3.22, 22.24; 28.37(33); 29.6, 24; 39.18(36.26); 40.5, 18, 19, 21 
(except 40.5, 18); ποιέω when referring to acts of creation: 4.11; 10.2; 14.21; 40.3(38.27); καθίστημι for formal appoints to a 
role: 2.14; 5.14; 18.21 (overrides לע creating ἐπιτίθημι [5.14; 18.21]); δίδωμι for divine acts: 4.11, 15, 21; 8.19; 9.5; 17.14; 21.13. 
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contexts led to the use of παρατίθημι (19.7; 21.1). Both contexts refer to the setting forth of 
God’s commands in a legally binding setting, in which the Israelites can use the items “set before 
them” to determine their culpability or innocence. It is likely that the main reason Ex’s 
translation includes the παρα- prefix is because of the Hebrew םהינפל following םיש. Ex regularly 
prefixes a verb in order to represent a Hebrew preposition, while additionally translating the 
preposition.88 In 19.7, the Hebrew semi-preposition ינפל is not represented, which suggests the 
semi-preposition’s ‘fusion’ into παρατίθημι.89 The Hebrew ינפל is represented by ἐνώπιον in 
21.1. It may be that ἐνώπιον is used in 21.1 to heighten the formal legal connotations,90 whereas 
19.7, being historical narrative, places less of an immediate demand on the reader.91 The specific 
choice of παρατίθημι is still worth exploring. Ex could have used προτίθημι,92 or really a host of 
other choices, seeing that Ex does not care to maintain the same root word throughout.93 In light 
of this, it is interesting that παρατίθημι is found in conjunction with δικαιώματα and other 
courtroom terms in the papyri. In the following examples, the relevant verbs are either 
παρατίθημι or παράκειμαι, which can serve as the passive of παρατίθημι in Attic Greek: 94 
5 UPZ 1 162, 3. 20-21 (2nd BCE) 
παρέκειντο δικαιωμάτων ὧν ἑκάτερος ᾑ̣ρεῖτο95 
Justifications were set before them by which each was seeking to gain a conviction 
 
 
 
                                                          
 88 e.g., with םיש 3.22; 15.26; 17.12; 28.37(33); 29.6, 24; 39.19(36.27). 
89 This instance is representative of a greater leniency towards Greek diction (cf. Anneli Aejemeleaus, “What Can We 
Know About the Hebrew Vorlage of the Septuagint” in On the Trail of the Septuagint Translators: Collected Essays [Rev. ed. 
CBET 50; Leuven: Peeters, 2007], 71-106, here 90-91. 
90 See commentary on ἐνώπιον below for this possible function. 
91 Another possibility is that παρατίθημι means “explain” in 19.7 with the dative indirect object (see LSJ, A.4), but the 
covenantal context in 21.1 warranted ἐνώπιον in order to convey the idea of “set before (for continued consideration).” This 
explanation is also supported by the genre of each text, the former being historical narrative and the latter being legislation that 
would have been continually binding on the people.  
92 Cf. LSJ, προτίθημι, I.3a, c, for legal usage. Both terms have many different possible meanings, so it is not as though 
one would have been less vague. See also UPZ 1 119.16 (159 BCE) for its use with a contract (ἀναγραφή).  
 93 Note ἐφίστημι (1.11); ἐμβάλλω (2.3); τάσσω (8.8); προσέχω (9.21); ἐγχέω (24.6); περιτίθημι (40.8). 
94 LSJ, παρατίθημι, A.a, notes that παράκειμαι “generally serves as the passive” in Attic Greek.  
95 Cf. line 23 for a repetition of these items. 
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6 P. Sorb. 3 72. 12-13 (266 BCE) 
 τὴν συγγραφὴν τῆς μ[ισθώσεως τὴν παρα]κειμένην 
 The contract of reward set before 
 
7 UPZ 1 162, 5. 21-22 (2nd BCE) 
παρέθετο96…μέρη…προσταγμάτων 
He cited as evidence…part…of the ordinance 
 
8 UPZ 1 162, 7. 3-4 (2nd BCE) 
οὓς παρέκειτ[ο] νόμους 
Which laws were set before 
 
The strong intimation is that the combination of δικαίωμα and παρατίθημι was intentionally 
drawn from the legal idiolect of the day, which the translator knew his audience would discern 
and understand as reflecting a legal register, particularly with respect to the courtroom. Perhaps 
this is a small sign towards the intention Ex has for the coming legislation. It also may suggest 
that the translator is more inclined towards Greek idiom than formulaic and morphological 
representation of the Hebrew text.  
 
ἐνώπιον. It is uncertain whether it is significant that this semi-preposition is used only to refer to 
something being “in the sight of” Israel, or more frequently, of God.97 It translates a variety of 
Hebrew prepositions/semi-prepositions, so the decision to use it here is voluntary.98 Perhaps the 
idea of being “in the sight of” someone suggests not only the location of a person or thing, but 
the active participation of the one “looking.” This fits all the contexts in which the word is 
used.99 If so, it points to the Israelites’ need to actively consider the legislation. It could also 
more simply suggest a physical presence of this law with them.  
                                                          
96 Perhaps “cited as evidence” is more in line with the meaning of this attestation, given it is in the middle voice. See 
LSJ, παρατίθημι, B.5.  
97 It occurs 13x. It refers to Israel in 14.2, 21.1; 34.10 (14.2 uses the plural instead of the singular for the suffix on וחכנ. 
The suggestion is that the Israelites, rather than the city of Baal-zephon, is in view. Moreover, there are a host of locational semi-
prepositions used in this verse [ἀπέναντι, ἐναντίας] and Ex may have simply run out of options and had to use ἐνώπιον); to God 
in 3.6; 22.8, 9; 23.15, 17; 32.33; 33.17; 34.9, 20, 23.  
98 Likewise, ינפל is generally rendered by ἐναντίον and ἔναντι, so the Hebrew is not the main reason for the translation.  
99 Perhaps besides 14.2. See footnote above.  
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The term ἐνώπιον has only four entries in TLG before it is found in the Septuagint 
Pentateuch.100 Three occurrences are from the sixth century BCE101 and one is from the third or 
fourth century BCE.102 The lack of other attestations and the time difference between most of 
these texts make it difficult to use them to inform our understanding of the use of ἐνώπιον in Ex. 
21.1. The papyri are more helpful in this regard. The term ἐνώπιον is used in the third century 
BCE papyri as such: twice in a legal context (P. Cair. Zen. 1 59073. 14 [257-256 BCE]; P. Hib. 1 
30. 26 [282-274 BCE]), once in a religious context (P. Genova 1 45. 5 [275-226 BCE]), and once 
in an everyday and unremarkable context (P. Mich. 1 69. 4 [241-240 BCE]). The legal papyri 
speak of persons coming “before” officials to give solemn witness (P. Cair. Zen.) and to appear 
in court (P. Hib.). Raija Sollamo, commenting on the entirety of the Ptolemaic papyri, notes the 
common “juridicial nature” of the uses and considers them to be “termini technici.”103 With little 
evidence from the third century it is uncertain whether ἐνώπιον was included in Ex to heighten 
the formal legal connotations, but its strong legal undertones leave open the possibility. If it was, 
perhaps it was chosen to point to these δικαιώματα being personal and legally binding104 or to 
highlight their presence in a courtroom setting (much like παρατίθημι).105 It is also interesting 
that Ex does not use this semi-preposition in the closely paralleled passage, 19.7. That passage is 
narrative, whereas 21.1 is part of a section of formal legal instruction. Perhaps the translator 
distinguished between these genres and here decided to include the term ἐνώπιον, which is 
frequently used in formal legal contexts.  
                                                          
100 Raija Sollamo, “Some ‘Improper’ Prepositions, Such as Enōpion, Enantion, Enanti, Etc., in the Septuagint and Early 
Koine Greek,” Vetus Testamentum 25, no. 4 (1975): 773-82, here 777, gives another example from Aeschines 3.43 based on an 
emandation of that text. This is not cited in TLG.  
101 Aesopus, Fabulae, fable 57.2.2; fable 57.2.12; and Proverbia, proverb 121.4.   
102 Theocritus 22.152, which uses ἐνώπιον as an adjective or an adverb (cf. Sollamo, “Some ‘Improper,’” 777).   
103 Ibid., 777. The frequency in which the semi-preposition is found in the papyri, he notes, is in part due to the often-
legal nature of the papyri, since contracts, agreements, and the like are what were written down.  
104 This is the first nuance of the term Sollamo (ibid.) finds.   
105 However, see footnote 91 for an alternative explanation. 
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3.3. Verses 2-6: Laws Concerning Slave Ownership 
 
3.3.1. Thematic Comment 
 
The presumed reason the Hebrew text opens with a slave law106 is to make a comparison 
with Israel’s servitude (7.16, 9.1, 13; cf. Dt. 15.12-18), which is the central narrative of the 
book.107 This intertextual connection is in part lost in Ex when the translator employs λατρεύω in 
some instances, whereas the Hebrew verb דבע is the underlying term in all of the passages.108 It is 
a slight difference, and it partially alters the grid through which a reader of the Greek text would 
perceive slavery throughout the book.109 
3.3.2. V. 2: On Obtaining a Slave 
ἐὰν κτήσῃ παῖδα Ἐβραῖον, ἓξ ἔτη δουλεύσει σοι· τῷ δὲ ἔτει τῷ ἑβδόμῳ ἀπελεύσεται ἐλεύθερος 
δωρεάν. 
םנח ישפחל אצי תעבשבו דבעי םינש שש ירבע דבע הנקת יכ 
 
ἐὰν. In biblical casuistic contexts יכ introduces a general topic and םא or וא which follow 
introduce a sub-topic related to the general topic.110 This distinction has been lost in Ex, who 
uses ἐάν for both יכ and םא. This is not necessarily due to Ex’s misunderstanding of this Hebrew 
sequence—the Greek language does not have two conditional particles which convey the same 
grammatical subordination as these do. The kind of grammatical subordination denoted in the 
                                                          
106 I speak with respect only to Exodus’ final editorial form.  
107 Cf. Propp, Exodus, 188. 
108 the λατρ- word group is a technical term for religious ceremonial duties as is attested widely in the Egyptian 
Ptolemaic papyri; see Adolf Deissmann and A. J. Grieve, Bible Studies: Contributions, Chiefly from Papyri and Inscriptions, to 
the History of the Language, the Literature, and the Religion of Hellenistic Judaism and Primitive Christianity (Eugene: Wipf & 
Stock, 2004), 140-141. 
109 Perhaps one such alteration would be that slavery under Egypt itself would not be disdained, but rather only slavery 
in which worship of Israel’s God was not permitted. This could speak to the Ptolemaic context the book finds itself in. Further 
discussion goes beyond the scope of this project.  
110 Shalom M. Paul, Studies in the Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law (Eugene: Wipf & 
Stock, 2006), 46; Tjen, On Conditionals, 13; A. Schoors, “The Particle kī,” in Oudtestamentische studien, P. A. H. de Boer 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1942), 240-276, here 270. John Zhu-En Wee, “Hebrew Syntax in the Organization of Laws and its Adaptation 
in the Septuagint” Biblica 85, no. 4 (2004): 523-544, here 529-530, more accurately defines this category by specifying that the 
subordination present is syntactic more than it is semantic. See Anneli Aejmelaeus, “Function and Interpretation of kî In Biblical 
Hebrew,” Journal of Biblical Literature 105 (1986): 193-209, for an overview. 
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Hebrew text could be achieved in the Greek language by employing the postpositive δέ, but Ex 
does not use this particle that way in this text.111 Instead, it seems to serve as a marker of the 
Hebrew ו in most cases. The absence of δέ in vv. 2, 8, 19, corresponds to the absence of ו in MT, 
which demonstrates the translator’s fidelity to the source text.112 In the phrase ἐάν δέ + 
subjunctive, δέ is also a colloquial means in Greek legal syntax for signaling that the following 
law is a continuation of the previous topic rather than a new topic. A new topic is begun without 
δέ (e.g., ἐάν + subjunctive).113 Ex does not follow this Ptolemaic pattern due to the desire to 
replicate ו,114 which Ex is prone to translate when present in the source text. The Hebrew text’s 
subordinating elements denoted by יכ and םא are therefore lost in the translation of Exodus 21. 
Finally, ἐάν is utilized instead of εἰ because it represents the idiomatic conditional particle in 
Greek case law.115     
 
κτήσῃ. The Hebrew verb הנק in this context either means to “juridically…acquire as one’s own 
property”116 or simply “to buy.”117 Paul comments that extrabiblical and contemporary 
documents do not indicate that a price is initially paid, which could suggest the former meaning 
to be more accurate.118 Whether or not Ex understood this nuance is inconsequential because the 
rendering is generic and stereotypical: κτάομαι basically means “to acquire” and is the only 
rendering of this Hebrew verb in the Septuagint Pentateuch. For this last reason Ex probably did 
not have in mind other means of attaining slaves which could occur in the ancient world.119 
 
                                                          
111 For this use of δέ in casuistic laws see the resources in footnote 349.  
112 Cf. Wevers, Text History, 168. 
113 See commentary on ἐάν in v. 8.  
114 See previous footnote.  
115 Examples of this are seen throughout this thesis’ citations of compositional laws.  
116 Paul, Studies in the Book, 46.  
117 Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 889, gives this definition for 21.2. 
118 Paul, Studies in the Book, 46. 
119 E.g., 22.2(3) (for theft) or Lev. 25.39 (for debt). 
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παῖδα. The word דבע (translated with παῖς here) in its basic Hebrew sense means “one who is in a 
subservient relationship to another.”120 It is used in a host of contexts and refers to various 
subservient relationships. In 21.2 it designates the status of a slave. In the slave laws of Hebrew 
Exodus, slavery is not portrayed as an inherently negative position, but rather “a mechanism for 
offering support and protection to the weak and disadvantaged.”121 It was a role that was 
“basically contractual.”122 This is not the case when it comes to slavery in the Ptolemaic epoch. It 
is for this reason that Wright comments, “those people who were enslaved in ancient Israel had a 
social and legal status different from that of the chattel slaves who made up the system practiced 
later in Hellenistic-Roman times.”123 The distance between these contexts and their forms of 
servitude is vast. This is a fact that, this study argues, is embedded in the text of Septuagint 
Exodus.124 In the laws of Greek Exodus 21, more than anywhere else, there are strong indications 
that “the Hellenistic Jewish translators and authors, when they used [slavery terms], invested 
them with the social and cultural meanings of the Hellenistic Mediterranean, not those of ancient 
Israel.”125 So how can this be demonstrated? 
 The proof of this assertion comes primarily by means of an assessment of the various 
lexemes employed by Ex when translating דבע and המא. The former is translated when referring 
to human servants with παῖς,126 οἰκετής,127 θεράπων,128 and potentially once by δοῦλη;129 the 
                                                          
120 Benjamin G. Wright, “Δοῦλος and Παῖς as Translations of דבע: Lexical Equivalences and Conceptual 
Transformations” in IX Congress of the International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies, 45, (ed. Bernard Alwyn 
Taylor; Cambridge, 1995), 263-277, here 264. 
121 Diana Lipton, Longing for Egypt and Other Unexpected Biblical Tales (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2008), 
41. Slavery is, of course, negatively portrayed in the narrative when referring to Egypt’s subjugation of Israel.  
122 Peter D. A. Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 
27. 
123 Wright, “Δοῦλος and Παῖς,” 266. 
124 And can also be seen, to a degree, in books like Greek Leviticus.  
125 Wright, “Δοῦλος and Παῖς,” 263.  
126 5.16; 11.8; 20.10, 17; 21.2, 5, 20, 32. 
127 5.15, 16; 12.44; 21.26, 27; 32.13. 
128 4.10; 5.21; 7.10, 20, 28, 29; 8.5, 7, 17, 20, 25, 27; 9.14, 20, 30, 34; 10.1, 6, 7; 11.3; 12.30; 14.5, 31 
129 Depending on the Hebrew Vorlage. See notes on 21.7. 
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latter is translated with παιδίσκη,130 θεράπαινα,131 οἰκέτις,132 and potentially once by δοῦλη.133 
Whether these terms are interchangeable or have their own nuances will change the way in 
which the legal materials should be interpreted. The following argumentation will begin with 
information from within the Septuagint Pentateuch and then proceed to the explain the data in 
the documentary and literary sources.  
θεράπων can be dismissed from the discussion because it is not used in the laws. 
However, it is interesting to note that the term related to θεράπων, θεραπεία, was a specific term 
for the royal household guard in Alexandria.134 This could be why this term is used for Pharaoh’s 
royal servants and especially when translating דבע in relation to Moses (4.10) and Joshua (33.11). 
The use of θεράπων also suggests Ex’s desire to classify certain servant positions despite the 
same Hebrew word underlying the terms (דבע).  
The lexeme, παῖς, refers to Israel/Israelites only outside of slave laws in 5.16.135 How is it 
defined? With respect to this text, Wright argues that the repetition of the terms οἰκετής and παῖς 
in the same verse and context suggests synonymy.136 However, there may be a contrast created 
by the translator that does not exist in the Hebrew, since only דבע is used in the original. When 
the Israelites describe their own service to Pharaoh, they refer to themselves as οἰκέται (vv. 15-
16). They have done all the work given to them and because of this they should be valued highly. 
Despite this, Ex then contrasts Pharaoh’s harsh treatment of them by saying, “ἰδοὺ οἱ παῖδές σου 
                                                          
130 20.10, 17; 21. 20, 32. Except 23.12 where no corresponding Hebrew male servant word is used. 
131 21.26, 27. 
132 21.7. In 2.5 Ex uses the translation ἅβρα (favorite slave; see ἅβρα, in Johan Lust, Erik Eynikel, and Katrin Hauspie, 
A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint: Revised Edition [Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft: Stuttgart, 2003]), which is itself 
demonstrative of the fact that Ex is quite capable of drawing on language that distinguished between slaves. This instance is not 
pertinent to the definition of the above terms.  
133 Depending on the Hebrew Vorlage. See notes on 21.7. 
134 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 102; cf. Polybius 4.87.5; 15.25.17 (2nd BCE); Diodorus, 31.17c (1st BCE). 
135 It refers to the Egyptians in 11.8, but it is hard to tell if it is pejorative or just a normal term there. It is 
inconsequential to this argument. 
136 “Δοῦλος and Παῖς,” 268. 
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μεμαστίγωνται ” (“behold, your slaves are scourged”). The Hebrew for both slave terms is דבע. 
The contrast, if present, is artificial in that it does not occur in the Hebrew, yet it would be 
readily perceived by the Greek reader. It is also plausible that οἰκετής and παῖς have different 
referents here. In v. 14 it is οἱ γραμματεῖς who “are scourged” (ἐμαστιγώθησαν). In contrast to 
this, the whole of Israel are referred to as οἰκέται (vv. 15-16). Thus, the γραμματεῖς who were 
beaten are only given the designation παῖς, which could again signify the lower or more 
demeaning status of the term. However, more evidence needs to be provided before that 
distinction can be confirmed. It will be demonstrated in the argumentation that follows. 
Another text, though outside of Exodus, seems to indicate an elevation of οἰκέτης above 
παῖς. Lev. 25.39-43 use οἰκέτης with reference to the potential enslavement of Israelites (which 
was not permitted), and also designates them as God’s οἰκέται (v. 42). In contrast, παῖς/παιδίσκη 
and δοῦλος/δούλη are used when referring to the enslavement of foreigners (v. 44). Moreover, 
these latter terms are used side by side with the same referent and no contextual element 
nuancing the words chosen. This suggests that παῖς/παιδίσκη and δοῦλος/δούλη are synonymous 
in that context.137 Consequently, though not conclusively, this text of Leviticus also suggests 
οἰκέτης to be the more favorable term. Ex likewise uses τῶν σῶν138 οἰκετῶν in a panegyric and 
appraisal of the patriarchs (32.13).  
These elements outside of the Covenant Code suggest a distinction should be made. 
Within the laws,139 particularly chapter 21, there is also one interesting pattern: παῖς/παιδίσκη are 
                                                          
137 Wright, “Δοῦλος and Παῖς, 267-268. 
138 Note the uncommon emphatic personal pronoun.  
139 12.44 is another law about the Passover which uses οἰκέτης. Its statement οἰκέτην τινὸς ἢ ἀργυρώνητον, “house-
servant or one purchased by silver” creates a dichotomy. If οἰκέτης refers to a slave, then they more than likely were purchased 
by silver (though others means of slave acquisition existed like concubinage, capture in war, and indebtedness). The “or” is not 
suitable. In fact, ἢ is a plus added by Ex. This means that the dichotomy was created on purpose by Ex. In larger Greek parlance, 
the terms παῖς, παιδίσκη, οἰκέτης, etc., only refer to slaves when the context requires it. The creation of the second category here 
would suggest to the Greek reader that this οἰκέτης was not a purchased slave. If this is not the answer, then it is also possible that 
παῖς was within the category of ἀργυρώνητον, anyways.  
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employed in 21.20-21, 32 in laws which cover subjects generally about slaves, whereas in texts 
that offer unparalleled advantages—particularly with respect to slavery in the Hellenistic 
period—οἰκέτης/θεράπαινα (vv. 26-27) and οἰκέτις (v. 7) are used. In short, a greater possibility 
of manumission and dignified rights are given to the latter group, whereas the former word group 
is used in laws where slaves are valued less, particularly through bodily harm. While a 
discussion of the potential Hellenistic influences on those verses must be saved for the 
commentary on each of them, the meaning of παῖς here in v. 2 should be considered further.  
If παῖς/παιδίσκη connote something different than οἰκέτης/θεράπαινα/οἰκέτις, what would 
it be? A nominal form of δουλ- is only used in 21.7, so there is no connection like that found in 
Lev. 25 to help here.140 The absence of δοῦλος is odd, since it is the most generic term for a slave 
in Ptolemaic Egypt.141 Wright suggests that it could have been heard as derogatory, or that the 
term was unsuitable for slaves who primarily worked in the house.142 This usage will be 
discussed in the commentary on 21.7.  
One possibility is that παῖς/παιδίσκη refer to agricultural slaves. There was a real 
distinction that existed in Ptolemaic Egypt, particularly Alexandria, with respect to household 
and agricultural slaves. Agricultural slaves were “not numerous” and “quite untypical” in 
Egypt.143 Field work was generally reserved for the free natives. Alexandria seems to have 
predominantly held household slaves,144 and slaves of the domestic variety were more common 
in Greek homes as well.145  
                                                          
140 See commentary on v. 7 for this word’s use.  
141 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 67. 
142 Wright, “Δοῦλος and Παῖς,” 270.  
143 Westermann, Upon Slavery, 56-57. 
144 Ibid., 57. 
145 Ibid., 54, 59. 
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The conclusion that παῖς/παιδίσκη refer to agricultural slaves does not hold up, however. 
The papyri unequivocally show that παῖς/παιδίσκη could be engaged in the same tasks as 
οἰκέτης/ οἰκέτις. Note the following: 
παῖδες are documented, for example, as 
1 delivering letters,146 clothes,147 working with stoves148 
❖ an οἰκέτης likewise delivers similar items149 
παιδίσκαι, similarly, 
 
2 work in their owner’s trade,150 and could also be house-oriented prostitute-slaves.151 
Tcherikover comments that a παιδίσκη was a “young serving maid” who could serve in anything 
from temple prostitution to household service.152 These tasks fall into the category of house-
bound qualities, not fieldwork/labor.153 Additionally, the Zenon Papyri use παιδίσκη as the most 
common term for generic slaves, not just agricultural.154 All of this evidence suggests that 
παῖς/παιδίσκη should be understood as a generic moniker for “slave.” 
 However, more can be learned from the evidence. While παῖς/παιδίσκη are used 
generically in some contexts, there is also a notable effort to distinguish between types of slaves, 
as the following examples show:  
3 σῶμα is a generic word for “slave” and is often qualified with either δουλικόν or 
οἰκετικόν,155 though those qualifiers are not always present.156 
                                                          
146 P. Cair. Zen. 2 59267. 1-2 (252 BCE); P. Cair. Zen. 3 59396, 2 (256-248 BCE). 
147 P. Cair. Zen. 2 59148. 4 (256 BCE). 
148 P. Cair. Zen. 2 59213. 3 (254-253 BCE). 
149 P. Cair. Zen. 3 59332. 6-7 (248 BCE). 
150 PSI 7 854.3, (258-257 BCE); SB 6709; P. Cair. Zen. 2 59142 (256 BCE); P. Cair. Zen. 2 59145 (256 BCE). This last 
papyrus speaks of a slave girl who may have been engaged in wool-spinning for many years; see, Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 121. 
151 Cf. Ibid. 
152 Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization, 69. 
153 Cf. Westermann, Upon Slavery, 56-57. 
154 It is noteworthy that the most common term for slaves is παιδίσκη in the Zenon Papyri (Victor Tcherikover, 
“Palestine Under the Ptolemies: A Contrbution to the Zenon Papyri,” Mizraim 4-5 [New York: G.E. Stechert & Co., 1937]: 9-90, 
here 17). 
155 SB 3 6797. 9, 11 (254 BCE); SB 5 8008, 2. 46 (3rd BCE); P. Grenf. 1.21 (2nd BCE); P. Lond. 401 (2nd BCE); 
Taubenshlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 68. Another common term not discussed here is ἀνδράποδον. 
156 E.g., P. Grad. 1. 13 (269-268 BCE). 
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4 P. Lille 1 29. 2, 10-11 (3rd BCE) as compared to lines 21, 27-28, show that from line 19 
onward, and all through column 2, οἰκέτης and δοῦλος/δούλη are never interchanged or 
used in the same law.157 
 
This kind of distinguishing is seen in Palestine, too. For example, 
 
5  P. Edg. 84 frg. a (257 BCE) indicates that certain παιδάρια158 are specifically οἰκετικά,159 
which, to Tcherikover, potentially indicates that these house-slaves are of a higher status 
than menial-labor slaves.160 
 
Considering these examples, can any pattern be discerned? Yes. First, it appears 
παῖς/παιδίσκη is the more generic term, as this group’s tasks could also be those that the οἰκ- 
group perform. Second, the reverse does not seem to be true. An οἰκ- class slave was relegated 
only to household tasks. This is seen in the consistent distinguishing between δουλικόν or 
οἰκετικόν slave classes. There is a conscious effort in some cases to differentiate between 
household and either general or menial slavery.161 From this it is possible to conclude either, 
with Wright, that “παῖς may indicate a more general slavery and οἰκέτης may connote a more 
specific one regarding the duties of the slave,”162 or, that the two groups were sometimes 
regarded as different classes in and of themselves. This latter demarcation may be more 
accurately represented in legal spheres, since, as Wright also concedes, “the language of official 
and juridical documents…had to maintain certain distinctions for legal reasons.”163 
 Therefore, based on the evidence from within Ex and the Ptolemaic documentation, there 
is a strong indication that παῖς/παιδίσκη as compared to οἰκέτης/οἰκέτις do not represent mere 
                                                          
157 LSJ, however, disagrees with this assessment of P. Lille 29. See οἰκέτης. William Linn Westermann, “Enslaved 
Persons Who Are Free,” The American Journal of Philology 59, no. 1 (1938): 1-30, here, 5, is also hesitant to make sharp 
distinctions between the terms, though he is evaluating evidence from many centuries. 
158 These is a term for particularly young slaves, but the papyri do not necessarily distinguish in terms for age 
difference (see, e.g., the seven-year-old girl sold as a παιδίσκη in SB 6709, [259BCE]). 
159 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 127. 
160 Ibid. 
161 It is not certain all the tasks that δουλικόν entailed.  
162 “Δοῦλος and Παῖς,” 270. 
163 Ibid., 276. 
 
34 
 
synonyms.164 This is probably particularly true with respect to the terms within legislation. The 
term παῖς in v. 2 is most suitably understood as a generic term for “slave,” one who would be 
involved in both agricultural labor and potentially household duties.  
Further argumentation will be given for οἰκέτης/οἰκέτις/θεράπαινα in their respective 
verses. The evidence presented thus far suggests that these titles represented distinctive slavery 
classes, as shown in the previous argumentation. This is most clearly seen in the frequent 
appellations δουλικόν and οἰκετικόν.  
 
ἀπελεύσεται ἐλεύθερος. The Greek translates ישפחל אצי. The verbs אצי and אב “are legal terms for 
‘entering’ and ‘leaving’ (one’s authority), i.e., the slave status.”165 Ex has represented this 
understanding by not translating with the typical ἐξέρχομαι, but ἀπέρχομαι. Most of the time the 
latter term seems to be used in Greek Exodus when referring to permanent departures.166 This 
permenancy may simply be coincidental, as J. A. L. Lee has documented that ἀπέρχομαι simply 
means “depart” in the third century.167 The verb ἀπέρχομαι is not typically used for manumission 
in the Koine period.168 However, the noun ἀπελεύθερος, which is derived from ἀπέρχομαι, is 
used frequently for a manumitted slave.169 The verb ἀπέρχομαι is not frequently used for 
manumission because, according to Lee, ἀποτρέχω had largely replaced ἀπέρχομαι by this era.170 
The reason ἀπέρχομαι is used in 21.2 is because ἀποτρέχω replaces ἀπέρχομαι only in the 
                                                          
164 Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 216, also concludes that there is a higher status represented by the οἰκ- group.  
165 Paul, Studies in the Book, 47. 
166 3.21; 4.19, 26; 5.4; 8.25; 10.28; 18.27; possibly 19.13; 21.2, 7; 12.21 is uncertain textually; seemingly not in 12.28. 
167 J. A. L. Lee, A Lexical Study of the Septuagint Version of the Pentateuch (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), 125. 
168 Neither LSJ or Lust, Greek-English, 63, convey this notion.  
169 The ἀπελεύθεροι are a specific group of people, namely, emancipated slaves (see LSJ, ἀπελεύθερος; cf. 
Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 110). 
170 Lee, A Lexical Study, 127. Cf. LSJ, ἀποτρέχω, IV, for this verb’s use in manumission.  
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present and imperfect tenses.171 This fact also explains the use of ἀποτρέχω for אצי in vv. 5, 7, 
since the present tense is employed.172  
The phrase ישפחל is grammatically obscure.173 The lamed prefix could suggest that ישפח 
is an abstract noun (i.e., “freedom”), but the suffixed י implies an adjective or descriptive noun 
(i.e., “a free [man]”).174 If the definite article represented by the pataḥ in MT were emended to a 
shĕwa, this latter reading would fit well.175 But how does Ex understand it? 
Ex variously renders a Hebrew finite verb + ל. There are stock formations,176 though a 
few oddities exist.177 This construction has a few instances in which it is translated as a finite 
verb and accusative,178 but this is the only place it seems that a predicate adjective179 with a finite 
verb is used.180 Why did Ex not simply translate with εἰς ἐλυθερίαν or something like it?181 
The answer is actually very simple. The phrase εἰς ἐλευθερίαν, while generally referring 
to freedom from slavery in some literary contexts,182 could also signify a relatively greater 
degree of freedom that might, however, still involve slave status.183 For this reason an 
                                                          
171 Ibid. 
172 אצי is only represented by ἀποτρέχω here in Ex. See notes on vv. 5, 7. 
173 Cf. C. Houtman and Sierd Woudstra, Exodus, vol. 3 (Leuven: Peeters, 2000), 125, for discussion and further 
bibliography.  
174 Propp, Exodus, 189; cf. Paul, Studies in the Book, 47. 
175 Propp, Exodus, 117.  
176 ל can become a dative indirect object with speech verbs: 3.14, 18; 6.6; 9.27; 10.16; 12.31; 13.5, 8, 15; 14.5; 15.18; 
16.22; 19.3(2x); 33.2; or an IO with other verbs: 4.25; 5.3, 8, 16-17; 8.4, 8, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25; 10.25; 12.16; 15.16; 19.4; 21.18, 
32, 34; 22.11, 19; 23.24; 26.17; 29.28, 35; 32.13; 33.1; 34.14, 15; 39.27(36.35);  or a genitive IO 3.18, 8; 4.8(2x), 9;15.26 
(usually with “listen of his voice”); It fuses into the copula when the finite verb is היה: 4.3, 4; 7.9, 10, 12; 8.12; 9.9, 24; 13.16; 
21.4; 30.4; 34.12; it can also simply be a preposition following a verb: 4.25; 5.4; 7.15, 17; 10.16, 17; 13.16; 19.9; 21.13, 18; 
29.17; 32.13; or an article: 8.25.  
177 The idiomatic 4.9; 28.32(28). 
178 22.29, 23.11, 21; 34.9. 
179 Herbert Weir Smyth, and Gordon M. Messing, Greek Grammar (rev. ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1956), §1042, suggests that predicate adjectives (particularly those that describe time, place, order of succession, etc.), when they 
modify the subject, express a quality of the subject, rather than describing the way the action of the verb occurs. 
180 Along with the same phrase in 21.7. With היה it can become part of a predicate nominative (see n. 61 above).  
181 General parallels in which εἰς + noun are used: 7.15, 17; 18.7; 19.9. Note that 21.5, 26, 27 use a predicate adjective 
construction to render this Hebrew form, too.  
182 It is used this way throughout the works of Demosthenes.  
183 Cf. Aeschines, In Timarchum, 65.6 (4th BCE) and the comments of Charles Darwin Adams, Aeschines: Aeschines 
with an English Translation (London: Harvard University Press, 1919), online at http://www. perseus.tufts.edu. 
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isomorphic translation like this would not necessarily convey complete manumission. The phrase 
also does not occur in the legal documentary sources. Instead, Ex chooses a rendering that 
mimics the idiomatic phrasing for manumission found frequently in the legal papyri:184 
The shorthand means of speaking of emancipation is through basic predication. 
6 P. Petr.2 1 3. 21-22 (238-237 BCE) 
ἐὰν δέ τι πάσχω ἀνθρώπινον, καταλείπω Σεμέλην [ἐλευθέραν] 
❖ Notice the double accusative predication, which is the active counterpart to 
Ex’s medio-passive/nominative structure.185 
 
7 SB 14 11998. 4 (116-100 BCE) 
 ἀφῆκεν ἐλευθέρ[α]ν Διονύσ[ιον186 
 
8 GDI 2038.9 (Delphi, 186 BCE)187 
 ἀποτρεχέτω ἐλευθέρα Γνωσιφίλα 
 
9 SB 5 8008, 2. 11 (260 BCE)188 
ἐὰν τινὰ φάσκηι ἐλ[ε]ύθερα εἶναι, κυρίας εἶναι 
 
10 P. Tebt. 700, 2. 51 (124-123 BCE) 
ὁ δὲ δοῦλος ἐλεύθερος ἔσται  
 
11 P. Petr.2 1 3. 21-22 (238-237 BCE)189  
ἐά[[ν]] μοι παραμείνω[σ]ι̣ν ἕως ἂν ἐγὼ ζῶ…ἔστωσαν ἐλεύθεροι 
 
Whether through a predicate adjective (examples 6-8) or a basic copula (examples 9-11), the 
idiomatic means of denoting manumission is through basic predication in combination with the 
lexeme ἐλεύθερος. Westermann sums up the exactness of this rendering well: “So far as I know, 
ἐλεύθερος with respect to human beings, as opposed to inanimate possessions, is used only in its 
                                                          
184 Note that v. 5, translating the same phrase, also has no ל prefix and the translation remains the exact same. Clearly 
the Hebrew syntax was not the most constraining factor here. Lee also comments that the use of manumission idiom here “must 
be deliberate” and “strikingly illustrate[s] the translators’ adherence to contemporary terminology (A Lexical Study, 127).  
185 In Diogenes Laertius 5.15-16, recording Aristotle’s will from the fourth century BCE, emancipation is phrased as 
εἶναι Ἀμβρακίδα ἐλευθέραν… ἐλεύθερον εἶναι and ἐλευθέρους ἀφεῖναι. The last example is grammatically similar to Ex.  
186 It is possible that this noun is to be reconstructed in the nominative as the subject of the verb. The predicative value 
of ἐλευθέραν would be lost in this case. One argument for reading Διονύσιος would be that an accusative of object-complement 
generally has the complement following the object. Here it is preceding it. However, word order for this construction is not fixed 
(see Smyth, Grammar, §1613, 1615, for examples).  
187 This example is taken from Lee, A Lexical Study, 125.  
188 In Lenger, Corpus, 43. 
189 See also P. Hib. 29. 6 (265 BCE); P. Col. inv. 480 1. 23 (198-197 BCE). 
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absolute significance of ‘free in status,’ as opposed to servile in status.”190 This term, predicated 
of the slave, is the most effective way to speak definitively of the new free status of a slave. The 
phrase εἰς ἐλευθερίαν would not necessarily accomplish this. 
3.3.3. V. 3: On Slave Marriage191 
ἐὰν αὐτὸς μόνος εἰσέλθῃ, καὶ μόνος ἐξελεύσεται· ἐὰν δὲ γυνὴ συνεισέλθῃ μετʼ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ γυνὴ 
ἐξελεύσεται μετʼ αὐτοῦ. 
ומע ותשא האציו אוה השא לעב־םא אצי ופגב אבי ופגב־םא 
 
αὐτὸς μόνος. ופגב is rendered idiomatically (αὐτὸς μόνος). While the etymological derivation of 
ףג is difficult to determine “almost all of modern critical literature agree as to the verse’s 
intent…[ופגב] means ‘alone.’”192 Within the spectrum of potential derivatives for ףג, most 
commentators see the word as also implying a lack of possessions within this specific context.193 
This latter point can be explored further, since Ex uses an idiom that does not imply a lack of 
possessions, but looks solely to the fact that the slave came in without another person. This can 
be seen in the use of the idiom αὐτὸς μόνος. This idiom is used specifically in contexts in which 
a writer intends to contrast whether a person is alone or with a group of others. The expression is 
demonstrable through the centuries before the Septuagint Pentateuch. Note the following: 
1 Hecataeus, Fragmenta, 1a, 1, F, fr. 18b. 8 (6th-5th BCE) 
αὐτὸν μόνον φησιν  
He speaks alone194 
 
2 Hellanicus, Fragmenta, 1a, 4, F, fr. 100. 6 (5th BCE) 
πάντων σωθέντων αὐτὸς μόνος τὸν υἱὸν ἀπέβαλεν  
Out of all of the ones rescued, only the son departed195 
 
                                                          
190 Westermann, “Enslaved Persons,” 12. 
191 Whether this is a new topic or a continuation of the previous topic, from a Greek legal perspective, would depend on 
the use of δέ (see 3.3.2.). However, Ex represents ו with δέ rather than matching this Greek norm, thus preventing any attempts at 
understanding a topical segmentation employed by the translator.  
192 Propp, Exodus, 190; cf. Paul, Studies in the Book, 47. 
193 Cf. the options in Propp, Exodus, 190-191; Carmichael, Origens, 83. 
194 Translation by F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker (FGrH) #1 (Leiden: Brill, 1923-1958), online 
at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu. 
195 Ibid. 
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3 Aristophanes, Ranae, line 79 (5th-4th BCE) 
ἀπολαβὼν αὐτὸν μόνον, ἄνευ Σοφοκλέους  
Take [him] all by himself…without Sophocles196 
 
4 Lysias, In Philonem, 18.1 (5th-4th BCE) 
τοτὲ μὲν αὐτὸς μόνος, τοτὲ δ’ ἑτέροις ἡγούμενος 
Going sometimes alone and sometimes…with others197 
 
5 Cleanthes, Testimonia et fragmenta, fr. 463.31 (3rd BCE) 
λέγων αὐτὸς μόνος δύνασθαι βαστάζειν τὸ…φορτίον  
Claiming to be able to bear the…burden alone198 
 
6 Polybius, Historiae, 21.26.17.3 (3rd BCE) 
αὐτὸς μόνος ἀπελύθη χωρὶς λύτρων 
He was the only one (of them) that was set free without ransom199 
 
This idiom strictly refers to being alone and not with a group of people.200 Why is the possible 
muting of the Hebrew text’s emphasis on entering and leaving slavery without possessions 
significant? It may be important because slaves in Ptolemaic Egypt owned possessions in 
contrast to ancient Israelite practice. Ptolemaic slaves were permitted to own land201 and had the 
right to litigation in cases of personal injury and damage to property.202 Indeed, “Slaves engaged 
in legal transactions for themselves (loans, leases, παράνομος).”203 
It is not likely that the masculine pronoun on ופגב is represented by αὐτὸς. This is for 
three reasons:  
1) αὐτὸς is not repeated in the following phrase καὶ μόνος ἐξελεύσεται. 
2) Ex does not translate a suffixed ו approximately one third of the time,204 with little 
apparent rhyme or reason.  
                                                          
196 Translation by N. G. Wilson, Aristophanis Fabulae (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 135-204, online at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu. 
197 W. R. M. Lamb, Lysias: Lysias with an English Translation (London: Harvard University Press, 1930), online at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu. 
198 J. von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, vol. 1 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1905), 103-137, online at 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu. 
199 Evelyn S. Shuckburgh, Polybius: Histories (New York: Macmillan, 1889). 
200 When used of persons. It can be used abstractly as well: Isaeus, De Nicostrato, 13.4 (5th-4th BCE); Aeschines 178.4 
(4th BCE). 
201 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 87. 
202 Ibid., 95; P. Cair. Zen. 145 (246 BCE). 
203 See ibid., 89-90, for more references.  
204 331x according to Logos Bible Software. 
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3) The translation here is exchanging a Hebrew idiom for a Greek idiom, so rigid 
equivalencies are not used. Still, Ex does not frequently add an emphatic αὐτὸς 
without a free-standing אוה.205 
 
καὶ (1o). The term καί is a plus here. Is this καί apodotic, or is it functioning in a different way? 
Notably, a potential apodotic καί is not translated twenty-five out of twenty-nine times in Ex.206 
This trend represents the translator being in line with Koine Greek standards,207 and suggests Ex 
does not intend for this instance to be read that way. It is possible that Ex intends καί to be read 
adverbially here (e.g., “also”). This usage is found in Classical Greek, and Tjen suggests it is in 
play here in the Koine period as well.208 The following parallel clause καὶ ἡ γυνὴ ἐξελεύσεται 
μετʼ αὐτοῦ seems to use καί with this adverbial function as well.  
 
ἐὰν δὲ γυνὴ συνεισέλθῃ μετʼ αὐτοῦ. The continuation of the preceding clause’s subject matter 
suggests Ex is using δέ here in a generic way to indicate progression of the topic at hand. That 
Ex uses δέ in this basic sense is suggested by instances like v. 12, where δέ is used in a law 
introducing a brand-new subject. Ex can, therefore, use δέ for both major and minor 
progressions. 
 As a general rule, verbless nominal clauses in the Hebrew text are translated in Ex in the 
same way—verblessly.209 When a clause contains a free-standing pronoun that follows the 
                                                          
205 22.7; 23.9; 33.14-15. The first two examples are within the laws, and those from chapter 33 circumvent a physical 
description of the divine presence. It is thus a rare trait.  
206 Tjen, On Conditionals, 215. 
207 Ibid., 218; Aejmelaeus, “The Significance,” 368-369. 
208 Tjen, On Conditionals, 217; see J. D. Denniston, The Greek Particles (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 308-309 for 
examples. 
209 For third person examples: 1.9, 15(2x), 16; 3.13; 4.22; 9.27(2x), 31(2x) (participial predicate); 12.26, 27; 15.3; 
16.14; 17.12; 18.4(2x), 10, 18; 20.10; 26.2, 20-21, 32; 27.9, 13, 14(2x), 15(2x), 16(2x), 17(2x), 18(5x); 28. 16(2x), 18, 19, 20; 
30.2, 13; 31.15, 16-17; 33.13, 18(2x); 34. 14; 36.9(37.2); 38.18(37.16), 19(37.17[4x]), 25-26(39.2), 29(39.7); 39.9(36.13[2x]), 
10(36.17[2x]). Tjen, On Conditionals, 169, notes this pattern, too. There are, of course, exceptions: 5.2; 7.14; 21.28; 22.14; 
28.17; 30.2; 39.5(36.12). In the sections on building materials for the tabernacle, copula are almost never present. The context 
was straightforward enough to not need to supply it.  
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subject (e.g., אוה) generally a copula is included.210 This is the kind of clause in the Hebrew text 
of 21.3 (אוה השא לעב־םא). Nominal clauses can also be transformed into clauses with finite verbal 
predicates to replace Hebrew idiomatic constructions with Greek ones,211 or when a participle is 
present.212 These are general patterns, but there are no hard-and-fast rules. Ex is often more 
concerned with clarity than with rigid translation equivalencies. In 21.3 there is an outstanding 
example of Ex translating with freedom. Tjen makes a valuable comment about this kind of 
freedom, stating, “All the subjunctive equivalents of nominal clauses turned into verbal clauses 
occur within the legal-instructional material. Most of them are apparently attempts at more 
natural rendering of Hebrew expressions.”213 In the whole of Ex these are found in 21.3, 8, and 
14. Are these freer renderings in the legal materials indicative of a freer translation technique for 
these sections? No. Aejmelaeus has compiled a helpful list of free renderings like this one which 
demonstrates that these kinds of free translations are not confined to legislation:214  
יתארקו ךלאה = Θέλεις καλέσω (2.7) 
יננה = Τί ἐστιν (3.4) 
ןושל דבכו הפ־דבכ = ἰσχνόφωνος καὶ βραδύγλωσσος (4.10) 
חלשת־דיב אנ־חלש = προχείρισαι δυνάμενον ἄλλον, ὃν ἀποστελεῖς (4.13) 
ןבתה תויהב רשאכ = καθάπερ καὶ ὅτε τὸ ἄχυρον ἐδίδοτο ὑμῖν (5.13) 
םיתפש לרע ינאו = ἐγὼ δὲ ἄλογός εἰμι (6.12) 
עדת םרטה = ἢ εἰδέναι βούλει (10.7) 
םעה־ןמ ואצי = ἐξήλθόν τινες ἐκ τοῦ λαοῦ (16.27) 
םיהלא שרדל = ἐκζητῆσαι κρίσιν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ (18.15) 
אפרי אפרו = τὰ ἰατρεῖα (21.19) 
הז אוה־יכ רמאי רשא = τῆς ἐγκαλουμένης, ὅ τι οὖν ἂν ᾖ (22.8[9]) 
םירבד לעב־ימ = ἐάν τινι συμβῇ κρίσις (24.14) 
ונממ ורסי אל = ἀκίνητοι (25.15[14]) 
אוה ערב יכ םעה־תא תעדי התא = σὺ γὰρ οἶδας τὸ ὅρμημα τοῦ λαοῦ τούτου (32.22) 
 
                                                          
210 For third person examples: 1.16; 3.5, 11; 4.10; 5.2; 8.15, 22; 9.32; 12.42; 13.17; 15.23; 16.15(2x), 36; 21.21, 29, 36; 
22.8, 14, 26(2x); 29.14, 22, 28; 31.14, 17; 32.16(2x); 33.3; 34.9, 10, 14; 39.14(36.21). Note that the copula-based translation 
slowly takes over as the translator moves forward. There are a few notable exceptions here, too: 1.19; 2.2; 5.8; 7.14; 12.27, 42; 
22.8; 29.19.  
211 1.19; 4.25; 7.7(2x); 9.28; 10.10; 24.14. 
212 3.5, 13; 5.8, 16; 12.33; 18.17; 34.10; except 12.11. 
213 Ibid., 173, emphasis mine.  
214 “What Can We Know,” 86-87. The list has been rearranged as starting from the beginning of the book. 
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While Tjen and Aejmelaeus have noted the free nature of this verse’s translation, they 
have not suggested why Ex was hesitant to simply translate with *ἐὰν ὁ κύριος τοῦ γυναίκος 
ᾖ.215 There are a few potential reasons. First, note that Ex’s normal translation for לעב is 
κύριος.216 The aversion to the phrase ὁ κύριος τοῦ γυναικός is explained by  
1) the confusion of referents that two different κύριοι in one section of law would create,  
2) the ambiguous meaning of the clause ἐὰν ὁ κύριος τοῦ γυναικός ᾖ, and 
3) the desire to create a parallelism between the protasis’ verbal phrase (συνεισέλθῃ μετʼ 
αὐτοῦ) and the apodosis’ verbal phrase (ἐξελεύσεται μετʼ αὐτοῦ). 
 
Even though the second explanation is the normal way Ex translates verbless nominal clauses, 
and even if Ex had used the relatively understandable designation ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς γυναικός217 to 
stipulate the husband-wife relationship (as v. 22), still the overall opaque rendering created by a 
one-to-one reflection of the Hebrew here does not create a straightforward reading in the Greek. 
If Ex had translated *ἐὰν ἀνὴρ τῆς γυναικός ᾖ, this text would still not be exact with respect to 
designating that the wife was with the man before he came into the position of slavery. Ex is 
prone to translate in such a way as to disambiguate a law rather than leave it polyvalent. 
Tangentially, I suggest this also points to the intended ‘on the ground’ practicability of these 
laws.218  
Having said this, another significant reason for this translation exists: in Ptolemaic legal 
contexts *ὁ κύριος τοῦ γυναικός referred primarily to a woman’s legal guardian.219 This guardian 
could be her husband,220 but could also be her son, father, grandfather, or brother.221 This 
                                                          
215 The expected translation based on the technique established above.  
216 21.28-29, 34, 36; 22.7, 10, 11, 13-14. 24.14 is a Hebrew idiom that is rendered with a Greek equivalent.  
217 This phrase is not idiomatic Greek but is simple enough that its meaning is not obscured. 
218 A straightforward example of this is seen in v. 22 with μὴ ἐξεικονισμένον for the much debated ןוסא היהי אלו. Ex 
demonstrates many changes that could indicate that this law was not meant to be “put in a glass casing” in a library somewhere, 
but rather to function as a clear and forthright legal reference in litigation. 
219 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 170; e.g., P. Enteux. 22, line 4; P. Enteux. 81, line 17. 
220 E.g., P. Ryl. 586 (99 BCE).  
221 Cf. e.g., P. Enteux. 22.4 (218 BCE).  
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guardian-κύριος did not exist in Jewish thought or law but did in Greek thought and law. It is a 
fact that Jews in Ptolemaic Egypt adopted this guardian system222 which might further explain 
Ex’s hesitancy to use κύριος here and in v. 22. Perhaps this is a small sign of Ex’s intent to 
demarcate this translation within a Greek legal framework.  
Ultimately, *ὁ κύριος τοῦ γυναικός was too obscure. It could have referred to the man 
being her slave-master, her legal guardian, or in some way her owner.223 This latter idea might 
have been too strong of a statement in Ptolemaic times, too, since women had the ability to call 
off a marriage at their own discretion, apart from any volition of the man.224 
3.3.4. V. 4: On Slave Marriage (Continued) 
 
ἐὰν δὲ ὁ κύριος δῷ αὐτῷ γυναῖκα, καὶ τέκῃ αὐτῷ υἱοὺς ἢ θυγατέρας, ἡ γυνὴ καὶ τὰ παιδία ἔσται 
τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ, αὐτὸς δὲ μόνος ἐξελεύσεται. 
 וינדא־םאופגב אצי אוהו הינדאל היהת הידליו השאה תונב וא םינב ול־הדליו השא ול־ןתי  
 
δὲ (1o). The inclusion of the conjunction here suggests that Ex had a Vorlage with an initial ו. 
Verses 2, 3, 8, 19 and 22.26(22.27) are the only verses in the formal casuistic sections of 
chapters 20-23 in which Ex does not include δέ following ἐάν.225 This is in line with lacking ו in 
MT. However, verses which do include a conjunction that is not represented in MT suggest that 
Ex has no problem adding them in at his own discretion. Verse 12 is an example of δέ being 
added, seemingly, to match the typical formulation ἐάν δέ + subjunctive. Given the completely 
different subject matter from what precedes, v. 12’s δέ certainly marks a new topic in the larger 
                                                          
222 Victor Tcherikover, The Jews in Egypt in the Hellenistic-Roman Age in the Light of the Papyri (Jerusalem: Hebrew 
University Press Association, 1945), 17; cf. Jane Rowlandson, and Roger S. Bagnall, Women and Society in Greek and Roman 
Egypt: A Sourcebook (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 245.  
223 This last idea is in fact what לעב means in the Hebrew (Propp, Exodus, 191; cf. Bruce K. Waltke, and Michael 
Patrick O'Connor, An Introduction to Biblical Hebrew Syntax [Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2010] 9.5.3b).  
224 Cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 121-122; Hans Julius Wolff, Written and Unwritten Marriages in 
Hellenistic and Post-Classical Roman Law (Haverford: American Philological Association, 1939), 34. 
225 Each of these clauses (barring 21.2, which begins a new genre/section) are closely related to the item that precedes 
them. When compared to the genre of compositional casuistic clauses in Greek law, the opposite is usually noted, i.e., ἐάν + 
subjunctive generally denote a break from the previous topic. See the examples in footnote 349. 
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discussion. Verse 36, also, includes δέ as a plus in the same phrase,226 but there the subject 
matter is a continuation of what precedes. In this instance δέ could be adversative, but it really 
does seem that Ex is simply repeating the stock ἐάν δέ + subjunctive rather than focusing in on a 
specific nuance of δέ beyond marking a progression of thought. That SamP demonstrates a 
Hebrew text in line with Ex and contrary to MT at some points in this regard (e.g., v. 10, 
21.37[22.1])227 makes it difficult to find a concrete answer, as Ex may represent an unknown 
Vorlage in some cases (e.g., perhaps v. 32). Still, that there are so many verses with no known 
Hebrew Vorlage including ו yet containing δέ in the introductory formula ἐάν + subjunctive228 
suggests that Ex wanted to maintain this stock formulation to keep a basic progression noted. As 
has been stated, this is not the way compositional casuistic law demarcates progression.229 
 
τὰ παιδία. The feminine singular pronominal suffix from הידליו is not represented here. The 
general pattern found in Ex is to remove redundant personal pronouns because “non-repetition 
was normal Greek practice.”230 Because there is only one pronominal suffix in this verse, it does 
not fit the criteria for redundancy. The parallel list of coordinate items in the following verse 
does fit that criteria (τὸν κύριόν μου καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ παιδία). In both contexts παιδία has 
no personal pronoun modifying it. 231 While it should not be pressed, it is interesting to note that 
                                                          
226 It is almost certainly an addition because the Hebrew וא is never preceded by ו in the biblical corpus.  
227 Or for other witnesses, cf. v. 30. 
228 E.g., 21.37(22.1); 22.1(22.2[2x]); 22.2(22.3); 22.3(22.4); 22.5(22.6); 22.12(22.13); 22.14(22.15); 22.22(22.23); 
22.24(22.25); 22.25(22.26); 23.4, 5. 
229 See footnote 225.  
230 R. Sollamo, “The Koinē Background for the Repetition and Non-Repetition of the Possessive Pronoun in Co-
Ordinate Items” in Studien zur Septuaginta und zum hellenistischen Judentum, ed. Robert Hanhart, and Reinhard Gregor Kratz 
(Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1999), 52-63, here 52. Cf. Rajak, Translation and Survival, 160. 
231 Ex is not necessarily consistent in this regard, however (compare vv. 26-27).  
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in Ptolemaic Egypt the status of slave was passed from mother to child.232 The children in these 
verses would not be “hers” since they belonged to the master as property.233  
Additionally, Stanton suggests as based on the Zenon Papyri that τέκνον would have 
been a term used more frequently with respect to free children, whereas παιδίον/παῖς were used 
with respect to slave children.234 While τέκνον is not used in slave contexts in Ex, the translator 
does use παιδίον in non-slave contexts (as v. 22).  
 
τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ. MT reads הינדאל, with the difference being the feminine Hebrew pronominal 
suffix as compared to the masculine Greek pronoun αὐτοῦ. As to this variant, Propp explores 
both MT and LXX readings and notes that each represent examples of a lectio difficilior.235 The 
difficulty lies in the proximity of the varied feminine and masculine pronominal suffixes 
preceding this word. The difference is moot, however, since the master owns both manservant 
and maidservant. As for Ex, it is uncertain whether the change is based in his Vorlage or due to a 
desire to smooth out the law, especially since the subject of the law is the relation of the male 
slave to his master and not the wife.236 The parallel reading in SamP suggests that Ex simply had 
a text with this reading, especially since, as Wevers documents, a change in the gender of the 
Hebrew pronoun in translation is not frequent.237 Perhaps, too, had Ex translated τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτῆς 
(disregarding the Vorlage question), the guardianship issue would again present itself, as this 
phrase could be primarily associated with that concept in Ptolemaic law.238 
 
                                                          
232 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 69, 72-73.  
233 Ibid., 76. Cf. Sarah B Pomeroy, Goddesses, Whores, Wives and Slaves: Women in Classical Antiquity (New York: 
Schocken Books, 1995), 140-141. 
234 G.R. Stanton, “ΤΕΚΝΟΝ, ΠΑΙΣ and Related Words in Koine Greek,” in Proceedings of the XVIII International 
Congress of Papyrology 2, (ed. B.G. Mandilaras; Athens: Greek Patrological Society, 1988), 463-480, here 468. 
235 Exodus, 188. 
236 Cf. Wevers, Text History, 193. 
237 4 times; ibid., 193-194. 
238 It is also possible that Ex simply wanted to maintain the same masculine third pronoun as in the rest of the verse. 
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αὐτὸς…μόνος. See notes on 3.3.3. 
 
3.3.5. V. 5: On Slave Status 
 
ἐὰν δὲ ἀποκριθεὶς εἴπῃ ὁ παῖς Ἠγάπηκα τὸν κύριόν μου καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ παιδία, οὐκ 
ἀποτρέχω ἐλεύθερος· 
 יתבהא דבעה רמאי רמא־םאוישפח אצא אל ינב־תאו יתשא־תא ינדא־תא  
 
ἀποκριθεὶς εἴπῃ. In the Greek language the use of the same verb in participial form before a 
cognate verb would be considered “odd” Greek.239 It is more “odd” than other renderings of the 
Hebrew infinite absolute + cognate verb. Gen, Ex, and Lev are the only translators who employ 
two synonymous verbs when rendering this construction.240 This use of synonyms is a freer 
rendering and would be considered “passable” compositional Greek.241 
 Tjen claims that speech verbs are normally associated with the imperfective aspect in the 
Greek language.242 To Tjen, the aorist εἴπῃ demonstrates that hard and fast rules are not usually 
found for verbal aspect in the Septuagint Pentateuch.243 The parallel passage in Deuteronomy 
15.16 uses the present tense for this speech verb244 which suggests that choosing between the 
present or aorist tense for this context and lexeme is a subjective choice on the part of the 
translators. Still, given that all the other aorist protases in the casuistic laws of Ex represent 
punctiliar events, it is difficult to imagine that this verb was not meant to be taken that way, too. 
Add to this that Ex uses the present tense in casuistic laws to refer, if an isolated present, to an 
iterative action (cf. v. 15). The verb εἴπῃ here in v. 5 could represent a singular occasion of 
                                                          
239 Rajak, Translation and Survival, 160; cf. Evans, Verbal Syntax, 260. 
240 Raija Sollamo, “The LXX Renderings of the Infinitive Absolute Used with a Paronymous Finite Verb in the 
Penteteuch” in La Septuaginta en la Investigacion Contemporanea (V Congreso d la IOSCS), ed. N. Fernández Marcos. (Madris: 
Instituto “Arias Montano”, 1985), 103. In the Covenant Code note Ex. 22.22(22.23) and 23.4. 
241 Ibid., 105. 
242 Tjen, On Conditionals, 122. Cf. Edwin Mayser, Grammatik der griechischen Papyri aus der Ptolemäerzeit, vol 2 
(Berlin & Leipzig: De Gruyter, 1906–1934), 135. 
243 Tjen, On Conditionals, 122. 
244 ἐὰν δὲ λέγῃ πρὸς σέ Οὐκ ἐξελεύσομαι ἀπὸ σοῦ. 
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affirmation towards lifelong slavery. This fits the context, also, since once the slave affirms his 
desire to remain, the punctiliar event of ear-piercing was to mark this status forever.  
 
Ἠγάπηκα. Evans has documented that the perfect tense is employed frequently in direct 
discourse within the Greek language, which is a trait that is also demonstrated in the Septuagint 
Pentateuch.245 This probably explains the perfect tense used here.  
 
τὸν κύριόν μου καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ παιδία. The Hebrew text here has first person pronominal 
suffixes on each coordinate item. In the Greek text, the non-repetition of the possessive pronoun 
μου after γυναῖκα and παιδία is noted by Sollamo.246 In compositional Greek there would be no 
advantage or distinct meaning if the pronoun were placed on any other of the nouns.247 Wevers 
notes that in coordinate noun phrases the genitive pronoun shows “no consistent pattern” as to 
how many occur or where they are placed.248 This thesis suggests, in this verse at least, it might 
have to do with an intentional muting by the translator, which prevented the rightful owner of the 
γυνή and παιδία from being obscured.249 At the same time, the text can be read with the genitive 
pronoun governing γυναῖκα and παιδία, so this point should not be pushed too far. It is only a 
possibility that the original readers would have implicitly understood that μου would not be used 
to refer to those two items. A parallel passage in 4.20 shows that no pronoun needed to be 
translated in a context where the relationships were obvious: 
1 וינב־תאו ותשא־תא השמ חקיו 
 ἀναλαβὼν δὲ Μωυσῆς τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ παιδία 
                                                          
245 Verbal Syntax, 158-166. 
246 Sollamo, Repetition of the Possesive, 43-44. 
247 Sollamo, “The Koinē,” 62-63. 
248 Text History, 187-188. 25.28(27) and 25.30(29) are the other texts resembling the number and positioning here. 
249 See the notes on 3.3.4. and τὰ παιδία 
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Additionally, vv. 15, 17(16), and 20 have the repetition of the possessive pronoun after two 
coordinate items which is considered a Hebraism and unidiomatic in compositional Greek.250 
This shows that Ex is not always constrained by Greek norms. The problem remains, however, as 
to whether the context involving legal slavery in chapter 21 would change the way the readers 
and translator perceived these relationships in v. 5.  
 
ἀποτρέχω ἐλεύθερος. The verb ἀποτρέχω is used elsewhere in 3.21 and 10.4, both in contexts 
referring to the release of Israel and their goods in order to go and serve their God. It translates 
אצי only here and v. 7. Why does Ex change the verb used to render the nearly identical phrase 
from v. 2 (there אצי ישפחל, here ישפח אצא)? In the notes on v. 2 it was indicated that ἀπέρχομαι 
and ἀποτρέχω are synonymous, with the latter taking over the former’s domain in the present and 
imperfect tenses in the Koine period.251 Since the present tense is used here, ἀποτρέχω is 
employed as it also is in v. 7. Ex has utilized an idiomatic phrase for manumission again 
(ἐλεύθερος in combination with an element of predication) as was shown in the commentary on 
v. 2. Ex is most concerned with these specific verbs and phrases being used rather than matching 
his source text with stereotypical renderings.252 In these contexts where technically referring to 
manumission mattered most Ex ensures that the text says just that.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
250 Sollamo, Repetition of the Possessive, 30; who notes that this occurs 20 out of 50 times in Ex. It is uncertain 
whether the repetition of pronouns in these lists of coordinate items would give prominence to the relationships under 
consideration.  
251 Cf. Lee, A Lexical Study, 127. 
252 This is not to say that Ex violated the semantic confines of the Hebrew terms. This is not the case.  
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3.3.6. V. 6: On Slave Status (Continued) 
 
προσάξει αὐτὸν ὁ κύριος αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ τότε προσάξει αὐτὸν πρὸς τὴν 
θύραν ἐπὶ τὸν σταθμόν, καὶ τρυπήσει αὐτοῦ ὁ κύριος τὸ οὖς τῷ ὀπητίῳ, καὶ δουλεύσει αὐτῷ εἰς 
τὸν αἰῶνα. 
םלעל ודבעו עצרמב ונזא־תא וינדא עצרו הזוזמה־לא וא תלדה־לא ושיגהו םיהלאה־לא וינדא ושיגהו 
 
3.3.6.1. Commentary 
 
ו (1o = not translated). Hebrew usually marks an apodosis with a ו, whether it is apodotic or 
resumptive.253 Apodotic καί is notably not translated twenty-five out of twenty-nine times in 
Ex.254 This trend represents the translator being in line with Greek standards.255 Ex and Gen both 
exhibit an inhibition towards apodotic καί.256 Ex, in particular, shows “near to perfectly correct 
usage.”257 The non-translation here is representative of idiomatic Greek since compositional 
Greek apodoses, especially in the Ptolemaic papyri and the NT, do not often include markers of 
the apodosis.258 In this way the non-translation here is also reflective of compositional casuistic 
law. 
 
προσάξει. The verb προσάγω is used to translate Hiphil ברק most often in Greek Exodus.259 In 
the Hiphil שגנ occurs twice in this verse, and once in 32.6 where the sacrificial context leads the 
translator to use προσφέρω. Other terms variously translate Qal forms of שגנ. It is only important 
to ask why προσάγω was used here, since this is the only other context with Hiphil שגנ. Of 
course, the Greek verb is suitable to indicate the causative act of “bringing” something 
                                                          
253 Wilhelm Gesenius, Thomas Jefferson Conant, and Emil Roediger, Gesenius' Hebrew Grammar (New York: 
Appleton, 1955), point 112ff. Cf. Tjen, On Conditionals, 18.  
254 Tjen, On Conditionals, 215; cf. 221. 
255 Ibid., 218; Aejmelaeus, “The Significance,” 368-369, 371. 
256 Tjen, On Conditionals, 221. 
257 Aejmelaeus, “The Significance,” 371.  
258 Tjen, On Conditionals, 37. 
259 14.10; 28.1; 29.4, 8; 29.10; 40.12, 14. It is προσφέρω in 29.3. Two other verbs translate this word each once: אוב in 
the Hiphil (19.4); רוס (3.4).  
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somewhere, which is reflective of the Hiphil stem. Secondarily, προσάγω is a verb used in 
literary legal contexts for bringing a person to court as a defendant or witness.260 This is also 
shown in the papyri,261 with C. Ord. Ptol. 22. 7-11 (260 BCE) using it in reference to the 
bringing of a slave to be registered. By itself προσάγω would probably not be associated with 
this meaning of the term. However, the plus of τὸ κριτήριον (“the tribunal”)262 just following 
confirms this precise intended sphere of meaning. Much needs to be said about this plus, as it is 
may be one of the strongest indicators of Ptolemaic legal interference in this translation. 
3.3.6.2. Excursus on τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ 
 
3.3.6.2.1. Introduction 
 
τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ. The original place to which םיהלאה־לא referred is not altogether clear. 
Scholars generally posit four options for where this ritual might take place according to the 
Hebrew: the owner’s house, the city gate, the temple, or a sacred place.263 Ex does not seem to 
choose any of these options.264  
As a basic conclusion, this study will argue that the plus of τὸ κριτήριον is related to Ex’s 
desire to formulate a law that did not trespass upon Ptolemaic Egyptian legal norms. Specifically, 
Ptolemaic Egypt had strict regulations when it came to the acquisition and maintenance of 
slaves. Ex has accommodated that standard by directing the readers to officialise their slave 
transactions at the local Ptolemaic-authorized office, which was probably labelled κριτήριον. 
There are a few questions that need to be answered to demonstrate this claim: a) How 
does Ex translate the Hebrew phrase םיהלאה־לא elsewhere and why? b) Does Ex add pluses like 
                                                          
260 LSJ, προσάγω, I. 8. 
261 E.g., P. Hal. 8.5 (231-230 BCE). 
262 See the next section for the translation of this word.  
263 Propp, Exodus, 193-194; Paul, Studies in the Book, 50-51; cf. Durham, Exodus, 321. 
264 That this is not referring to a synagogue is argued below. Cf. also Swete, Introduction, 446, who labels this verse as 
an exegetical/hermeneutical addition of the translator. He does not explain why it was necessary, however.  
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this in other contexts? c) What did κριτήριον mean in third century Ptolemaic Egypt? d) Is there 
an ostensible reason why Ex would include κριτήριον here based on that definition? 
3.3.6.2.2. a) Translations of םיהלאה־לא 
     םיהלאה־לא  
 = πρὸς τὸν θεόν  
❖ in contexts in which words are being spoken to God.265  
 = ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ 
❖ in contexts where someone is physically going before God, however that 
might have been tangibly conceived.266  
 = εἰς τὸ ὄρος τοῦ θεοῦ267  
 = τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ268 
 
 It has been previously argued elsewhere that Ex demonstrates a desire to avoid 
representing God or his presence physically.269 From such a conclusion it could be argued that 
21.6 is another example of this kind circumvention of the physical when it comes to talking 
about God. However, Ex makes no such interventions in 3.6 and 22.8(7) where this same phrase 
is translated with ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ.270 Verse 22.8(7) is a similar legal context in which the lord 
of a house is to go םיהלאה־לא and swear an oath of innocence. Ex makes no addition or 
intervention in that text. A similar case could be made for 22.9(8), which also has a legal 
decision going ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ (םיהלאה דע). These suggest that something about the context and 
content of 21.6 compelled Ex to add τὸ κριτήριον, and not the genre of the text. It is always 
possible that a variant Vorlage caused Ex to translate this word here, but no such reading is 
                                                          
265 2.23; 3.11, 13; 18.19 
266 3.6; 22.7(8); 34.20, 23. 
267 19.3 and 24.13. 19.3 seems to include τὸ ὄρος either based on a Vorlage like the text in 24.13 or because, as is the 
translator’s custom, Ex circumvents any direct description of a physical appearance of God. This does not affect the argument for 
21.6 if τὸ ὄρος is based on a variant Vorlage. Otherwise it is another example of a description of God’s physicality being 
avoided.  
268 Only in 21.6. 
269 Jan Joosten, “To See God: Conflicting Exegetical Tendencies in the Septuagint” in Die Septuaginta — Texte, 
Kontexte, Lebenswelten, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 219 (ed. M. Karrer, W. Kraus; Tübingen, 
Mohr, 2008), 287-299, specifically, 290-293; L. Perkins, “The Greek Translator of Exodus, Interpres (translator) and Expositor 
(interpretor): His Treatment of Theophanies,” Journal For The Study Of Judaism 44, no. 1 (2013): 16-56. 
270 That 3.6 is a context with a theophany may influence the translation there, however.  
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presently documented, nor does any other Pentateuchal translation use any term that would point 
to this ostensible Hebrew reading.271 Before analysing the function of κριτήριον within Ex’s 
milieu, it is appropriate to ask whether an addition like this is a rarity in this translation. If it is, 
this further emphasizes the constraining power of whatever outside force persuaded Ex to change 
the text. 
3.3.6.2.3. b) Pluses in Ex 
 
 For a full list of the pluses in Exodus 1-24 as compiled by this author, see Appendix I. As 
per Tov’s analysis, that list could suggest that a large portion of pluses in Greek Exodus as 
compared to MT are due to harmonizing that has occurred at the Hebrew level, and without any 
added intention of Ex.272 Wevers, on the other hand, offers the perspective that many of the 
pluses are on account of the translator’s own volition and not an expansionary Vorlage.273 It is 
not the intention of this thesis to arbitrate between these competing views.  
Some pluses, like the verse in question, do not seem to be based out of a harmonising 
tendency. Many pluses seem to indicate that Ex only added to the text when something was 
deemed unacceptable theologically or was in danger of being misunderstood in a pivotal part of 
the text, rather than adding minor details.274 This latter category is of course a subjective 
evaluation on the part of this author.  
                                                          
271 Daniel 7.10 translates κριτήριον for Aramaic אניד (“judges; court.” See Brown, et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-
Briggs, 1088). The issue with using Daniel for evidence is due to the changing specific definition of κριτήριον after the third 
century. 
272 Emmanuel Tov, “Textual Harmonization in Exodus 1-24,” A Journal of Biblical Textual Criticism 22 (2017): 1-16, 
particularly 15, highlights the harmonizing tendency of Ex’s Hebrew text in chapters 1-24. While this author does not agree with 
every specific claim made in this article, its evidence is worth considering. It is a coincidence that Tov and I examined the same 
chapters in our work on pluses, and he added some very helpful insights into my own discoveries regarding the harmonisations 
present. See also See Emanuel Tov, “The Shared Tradition of the Septuagint and the Samaritan Pentateuch,” in Die Septuaginta: 
Orte und Intentionen (ed. Siegfried Kreuzer et al.; WUNT 361; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2016), 277–93. 
273 Cf. Wevers, Text History, 147ff. 
274 Some examples seem to be theologically motivated (circumventing a physical description of the divine presence in 
4.12; 16.3; 18.5); some clarify small points in the narrative (12.39), or make certain the event being described could not be 
misinterpreted (14.25; 21.15[14]; 21.36; 22.16[17]; possibly 18.18). For those of more spurious origins see Appendix I.  
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The strange thing about 21.6 is that ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ (the expected translation as per 3.6 
and 22.8[7]) is elsewhere regarded by the translator as understandable and in no further need of 
clarification. If it were problematic, one would expect Ex to consistently make changes to this 
phrase or add pluses, much like is done when circumventing a physical description of the divine 
presence.275 Instead, something else has triggered the plus and the only data that can give insight 
from here is an evaluation of κριτήριον and its function in the third century world with respect to 
slavery.  
3.3.6.2.4. c) Definitions of Κριτήριον 
 As a basic and generic definition Greg Horsley defines the word with the primary sense 
of “means/standard of judging,” stating that, “the basic sense [of κριτήριον] had not become 
obsolete after the classical period.”276 It is possible that Ex is simply using this term in a plain 
way such as this. However, the ‘on the ground’ function of κριτήριον in third century Alexandria 
and Egypt strongly suggests there is more to the equation. 
The κριτήριον was a court and representative office of Ptolemaic legal authorities in the 
third century which focused on general matters of law and societal organization.277 Wolff claims 
that its role as a court with this function has no previous attestations before the Ptolemaic period, 
and it may in fact have been an invention of that period,278 particularly from within 
Alexandria.279 He states that these courts were found in the cities and in the Chora.280 They stood 
primarily in contrast to the δικαστήριον which was a representative office for those with full 
                                                          
275 For pluses because of this see 4.12; 16.3; 18.5.  
276 Greg H.R. Horsely, New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, vol 4 (North Ryde: Ancient History 
Documentary Research Centre, Macquarie University, 1987), 157. 
277 For an overview, see Hans Julius Wolff, Das Justizwesen der Ptolemäer (München: Beck, 1970), 96-112.  
278 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 62. 
279 Wolff, Das Justizwesen, 97. 
280 Ibid., 99. 
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Greek citizenship.281 Foreigners who did not have these rights were sent to the κριτήριον.282 The 
δικαστήριον also had a greater role in punishing individuals and giving royal aid.283 In his study, 
Wolff notes that the κριτήριον and the δικαστήριον were distinct entities in third century 
Egypt,284 though this distinction was lost in the second century.285 Beyond these basic facts, there 
is little other definitive information available as to the distinctive qualities of the κριτήριον, other 
than that it was used for more general legal items than the δικαστήριον.286 
It cannot be stressed enough that the κριτήρια were concrete, multitudinous,287 and 
authorized courts dispersed all over Ptolemaic Egypt. Alexandrian Jews would be accustomed to, 
and frequently attend, such courts. Take, for example, in the papyri P. Hal. 1, 2. 40, 43, 76 (3rd 
BCE), which all direct the readers of these laws to go to either the δικαστήριον or the κριτήριον 
for their legal needs. P. Hib. 2, 1. 11-12 (and 25. 49-50 [3rd BCE]) refer to various κριτήρια 
designated to different locations using a specific phrase: ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀποδεδειγμένου κριτηρίου (“at 
the appointed tribunal”).288 The κριτήριον was where a host of official legal matters occurred in 
Ptolemaic Egypt.  
 
 
                                                          
281 Ibid. The courts (δικαστήριον) held a unique authority in later Athenian law (after the 4th BCE [Hansen, Mogens 
Herman Hansen, Eisangelia: The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century B.C. and the Impeachment of 
Generals and Politicians (Odense: University Press, 1975), 14]). The δικαστήριον acted as a standing court in Egypt from as 
early as 270 BCE (Bagnall and Derow, The Hellenistic, 288). 
282 Wolff, Das Justizwesen, 99, 108. 
283 Ibid., 99. 
284 Ibid., 96-97, 100. 
285 Ibid., 110; cf. Wolff, “Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 67-77. 
286 Idem., Das Justizwesen, 99. There was another court of appeal established at the outset of the third century, the 
κοινοδίκιον. It functioned as an intermediary for cases between Egyptians and Greeks (Kasher, The Jews, 50; Taubenschlag, Law 
of Greco-Roman, 483). This court was open to other nationalities as well (ibid., 484). However, since it dealt with specifics 
regarding international relations, it would have been an unsuitable term in Ex which focuses on inter-Jewish relations. There was 
also the λαοκρίται, but that court was specifically for native Egyptians.  
287 They are referenced in the papyri in the plural and in various locations.  
288 Cf. also P. Hibeh 2 198, 11. 237 (242 BCE): ἐν τῶι ἀποδεδειγμένωι κριτηρίωι. 
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3.3.6.2.5. d) Reason for the Addition of Κριτήριον 
 A few questions need to be asked having given this definition:289 First, is Ex intending 
κριτήριον to be taken as a general term, as in, “standard of judgement” with no reference to the 
laws or systems that be? If so, it could indicate the slave master was to go to a synagogue or the 
like for this process. Second, is there evidence that would suggest that Ex used the term with its 
more specific and ‘concrete’ realization as an actual Ptolemaic court Jews went to?290 Or did Ex 
at least want to allude to those courts? These points will be taken in reverse. 
  What purpose would it serve for Ex to use κριτήριον in this context? Is it because it was 
the foreigners’ court, i.e., the Jewish court, and thus applied in a general way to them? No, it 
should not be considered likely that Ex is referring to specifically foreign courts when using 
κριτήριον. The evidence suggests that there were Jews who did in fact use the δικαστήριον for 
legal matters. 
P. Petr. 3. 21g (226 BCE) is a case of assault between two Jews which is brought before a 
Greek court, the δικαστήριον (line 47), using Greek laws.291 The guardian of the woman was an 
Athenian (line 38) and likely connected to the military292 which are very likely the reasons they 
appeared in Greek court.293 Jews not connected to the military would not have this privilege. 
That the Jewish population was divided by legal privilege based on their connection to military 
has recently been made certain.294 Most scholars claim that those associated with the 
                                                          
289 I am leaving out the question of what the appellation τοῦ θεοῦ might add to the word for now.  
290 Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 215, comment that κριτήριον represents an interpretive move that is “adaptée 
à la réalité juridique concrete,” but explain this idea no further.  
291 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 152. 
292 Ibid., 156. 
293 This is what Kasher, The Jews, 50-51, 142, argues. See also 63-74, 142-143, for Jews who worked in a lower, non-
privileged class. Wolff, “Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 71, while not agreeing, does not mention these non-privileged workers. 
294 Sylvie Honigman, The Septuagint and Homeric Scholarship in Alexandria A Study in the Narrative of the Letter of 
Aristeas (London: Routledge, 2012), 99-100. 
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πολίτευμα295 were likely also associated with the military, and it is for these that the δικαστήριον 
was set up in the Chora.296 Tcherikover summarizes this nicely: “Presumably, besides 
maintaining national customs such as traditional holidays, religious ceremonies and the like, in 
all legal matters members of the politeuma acted in accordance with the general Hellenistic law 
that applied in the country and used to have recourse to the ordinary court of the government.”297 
While this is true, it needs to be emphasized that P. Petr. 3. 21g is the only direct instance 
recorded in the papyri of two Jews going to Greek court in all the papyri mentioning Jews in the 
third century.298 
Therefore, based on the surviving evidence regarding πολίτευμα, some Jews would 
undoubtedly go to the δικαστήριον. Ex would not have used κριτήριον as a catchall reference to 
the court that all foreigners went to. It would not have held that significance to the translator.  
 While it is possible to say that the κριτήριον was not specifically referring to the court 
that all Jews went to, there is little else that can be definitively stated about the function of that 
court in the third century. There is one papyrus that connects the protocol of slave emancipation 
with the κριτήριον (P. Hib. 1 29. 4-6, [265 BCE]), but there is not enough evidence to be sure 
that the κριτήριον was specifically the court for all matters regarding owning, trading, or the 
manumission of slaves.299  
                                                          
295 This term usually denotes an ethnic group within another geographical locale other than their own and under the 
authority of the Ptolemies. See Aristeas 310; Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 583-584; Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 6; idem., 
Hellenistic Civilization, 297. For the Jews being given this status just north in Cyrene see CIG 5361; cf. Kasher, The Jews, 44. 
296 Honigman, The Septuagint and Homeric, 99; Rajak, Translation and Survival, 80; Wolff, “Law in Ptolemaic 
Egypt,” 68. 
297 Tcherikover, The Jews, 97.  
298 And most of the second. In the research for this study all documented sourced were analysed as recorded in 
Tcherikover et al., Corpus, vol. 1; P. Magd. 35 (218 BCE) is unclear as to whether everyone in the case were Jews, and should 
not be thus considered; cf. ibid., 239-240. 
299 Likewise, the δικαστήριον is connected to slaves in P. Lille 1 29 (3rd BCE), but the fragmentation there leaves the 
connection more uncertain than P. Hib. 1 29. 
56 
 
It is more helpful to approach the problem of the plus in 21.6 from a different angle. 
There is definitive documentation regarding Ptolemaic legislation about slave ownership and 
practice. The stiffness and unbending quality of their rules on this subject give a strong 
indication why Ex had to add this plus at this juncture in the text, if Ex did not want to translate a 
law that would be utterly hostile to Ptolemaic rule. 
In short, “The entire process of slave sales was under complete government control.”300 
This can be seen by the fact that there was a high tax on the trade of slaves and slavery in general 
in Egypt,301 which was regulated very closely.302 There was an import tax303 and a basic tax on 
each sale.304 There was also a tax on the manumission of slaves.305 These taxes from the 
surrounding countryside were sent to Alexandria306 which is an indication of the centralized and 
official slave management occurring there.307 There was also considerable effort and legislation 
to ensure slaves were acquired and transmitted under strict supervision and according to code.308 
Slaves also had to be documented for tax purposes.309 In fact, “Those who fail[ed] to register 
slaves suffer confiscation of the slaves.”310 In some instances, Taubenschlag comments, “Persons 
who fail to register themselves and those whom they ought to, no matter what their nationality, 
[were] fined a quarter of their property.”311 In other cases, like that shown in P. Ord. Ptol. 22. 7-
                                                          
300 Westermann, Upon Slavery, 9. 
301 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 73; idem., Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 157-158. Cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 553; 
Westermann, Upon Slavery, 61, and see 33, 36, and 38 for these taxes stretching back as far as the Ptolemaic Period existed. 
302 As evidenced by P. Col. inv. 480 (198-1987 BCE); P. Lille 1 29 (3rd BCE); and P. Hib. 29r (265-264 BCE); cf. 
Westermann, Upon Slavery, 47-48, 58. 
303 P. Cair. Zen. 1 59093. 10-13 (257 BCE).  
304 Westermann, Upon Slavery, 61. 
305 Ibid., 61, who concedes that this must be implied based on other evidence from Hellenistic cities of the time since 
nothing survives for Ptolemaic Egypt; cf. 39-41. 
306 Ibid., 9, 48.  
307 Ibid., 48.  
308 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 84-85; idem., Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 164-165; Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 476; P. 
Harr. 61. 1-12 (180 BCE), which are paralleled in the third century according to Fraser. Cf. P. Col. 1 inv. 480 (198 BCE). 
309 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 610; for legislation to this regard see, e.g., P. Grad. 1 (mid 3rd BCE); P. Hib. 
29 (265-264 BCE); P. Col. Inv. 480 (198-197 BCE); P. Lond. 3 642 (180-145 BCE). 
310 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 476. 
311 Ibid. 
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11 (260 BCE), there was the charge of 3000 drachmas and the loss of the slave for those who do 
not register their slave. With all this data Westermann sums up the necessity of bringing every 
slave to the official office: “it is apparent that prospective sales must be declared 
beforehand…through the offices of the market supervisors.”312 
It is clear from this data that anyone who was going to gain a slave would absolutely have 
to go to the Ptolemaic office and register them. If Ex had translated with ἐνώπιον τοῦ θεοῦ or 
something like it, the suggestion would be that the slave ceremony and officialization could 
occur pretty much anywhere with a doorframe. Such a law would be in direct contradiction and 
even hostile to the Ptolemaic government. This angle also explains why no plus was needed in 
22.7(8), because that text refers to a matter that was not regulated by the government. Verse 
22.7(8) is about a neighbour being wronged by theft. In Ptolemaic law that crime would have to 
be reported by the victim if any action were to take place,313 mostly because the Ptolemaic 
government did not give much regard to private matters like 22.7(8).314 Slave matters, however, 
always had to be reported.  
Based on these findings the reason for this plus can probably be understood as 
cautionary. Because a change in slave status required going to the official court, and that 
κριτήριον could have been the title of these official courts, it does not seem possible that an 
Alexandrian Jew would read τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ in this context and not imagine those specific 
institutions. It is most probable that the translator had these in mind. The term should probably 
not, then, be understood in a broad sense. Why not add a plus that is more generic like *τόν 
                                                          
312 Upon Slavery, 12, emphasis his; cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 97; Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization, 
304, argues that slave emancipation would have occurred at Jewish courts, apart from the Greek systems. He gives no reason for 
this, but it does not affect the argumentation here. That Jewish court would still be authorized by the Ptolemies and would collect 
data for them.  
313 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 543-544, 685. 
314 J. Modrzejewski, “La Règle de Droit,” 139. 
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τόπον τοῦ θεοῦ (this plus actually occurs in 24.7 for םיהלאה־תא)315 or more Jewish like *τόν 
συναγωγήν τοῦ θεοῦ rather than refer to a specific and ubiquitous court of the Ptolemies that 
dealt with slave administration?316 Even if the phrase were interpreted as more generic, the 
immediate association of anyone in third century Alexandria would be to the Ptolemaic court. 
Maybe Ex intended for this kind of polyvalence as a safeguard against anyone reading the text in 
comparison with Ptolemaic legal norms.317  
The whole phrase τὸ κριτήριον τοῦ θεοῦ does not occur in any documented sources so it 
is hard to know exactly how τοῦ θεοῦ would be heard from a Greek perspective. A genitive 
noun’s meaning is determined by its idiomatic pairing with its head noun. For the argumentation 
provided, the exact nuance of τοῦ θεοῦ does not need to be determined. Likely the genitive 
connotes something like divine approval or origin.318 Perkins has argued that Ex’s arthrous 
rendering of םיהלא throughout the translation could suggest a monadic understanding of the 
articulated θεός, i.e., “the only God.”319 However, the article is probably best understood as 
simply referring to Israel’s deity.320 This means that the κριτήριον would be positively associated 
with that specific god. That the phrase is not anarthrous probably also suggests that the genitive 
does not function adjectivally, in that it does not use τοῦ θεοῦ to infuse κριτήριον with divine 
attributes. This would be possible with an anarthrous reading.321 
 
                                                          
315 The plus here is to circumvent a physical description of the appearance of God, however.  
316 At least in part.  
317 A final option for this plus would be that its position within the whole Covenant Code speaks to its function. It could 
be that τὸ κριτήριον being added at the outset of the laws would signify that subsequent laws were to imply that the court was to 
be involved in their proceedings as well.  
318 The closest phrase found in the documentary evidence near the time of the translation is πρόσταγμα τοῦ θεοῦ (P. 
Cair. Zen. 3 59426. 7 [275-226 BCE] and similarly in P. Cair. Zen. 1 59034. 18-19 [257 BCE]). The genitive in these seems to 
indicate origin, but it, too, is difficult to label exactly.  
319 Larry Perkins, “The Septuagint Translator(s)’s Rendering of םיהלא,” unpublished paper accepted for publication in 
Catholic Biblical Quarterly (publication date TBA), 7. A copy of this paper was shared privately with this author.  
320 Ibid., 3. Propp (Exodus, 192) claims that the LXX envisions τοῦ θεοῦ as referencing “ordinary magistrates” infused 
with divine authority (in line with the Targums, Syriac, and Rashi). This is very unlikely given the use of the article with θεός. 
321 Cf. Perkins, “The Septuagint,” 9.  
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3.3.6.3. Commentary Continued 
τότε. This word is a plus only here and in 33.23. The latter context states καὶ ἀφελῶ τὴν χεῖρα, 
καὶ τότε ὄψῃ τὰ ὀπίσω μου (“And I will take my hand away, and then you shall see my hind 
parts”). The term τότε seems to function in this context as a means of making the verbal actions 
sequential so that the text does not imply that Moses saw the hand of God. Ex 21.6 is a bit more 
opaque. Does the translator add τότε to signify that going to the κριτήριον is a separate event 
from the ceremony of ear piercing? Or, does the ear piercing occur at the κριτήριον. The latter is 
what the text more naturally reads without τότε, so perhaps the former is intended. If it is, then 
Ex has made another nod in the direction of the separate event of slave registration. It may also 
be that τότε is added to reduce parataxis at the Hebrew level, though one would expect this more 
often in the translation if that is the only reason.  
 
πρὸς τὴν θύραν ἐπὶ τὸν σταθμόν. The use of the two prepositions πρὸς and ἐπὶ could be an 
“exegetical” choice of Ex who has decided that תלד and הזוזמ do not represent alternatives, but 
that the latter (σταθμός)322 is a further specification of which part of the θύρα would be involved 
in the ceremony.323 This change could actually be part and parcel of Ex’s understanding of וא, 
which can sometimes mean “or rather.”324 If it does mean “or rather,” then Ex may have 
rendered the text based on its sense, i.e., “toward the door, or rather, on the doorpost.” Ex only 
omits וא once elsewhere in a place where the meaning is not altered.325 This suggests that Ex has 
taken וא into consideration here. If Ex has understood it as “or rather,” there would be no real 
                                                          
322 For this word’s classical use as “doorpost” or “doorframe” see John Chadwick, Lexicographica Graeca: 
Contributions to the Lexicography of Ancient Greek (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), 257. 
323 Cf. Wevers, Text History, 217. Propp, Exodus, 118, wonders if the translator could not figure out why there would 
be a door without a doorpost.  
324 Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 14. 
325 4.11, where it is clearly stylistic in that Ex creates two pairings, δύσκωφον καὶ κωφόν, βλέποντα καὶ τυφλόν. This 
omission does not change the meaning at all. 
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“exegetical” change to the text. This would also go against Büchner’s suggestion that Ex’s 
exegesis here is particularly halakhic as reflected in Rabbi Mekilta’s Commentary on Exodus.326  
It is interesting to wonder about the impracticality that “the door or the doorpost” would 
create in the actual practice of this law. If the ceremony was taking place at a public area or even 
an official office, having more than one designated spot for the procedure could cause irritation 
or confusion by those officials. The change is rather practical in this regard, too. In this way, it 
coincides with the plus of τότε which adds an orderliness to the text.  
3.4. Verses 7-11: Laws Concerning a Daughter Sold as Slave 
3.4.1. V. 7: On Status and Manumission 
 
Ἐὰν δέ τις ἀποδῶται τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρα οἰκέτιν, οὐκ ἀπελεύσεται ὥσπερ ἀποτρέχουσιν αἱ 
δοῦλαι. 
םידבעה תאצכ אצת אל המאל ותב־תא שיא רכמי־יכו 
 
Ἐὰν δέ τις. This is a common introduction to compositional conditional sentences. In royal 
decrees and official legal casuistic laws it designates “special provisions, or variations and 
exceptions” in regard to the initial items discussed.327 This fits with what is occurring here in 
these slave laws. Verses 2-6 refer to either male slave laws or to the release of all slaves in 
general, whereas vv. 7-11 focus on a more specific subcategory of slavery, namely, daughters 
given as slaves. While the translation generally correlates well with the Hebrew text, the use of יכ 
in the Hebrew indicates a new section, whereas ἐάν δέ τις—in compositional Greek law—
indicates a subsection of the previous main topic. This nuance of the Hebrew has been lost in this 
                                                          
326 Dirk Büchner “On the Relationship Between Mekilta De Rabbi Ishmael and Septuagint Exodus 12-23” in IX 
Congress of the International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies, 45 (ed. Bernard Alwyn Taylor; Cambridge, 
1995), 403-420, here 413. It would be helpful for Büchner to define the parameters of “halakhic” interpretation. For example, 
later commenting on v. 13 he states, “[Ex] interprets from the explicit to the general, in order to make allowance for a broader 
halakhic category” (414). What is shown here in v. 6 would be Ex going from the general to the explicit. Are both halakhic? Or 
can an interpretation only be considered halakhic if it is found in the rabbinic sources? See Leo Prijs and Eva Prijs, Jüdische 
Tradition in der Septuaginta; Die grammatikalische Terminologie des Abraham Ibn Esra (Hildesheim: Olms, 1987), 9, for a 
similar interpretation to Büchner. 
327 Westermann, Upon Slavery, 30, speaking of the διάγραμμα in this instance. 
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instance. The translator should not be faulted. In order to indicate a new topic in Greek 
compositional casuistic law, δέ would not be used.328 Still, Ex had a ו that needed to be 
represented. Ex thus needed to make a choice whether to represent Greek idiom (that is, of 
course, if the translator was cognisant of this aspect of Greek legal syntax) or the Hebrew source 
text. Ex chose the latter here. Little is lost from the source text’s meaning since the topics are still 
generally close to each other.  
In contrast to this, Ex does represent Greek idiom by not translating the beginning of the 
clause with καὶ ἐάν. In all the documentary sources, nearly no formal casuistic law, nor entreaty 
for that matter, begins a conditional sentence with καὶ ἐάν.329 Only in the Zenon epistolary 
correspondences do some conditional clauses begin with καὶ ἐάν.330 This genre is not the same as 
formal legal texts. In legal texts καὶ ἐάν is reserved for inter-clausal additional conditions or 
concessions. Had Ex translated the beginning of any of the casuistic laws in this chapter with καὶ 
ἐάν, he would be out of sync with Greek legal idiom. 
 
ἀποδῶται. Verses 21.7, 17, 35 and 22.1(2) use the middle of ἀποδίδωμι for רכמ.331 The two other 
translations of רכמ are πωλέω (21.8) and πιπράσκω (22.2[3]). All occur within the Covenant 
Code. The middle voice of ἀποδίδωμι suggests a measure of self-will on the part of the person 
who is selling.332 The reason it is not used in 21.8 and 22.2[3] is because in the first context, the 
                                                          
328 See comments on 3.4.2. and ἐάν (no δέ). 
329 The only exceptions, among some 150 examples, might be P. Hib. 2 198, r, 5. 120 (242 BCE); P. Tebt. 3.1 703 5. 
158 (210-209 BCE); possibly P. Sorb. 3 74 r. 2 (270-266 BCE). These examples may in fact not represent the beginning of a new 
sentence, but instead be in continuation with the previous thought and should instead be marked with a semi-colon.  
330 E.g., P. Cair. Zen. 2 59160. 11 (255 BCE); P. Cair. Zen. 2 59251. 9 (252-251 BCE). 
331 ἀποδίδωμι is used in casuistic law in the active voice at 22.25(26), 30(29); 23.4, though it renders different Hebrew 
verbs. These seem to be active due to the potential confusion the future middle tense formation could cause when in the second 
person singular, since that form looks like the aorist active subjunctive (both -ση) which is used all throughout the Code. It is also 
possible that where these actives occur there is no prior act of selling intimated. 
332 LSJ, ἀποδίδωμι, III.  
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statement is axiomatic and the act of selling refers to all sellers of any motivation or type,333 and 
in the second context, because the passive and not the middle voice had to be employed.  
 
ἑαυτοῦ. This addition occurs with moderate frequency in Ex and sometimes in the same position 
as here (article/reflexive pronoun/noun).334 A personal connection or measure of self-
involvement is indicated in each of these contexts, not just possession. It is interesting that this is 
also the way in which familial relations are often described in Greek legal texts.335 Perhaps this 
idiom has influenced the translator, which in turn caused a change in the translation of the 
Hebrew word order (the suffix before its attached noun). Take these examples:336 
1 P. Petr. 1 12. 10, (238 BCE) 
τῆι ἐμαυτοῦ γυναικὶ 
To his own wife 
2 UPZ 1 162, 5. 27 (2nd half of 2nd BCE) 
τὸν ἑαυτοῦ πατέρα337 
 His own father 
 
οἰκέτιν…αἱ δοῦλαι. Propp suggests that behind Ex’s δοῦλαι lies a harmonization in the Hebrew 
Vorlage. The harmonization is not at the word level but at a conceptual level, and occurs in 
relation to the concepts in Dt. 15.12. Here there seems to be a promotion in status given to 
females in that they may apparently be emancipated. It is argued that this possibility is not 
present in Hebrew Exodus. In Propp’s view, Ex’s Vorlage read תומא instead of םידבע for this 
reason.338 This harmonization would erase the inherent contradiction between these Hebrew 
texts, one inhibiting female manumission (Exodus) and one requiring it (Deuteronomy). As far 
                                                          
333 See comments below.  
334 All the examples are as follows: 2.11; 12.4; 13.19; 14.6; 18.1, 23, 27; 21.7; 32.27; 33.11; 34.35; 39.14(36.21). 
335 This phraseology is not limited to legal texts but it is not so frequent in the literary works to be not worth 
mentioning.  
336 Cf. Demosthenes 45.28, citing a law with τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ γυναῖκα. 
337 Cf. lines 33-34. 
338 Exodus, 118-119. 
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as this author is aware, there is no translation-technical way of discerning which text Ex had. No 
other readings with תומא are documented.339 Neither does Ex ever change the gender of the 
Hebrew words for “slave” when using it to refer to persons.  
The differences between οἰκέτις and παῖς and their respective classes have been discussed 
in 3.3.2. (παῖς). The additional information here is that both οἰκέτις and δοῦλη, though related to 
the word groups in 3.3.2., only occur here. The term οἰκέτις is not attested frequently in the 
literary sources.340 Only one contrast like that found in 21.7 exists. In Euripides, Electra, 104 
(5th-4th BCE) the author compares οἰκέτις γυνὴ with δούλης γυναικός. A translator suggests the 
difference be “serving maid” and “slave girl” respectively.341 Theocritus Bucol. Idyllia, 18.38 
(4th-3rd BCE) uses the term for “housewife” according to LSJ.342 Ex cannot be using the term in 
any way that does not refer to slavery, however, given the emancipatory verbs used here 
(ἀπελεύσεται and ἀποτρέχουσιν). Ex does not mean “housewife.” Thus, this text creates a bit of 
a standstill when it comes to exact definitions. What must hold true is that οἰκέτιν and αἱ δοῦλαι 
refer to different classes. If they were synonymous, the law would be tautologous (“the female 
slave shall not be emancipated as the female slaves”).343 This is another indication that there may 
have been a class and benefit distinction between slaves of the οἰκ- status and slaves of the 
παι/δουλ- status.  
 The only evidence that can really provide any base to stand on is the consistent 
distinction made in the papyri (noted in 3.3.2. [παῖς]) between the labels of οἰκ- and δουλ- when 
                                                          
339 If Ex did have המא and תומא, then this distinction created with οἰκέτις and δοῦλη may be Ex’s way of sorting out 
what would have been a tautologous Hebrew text (“the female slave shall not be emancipated as the female slaves”). 
340 12x before here. 
341 Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neill, Jr, ed., Euripides: The Complete Greek Drama, vol. 2, Electra, by E. P. 
Coleridge (New York: Random House, 1938), at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu.  
342 Additionally, Hippocrates, De Morbis Popularibus, 4.1.33.3 (5th-4th BCE) refers to the “eighth οἰκέτις” of a man, 
which seems to refer to a wife, not just a servant, since enumerating servants like this would make little sense and is very 
uncommon. 
343 That, or an incredibly unfair set of rights would be given to female slaves in this one situation, which, ostensibly, 
did not belong to the rest. 
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delineating slaves and their tasks. Again, παῖς and παιδίσκη are general terms which often 
receive an adjective to specify the type of work they were to do. The root δουλ- in these contexts 
refers to agricultural work or menial labor. Ex 21.7 is a context that uses both οἰκ- and δουλ- 
which suggests this contrast is present. So, the distinction in this verse most likely is between a 
woman slave given the status of “household-only” and the other slave women who were 
relegated to agricultural or menial labor. Thomas Wiedemann notes that agricultural slaves were 
treated more poorly and had less of a chance to be emancipated than their household 
counterparts.344 As stated above, Wright comments that δουλ- may have even been derogatory,345 
a comment that again points to its potential low status.346  
Considering all these items, perhaps the term οἰκέτις was typically associated with 
housewife slaves. This would make sense given Ex’s context, which straightforwardly requires a 
commitment to marriage.  
 Finally, on the matter of commitment to marriage, Fraser comments that “masters of 
slave-women, and other men of the household, frequently had children by female slaves, and the 
recording of their mother’s name only [in legal documentation] was an indication of their 
illegitimacy.”347 In other words, some slave women did not have the privilege of a recognized 
marriage or family status. This may also be another reason for using οἰκ- here since the lowest 
valued slaves did not enjoy the privilege of being married, which is discussed in the following 
section (in vv. 8-11).  
 Considering all these indicators, it appears Ex is using οἰκ- in order to translate a law 
more in line with the standards of the day. This law would not clash with Ptolemaic slave norms. 
                                                          
344 Thomas Wiedemann, Greek and Roman Slavery (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 133. 
345 “Δοῦλος and Παῖς,” 270.  
346 Consequently, this would be why it appears so infrequently in the Greek Pentateuch. 
347 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 85; cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 629. 
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It would function with greater ease within that society which suggests that it probably was 
intended to do that very thing.  
3.4.2. V. 8: On Contractual Obligations 
ἐὰν μὴ εὐαρεστήσῃ τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτῆς ἣν αὐτῷ καθωμολογήσατο, ἀπολυτρώσει αὐτήν· ἔθνει δὲ 
ἀλλοτρίῳ οὐ κύριός ἐστιν πωλεῖν αὐτήν, ὅτι ἠθέτησεν ἐν αὐτῇ. 
הב־ודגבב הרכמל לשמי־אל ירכנ םעל הדפהו  הדעי אל־רשא הינדא יניעב הער־םא  
ἐὰν (no δέ). The absence of δέ, assuming the Göttingen text, is due to the Hebrew source text not 
including ו.348 In Greek casuistic laws, no δέ would usually indicate that a clean break has been 
made with the previous content and a new law is being discussed.349 Ex does not represent that 
characteristic in this translation.  
 
μὴ εὐαρεστήσῃ τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτῆς. The use of μή to negate this conditional clause is characteristic 
of Classical and Ptolemaic Greek, regardless of the mood employed.350 Ex has reworked the 
Hebrew nominal clause הינדא יניעב הער. In twenty-one out of thirty-seven cases, Hebrew nominal 
conditional clauses without שי, ןיא, or a pronoun are matched by pure nominal equivalents in the 
Septuagint Pentateuch.351 The remainder involve examples in which an addition is made to 
include a verbal element.352 More specifically in Ex, “All the subjunctive equivalents of nominal 
clauses turned into verbal clauses occur within the legal-instructional material. Most of them are 
apparently attempts at more natural rendering of Hebrew expressions.”353 In Exodus these are 
found in 21.3, 21.8, and 24.14. If Ex had followed the general translation protocol, based on the 
                                                          
348 There is considerable evidence for its inclusion in the manuscript evidence, however. See the apparatus in Wevers, 
Exodus, vol. II, 249. 
349 See Bechtel et al, Dikaiomata, 64 (line 84), 107 (lines 186, 196, 203, 210), 140 (line 242). For δέ as a subordinator 
for the same kind of law see ibid., 107 (lines 188, 199, 200, 205, 207), 140 (line 256). See also the example in Lenger, Corpus, 
109-110 (fragment of prostagma). 
350 Tjen, On Conditionals, 48; Mayser, Grammatik, vol. 2, 275-85. 
351 Tjen, On Conditionals, 169. Note, however, that the SamP has איה here which may indicate its presence in Ex’s 
Vorlage.  
352 In Exodus this occurs in 21.8; 22.14(15); 24.14; 32.24. Cf. ibid.  
353 Ibid., 173, emphasis mine. 
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typical lexical choices and renderings of nominal clauses, something like *ἐὰν κακὴ ᾖ εναντίον 
κυρίου αὐτῆς would have been translated.  
Why was such a translation avoided? It probably relates to how κακή and ἐναντίον would 
have been read. Unless Ex is circumventing a physical description of the divine presence,354 יניעב 
is always translated ἐναντίον.355 This semi-preposition in the Ptolemaic papyri356 always “states 
in whose presence something has happened or is to happen, so that they are witnesses of it.”357 
This locational meaning combined with something like κακή could very easily be read as 
indicating that the slave girl would do something wrong in the master’s presence,358 or would 
refer to events after coming into the master’s services. That is not the intent of the Hebrew. The 
term הער likely refers to either the prospective wife’s general incompatibility with the buyer359 or 
her physical unattractiveness.360 Had Ex produced a translation along those lines, the result could 
have been the depiction of a negative state (κακὴ ᾖ) rather than the absence of a positive one (μὴ 
εὐαρεστήσῃ) for rejection to be permissible. Ex’s actual translation is more specific this way, 
allowing for the daughter to be returned for anything the master finds undesirable. This would be 
favourable both to the father and the master.  
The only text before the common era in which εὐαρεστέω occurs in a situation that has to 
do with marriage may also suggest why it is used in 21.8. It is found in H. Thesleff’s The 
Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period,  under the heading of Melissa, Fragmentum 
epistulae ad Clearetam, lines 5-6: τᾶς δὲ ποθ’ ἕνα τὸν ἴδιον εὐαρεστούσας γυναικὸς κόσμος ὁ 
                                                          
354 33.12, 16, 17; 34.9.  
355 3.21; 5.21(2x); 11.3(2x); 12.36; 15.26; 33.13(2x). 
356 And in the literary sources in general.  
357 Sollamo, “Some ‘Improper’ Prepositions,” 780. 
358 κακός has a wide range of meanings, however. See LSJ, κακός, I.  
359 Cf. Gen. 28.8, which notably adds a moral element with πονηραί. 
360 Propp, Exodus, 197. 
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τρόπος πέλει καὶ οὐχ αἱ στολαί361 (“But the adornment of a woman who wishes to please only 
one man, her own husband, is her character and not her clothing”).362 In this context, εὐαρεστέω 
is used in the description of an ideal wife. The rest of the letter goes on to describe her 
perfections. Perhaps this verb was used this way when speaking of spousal obligations. If so, its 
employment in Ex suggests what has already been argued, namely, that the slave-wife had to be 
flawless in the master’s eyes in order for him to accept her. Any flaw prevented the contract from 
being drawn up.  
On the return of slaves in Greek law there is nothing documented for the Ptolemaic 
period. However, a Cretian363 law from the fifth century states that a slave purchased can not be 
returned even if that slave causes damages and is ill-favoured.364 Considering this, maybe Ex’s 
law would be particularly generous.  
 
ἣν αὐτῷ καθωμολογήσατο. The pronoun αὐτῷ in Ex represents a Hebrew text reading ול and not 
אל (MT).365 Wevers confirms this.366 It is interesting that in the Hebrew there are no instances in 
Exodus of the relative רשא having as its antecedent the pronominal suffix on the previous 
noun.367 Neither does the translator render the relative pronoun based on the previous pronominal 
suffix anywhere else. Ex is being creative here and has pulled the pronominal suffix from הדעי 
back into the relative pronoun. This is understandable, since the ostensible reading with the 
                                                          
361 H. Thesleff, The Pythagorean Texts of the Hellenistic Period (Abo: Abo Akademi, 1965), 115-116. 
362 This translation is from Abraham J. Malherbe, Moral Exhortation: A Greco-Roman Sourcebook (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1986), 83.  
363 Crete is close to Egypt and had affiliations legally, based on their shared Athenian heritage (see 3.2.).  
364 Ilias Arnautoglu, Ancient Greek Laws: A Sourcebook (London: Routledge, 2010), 46. 
365 For a detailed look at the text history here see Propp, 119. 
366 Text History, 149-150. 
367 All searching was done manually via Logos Bible Software. 
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master as the referent of the relative pronoun would read *ᾧ αὐτῷ καθωμολογήσατο. Two dative 
pronouns with the same referent back to back like this is unidiomatic Greek.368 
 The verb used, καθωμολογήσατο, translates דעי. This Hebrew verb probably means 
“make a commitment,” particularly as it relates to making a maidservant an eventual wife.369 It 
may in fact be a technical term for this specific kind of marriage.370 This verb “probably [also] 
includes the notion of setting a specific time limit to her menial status.”371 It does not simply 
mean “to betroth” since שרא would be a verb more suitable for that intention.372 Likewise, ףרח 
(Lev. 19.20) seems to be the verb used for a slave’s engagement.373 Therefore, the verb דעי 
probably only denotes that the master is committing to make an engagement and arrangement for 
marriage, not necessarily to be the one engaged to her.374  
 Ex’s translation choice of καθομολογέω for this Hebrew verb is vexing. Tov comments 
on all the derivatives of the ὁμολογ- word group yet has missed this word which only occurs here 
in the LXX.375 There are only two middle voice uses of the verb in the literary sources before the 
Septuagint Pentateuch. Dieuchidas, Fragmenta, 12.11 (4th BCE) uses the parallel phrase, ᾧ 
καθωμολόγητο (“which to himself he vowed”),376 which suggests that Ex’s language (αὐτῷ 
καθωμολογήσατο) would not be misunderstood. Only one papyrus from the Ptolemaic period 
uses this verb, but in an unremarkable manner.377 If the verb only means “betroth” in Greek, then 
                                                          
368 TLG lists no parallels before the common era.  
369 Cf. Calum Morgan Carmichael, The Origins of Biblical Law: The Decalogues and the Book of the Covenant (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992), 90. 
370 Paul, Studies in the Book, 54. 
371 Propp, Exodus, 197. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Paul, Studies in the Book, 54. 
374 T. Muraoka, A Greek-English Lexicon of the Septuagint: Chiefly of the Pentateuch and the Twelve Prophets 
(Louvain: Peeters, 2002), 351, gives an alternative interpretation that the subject of καθωμολογήσατο is the father. This is not 
consequential to any of the argumentation provided here. In this reading, ostensibly, ἀπολυτρώσει would have the father as its 
subject as well.  
375 Tov, “Greek Words,” 115-121. 
376 Andriscus, Fragmenta, 1.29 (4th-3rd BCE) uses the term for betrothal, too.  
377 P. Cair. Zen. 4 59665. 19 (275-225 BCE), promising to finish a mosaic.  
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the nuance of the Hebrew verb referring to a specific kind of slavery that leads to marriage has 
been lost.  
 
ἔθνει ἀλλοτρίῳ. This phrase translates ירכנ םע and has three typical definitions for the Hebrew.378 
It can mean: 
1) a people group that is non-Israelite.379 
2) a person outside of the family of the girl sold380 or of the purchasing family.381 
3) taken from the perspective of the master, anyone but himself. 
Ex has obviously read the text as the first option. This is demonstrated by the use of ἔθνος which 
does not refer to individuals or specific families. Ex could have used λαός if a narrower group 
were in view.382 Indeed, at first glance one might assume that םע is translated ἔθνος because Ex 
is referring to a different people group than Israel, who are instead called λαός some 158 times in 
the book. However, the Egyptians can be called a λαός (8.9), so this distinction does not hold up. 
Moreover, ἔθνος translates םע a few times when referring to Israel (19.6; 23.11). Ex does not use 
strict rules in labelling different people groups. The context of each use needs to be the 
determining factor for either λαός or ἔθνος being used. Tessa Rajak comments that λαός is used 
as far back as Homer to refer to a specific ethnic or cultural group, whereas ἔθνος has “less 
formal implications” than λαός when describing a people.383 Perhaps this is why in Heliodorus, 
Aeth., 5.19 (187-175 BCE), the entirety of Egypt (which was not comprised of only ethnic 
Egyptians!) can be described as an ἔθνος. This information will come into play below.  
                                                          
378 These are taken from Propp, Exodus, 198-199 and Durham, Exodus, 312, 321-322. 
379 So Carmichael, The Origins, 90. 
380 For the use of םע as family: Gen. 31.15; Ps. 69.9; Prov. 5.10; Job 19.15; Eccl. 6.2. 
381 For this option see Paul, Studies in the Book, 54. 
382 See Rajak’s comments below.  
383 Tessa Rajak, “Synagogue and Community in the Graeco-Roman Diaspora,” in Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman 
Cities (ed. John R. Bartlett; London: Routledge, 2012), 55-87, here 32. 
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 Further distinctions need to be made than these. In the next section on οὐ κύριός ἐστιν 
πωλεῖν αὐτήν it will be argued that Ex may have altered the text to fit Ptolemaic law. Which 
segment of law Ex was trying to accommodate depends on how ἔθνει ἀλλοτρίῳ would be 
perceived by a Jew in Ptolemaic Egypt. It has already been established that both Gentiles and 
Jews can be referred to as ἔθνος. What needs to be established is whether ἀλλοτρίῳ connoted 
(again, to the Ptolemaic reader) a “foreign” people, as in a people culturally distinct from Israel 
though still within proximity or even living amongst them, or instead a people proximally far 
away. The term ἀλλοτρίῳ translates only ירכנ in Septuagint Exodus (2.22; 18.3; 21.8). Ex is not a 
translator who is bound by stereotypical translation equivalents, as has been seen. Therefore, it 
should not be argued that Ex ‘had no other choice’ but to use this translation every time. The 
other two uses of ἀλλοτρίῳ in Ex use the word to refer to proximal distance.384 Is this how the 
adjective is used in literary sources, particularly when coupled with ἔθνος? Three references 
describe an ἔθνος that is ἀλλότριος, and all of them use the term to describe a proximally distant 
people group or land.385 
 
οὐ κύριός ἐστιν πωλεῖν αὐτήν. Ex 21.8 is odd in that Ex has apparently not translated the Hebrew 
imperfect verb לשמי with a verbal equivalent. Instead, Ex has κύριός ἐστιν. While לשמ only 
occurs here in Ex, it is not a rare verb (cf. Gen. 1.18; 3.16; 4.7; 37.8; Dt. 15.16) and all the other 
Greek Pentateuchal translators understand its basic meaning to be “to exercise authority.”386 
Additionally, an investigation into the translator’s typical translation technique shows that Ex is 
not prone to translate Hebrew finite verbs with a non-finite form.387 When it comes to a finite 
                                                          
384 18.3 is repeated content from 3.22.  
385 Lysias 2.6 (5th-4th BCE), Isoc. 10.50 (5th-4th BCE); Hdt. 8.73 (5th BCE).  
386 For this definition see Propp, Exodus, 199; cf. Paul, Studies in the Book, 54. 
387 See Appendix IV.  
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verb and an infinitive complement as here (הרכמל לשמי), Ex nowhere completely removes either 
the verb or the infinitive in the translation.388 The trend is towards a fuller rather than a truncated 
text. This is one line of reasoning suggesting Ex did not just omit the verb. Another piece of 
evidence is that κύριος is anarthrous, but when referring to the earthly slave-master in these laws 
κύριος is always articulated. Finally, as noted in 3.4.1. (ἀποδῶται), this is the only place 
ἀποδίδωμι is not used for רכמ.389 This at least suggests that there is something different about this 
verse’s “selling” than in the rest in the Covenant Code. 
What accounts for these oddities? There are two answers. One is purely text-critical, and 
for that reason should be preferred. The second is based in the possible influence of two different 
Ptolemaic legal standards.  
For the text-critical argument, it is suggested that the problem is explained by Ex’s 
Vorlage. The translator had or perceived a text that read לשמ, without the inflective prefix י. The 
participle ל ֵׁשֹמ is found in Genesis (24.2; 45.8, 26) with the plain meaning of “master” or “ruler.” 
It is not rare. The likelihood that Ex’s Hebrew Vorlage was read as ל ֵׁשֹמ is probably the reason Ex 
included κύριος here rather than a verb. And while Gen translates this term with ἄρχων/ἄρχω, Ex 
needed to translate with κύριος because v. 8 is a law about masters in the strict legal sense. The 
term ἄρχων is not typically used to refer to masters of slaves in Greek law. The different Hebrew 
root לשמ also signaled that Ex should interpret the text to refer, not to the specific master 
mentioned immediately before (which would have been signified by the article), but rather to all 
                                                          
388 The data shows: both verbs represented (2.3, 15, 18; 3.4; 3.6, 8, 12; 4.14, 23, 24, 27; 5.7; 7.18, 21, 27; 8.24, 25; 
9.28, 34; 10.26, 27; 12.23, 39, 48; 13.15; 14.11, 13; 15.23; 18.13, 18, 23; 19.12, 24; 21.14; 22.15; 24.12; 29.44; 32.1, 6; 32.12, 
14; 33.20; 34.30; 35.1, 29; 36.5; 39.3[36.10]; 40.15[40.13]; 40.35[40.29]); the infinitive or finite not translated directly but still 
both represented (2.21; 7.15; 10.29; 16.3; 18.7; 16.28; 23.5; 30.36; 32.8; 34.33; 35.4); translated as two infinitives (10.28); 
translated as two finites (16.35; 40.37[40.31]). Only 14.27 changes the very idiomatic ותארקל to ὑπὸ τὸ ὕδωρ. 19.13 is textually 
corrupt and is not included in this assessment either. 
389 See 3.4.1 for exceptions. 
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masters by means of an axiomatic statement, i.e., “a master is not to sell her[/anyone] to a 
foreign people.” 390  
The alternative argument for Ptolemaic influence is predicated upon either Ex’s willful 
removal of the verb לשמי, or the ignoring of the initial י to create the text found in Ex.391 If the 
text has become axiomatic, as argued above, then it may be that Ex is drawing on one of two 
strict legal norms in Ptolemaic Egypt. First, ἔθνει ἀλλοτρίῳ would probably be heard, as 
previously stated, as referring to a far-off land and not an ethnically distinct group living nearby 
or even amongst the Israelites. It is widely acknowledged that Egypt did not permit the export of 
slaves.392 So, when Ex writes, “a lord is not to sell her to a distant nation,” anyone reading that 
law in Ptolemaic Egypt would already assume as much.  
The other option for Ptolemaic influence takes ἔθνει ἀλλοτρίῳ to refer to other people 
groups living amongst the Israelites. Hellenistic legal scholars generally agree that intermarriage 
between two different people groups (e.g., Greeks, Egyptians, Jews) was frowned upon in third 
century Alexandria.393 The axiomatic statement would then be a nod towards this general attitude 
of all Ptolemaic residents of Egypt, namely, that different ethnicities should not be married to 
one another.  
 
                                                          
390 When referring to the master of a slave, the root ןדא is used elsewhere. 
391 The other possibility would be that the text did not have the י and that Ex’s text just coincidentally lined up with 
Ptolemaic law.  
392 Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization, 68, 433; idem., Mizraim, 19; Westermann, Upon Slavery, 58; P. Lille 29, 1. 13 
(the procedures in this text may not be the same as Alexandria; cf. Bagnall and Derow, The Hellenistic, 236. For a less convinced 
opinion on this subject, see Rostovtzeff, “Ptolemaic Egypt,” 135. 
393 Gideon Bohak, “Ethnic Continuity in the Jewish Diaspora in Antiquity,” in Jews in the Hellenistic and Roman Cities 
(ed. John R. Bartlett; London: Routledge, 2012), 175-192, here 185; Margaret H Williams, The Jews Among the Greeks and 
Romans: A Diasporan Sourcebook (London: Duckworth, 2001), 131. Wolff takes a middle of the road approach and suggests 
there was significant pushback from intermarriage though it did happen (“Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 68-69). Which groups were 
more intolerant to this has yet to be discovered (ibid., 69); cf. also Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 104. 
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ὅτι. This is the only occasion in Greek Exodus of inseparable ב translated as the causal or 
declarative394 connector ὅτι .395 In fact, inseparable prepositions (besides ל) are almost never 
translated as causal or declarative connectors, barring only διά.396 Ex’s rendering is not wrong, 
however, since ב with an infinitive “forms a periphrasis for the gerund” and denotes causality.397 
Ex was not comfortable with the law stating anything but a strict connection between the 
breaking of the contract with the slave girl and the consequent inability to sell her to anyone but 
her father (v. 8).398 
 
ἠθέτησεν ἐν αὐτῇ. The combination of ἀθετέω with ἐν is considered a Semitism in its rendering 
of ב דגב.399 It is the first use of these Greek items documented together. If ἐν αὐτῇ is taken as a 
dative of reference, (e.g., 21.16[17]) there is little reason to think it would have been 
incomprehensible.400 LSJ defines ἀθετέω as a contractual word.401 It is only used once elsewhere 
in the Septuagint Pentateuch (Dt. 21.14) and the context is similar: a wife taken in from captivity 
is not to be “dealt treacherously with” or “broken faith with” (οὐκ ἀθετήσεις αὐτήν). In other 
words, this wife is to maintain her privileges and not be treated unfairly or unfittingly of her 
status in a divorce. Septuagint Jeremiah 3.20 likewise uses ἀθετέω to refer to a broken marriage 
covenant.402 This word thus falls within the marital legal sphere (cf. also Is. 24.16[Gk.]). 
 
 
                                                          
394 Smyth, Grammar, 631, § 2770 (cf. 503, § 2240 and 582, § 2578). 
395 ב = untranslated (77x); εἰς (42x); ἐπί (40x); κατά (17x); ἐκ (11x); ἀπο (10x); μετά (10x); ἐναντίον (9x); ὅταν (9x); 
διά (7x); σύν (7x); παρά (4x); ὠς (4x); ἀνά (3x); μέσον (2x); ἀντί (2x). διά is used as an accusative causal connector in e.g., 16.8. 
396 Cf. e.g., 16.8. 
397 Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 90. 
398 Additionally, the aorist finite verb with its temporality most clearly solidified the connection between v. 8a and 8b. 
This connection could be obscured if Ex had used either μετά or διά and an infinitive ἀθετέω (see Smyth, Grammar, 380-381, § 
1691, and 374-375, § 1685, respectively).  
399 Lust, Greek-English, 12. 
400 See Smyth, Grammar, 344, § 1496. 
401 ἀθετέω, I/I.3. 
402 Though see 12.6 where it is used to refer to familial faithlessness. 
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3.4.3. V. 9: On Contractual Obligations (Continued) 
 
ἐὰν δὲ τῷ υἱῷ καθομολογήσηται αὐτήν, κατὰ τὸ δικαίωμα τῶν θυγατέρων ποιήσει αὐτῇ. 
 הל־השעי תונבה טפשמכ הנדעיי ונבל־םאו  
τὸ δικαίωμα. Tov suggests that δικαίωμα in 21.9 is a “symbol” for טפשמ, having no real 
connection to the Greek word’s normal semantic domain.403 He argues this based on טפשמ in v. 9 
having a different meaning than v. 1 in the Hebrew. In verse 9 it allegedly means “custom” 
rather than “legal precedent.”404 This interpretation presupposes that Ex both understood the 
original nuance of טפשמ as “custom” and also that the translator was more concerned with having 
“symbolic” or “stand-in” Greek translation words that redirect the reader towards the underlying 
Hebrew. Neither of these presuppositions are plainly at work in the translation. It is just as 
possible, if not more likely, that Ex took the difficult word in the same way as 21.1, i.e., as a 
“legally binding statement.” If Ex had any issues with what the verse meant, δικαίωμα would be 
the obvious contextual rendering based on v. 1 and v. 32.405 Moreover, Ex uses κρίσις for טפשמ 
elsewhere,406 so it is not as though δικαίωμα is a strict stereotypical equivalent. For these reasons 
Ex is more than likely maintaining a standard Ptolemaic definition of δικαίωμα, whether 
“decree” or “legally binding statement,” just like in 21.1.407 The word δικαίωμα should not be 
considered a “symbol” here as Tov claims.408  
 
 
 
                                                          
403 “Greek Words,” 113.  
404 Cf. Propp, Exodus, 200; Paul, Studies in the Book, 55. 
405 For a similar critique of Tov on this verse see Takamitsu Muraoka, “Towards a Septuagint Lexicon,” in VI Congress 
of the International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies (ed. Claude E. Cox; Jerusalem: Scholars Press, 1987), 255-
276, here 259-260. 
406 15.25; κρίμα in 23.6. 
407 See the commentary on that verse.  
408 It is uncertain whether τὸ δικαίωμα τῶν θυγατέρων would be understood as referring to the guiding principles in vv. 
7-8 or would be heard more within the Ptolemaic context as “the legally binding treatment due to daughters,” which treatment is 
not specifiec in this text.  
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3.4.4. V. 10: On Contractual Obligations (Continued) 
 
ἐὰν δὲ ἄλλην λάβῃ αὐτῷ, τὰ δέοντα καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν καὶ τὴν ὁμιλίαν αὐτῆς οὐκ ἀποστερήσει. 
ערגי אל התנעו התוסכ הראש ול־חקי תרחא־םא 
ἄλλην. The Hebrew does not refer explicitly to polygamy. The term תרחא refers to “just another 
female in the household, whether slave, concubine, or wife.”409 Ex seems to understand that the 
source text refers only to another wife. This is seen most clearly by the adoption of Greek 
marriage contract language (see below). While it is a minor point, ἄλλη seems to be the term in 
marriage contracts for speaking of a secondary wife.410 Ex could have chosen either ἕτερος or 
ἀλλός here (cf. 22.4[5]).411  
 
τὰ δέοντα καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν. The primary difference between the Hebrew and Greek here is the 
rendering of הראש as τὰ δέοντα. In this context ראש likely means “food” (cf. Ps. 78.20, 27).412 
Perhaps it means “full participation in the family meals.”413 Propp suggests that it could mean the 
woman’s own flesh (given the fact that the word often means living flesh) and the necessity to 
keep her healthy.414 It could also refer to the maintenance of sexual intercourse for the right and 
purpose of procreation.415 The most common understanding is that it refers to the necessity to 
give an equal share of food to the woman as compared to the rest of the household. It is 
surprising that Ex did not translate with τροφή which is used in the legal papyri to refer to this 
same kind of obligatory food.416 In contrast, within Greek legal language τὰ δέοντα is a way of 
                                                          
409 Propp, Exodus, 201. 
410 P. Eleph. 1. 8 (310-309 BCE); P. Tebt. 1 104. 19 (92-91 BCE).  
411 33.5 is the only other place Ex might translate רחא with ἀλλός (it seems like Ex read רחא rather than דחא there). 
412 Propp, Exodus, 201, notes that the Semitic cognates in Punic and Akkadian mean this, too 
413 Cf. Ibid., 201. 
414 Ibid. 
415 Ibid. The term could suggest access to “kin”; cf. Lev. 18.6; 21.2; Num. 27.11. 
416 See LSJ, τροφή, I.2, and e.g., P. Tebt. 3.1 776 (200-176 BCE), in a petition about a dowry being held back (notably 
using ἀποστερέω). 
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saying “all necessaries,”417 i.e., “everything the woman needs.”418 This is an expansionary 
translation that creates a greater degree of inclusivity.  
The idea of providing everything a wife needs lest she be permitted to initiate divorce 
proceedings is found explicitly in Greek marriage contracts in Egypt: “No rules for the rights and 
obligations of the spouses are to be found in the national Egyptian marriage settlements. On the 
other hand, Greek marriage contracts outline with more or less detail the husband’s obligation to 
maintain the wife adequately, to treat her properly, and to be faithful to her.”419 In contrast, 
native Egyptian marriage contracts from the Ptolemaic period are mostly written about property 
rights and ownership.420 In practice, native Egyptians still allowed for marriage dissolution even 
if it was not a common part of a contract. Kugler notes that from the fifth century onward, 
Judeans in Egypt took on the Egyptian practice of allowing for a woman who had sufficient 
grounds to initiate proceedings for the dissolution of a betrothal or a marriage.421 Wolff notes 
that later in the Ptolemaic period Greek marital legislation essentially took over in the Chora, 
though there may have been a bit more diversity in Alexandria.422 Both Egyptian and Greek legal 
traditions allowed for the wife to initiate divorce proceedings if there was sufficient justification 
for doing so. Given the influence of Greek marital law on Ptolemaic Egypt, the translation τὰ 
δέοντα should be compared further to Greek law. This comparison will be performed below.  
                                                          
417 See, e.g., the translation in Arthur S. Hunt, and C. C. Edgar, Select Papyri (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1959), 7. 
418 Ex uses τὰ δέοντα also in 16.22 for םחל, but that does not indicate that τὰ δέοντα means “food requirements” since 
Ex uses the term to refer to the required (i.e., “necessary”) amount of bread the Israelites were supposed to take in from v. 16. 
419 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 120. This ideal extends back into Greek thought, even to concubines. Isaeus 
10.10 (4th BCE Athens): “Even men who give their female relatives as concubines make agreements about what will be given to 
them as concubines” (Mary R. Lefkowitz, and Maureen B. Fant, Women’s Life in Greece and Rome: A Source Book in 
Translation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2016), 38. 
420 Written in Demotic. See Jan Rowlandson, Woman and Society in Greek and Roman Egypt (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), 156-162. This is not to say women never had provisions lists: see Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 
24. 
421 Kugler, “Uncovering,” 149. 
422 “The Law,” 71. 
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Before this juxtaposition occurs, it should be noted that it is still possible for Ex to have 
read the threefold list (התנעו התוסכ הראש) in the way Paul describes it: “In sum the basic 
necessities of life were epitomized in Mesopotamian legal texts by a formulaic triad of 
commodities.”423 The term τὰ δέοντα would then be a non-specific rendering based on the larger 
intent and context of the text. However, when the papyri are consulted, it becomes very difficult 
to claim that Greek law has not affected Ex’s language. This is because τὰ δέοντα and ἱματισμός 
are usually the first items both in marriage contracts and in the portion specifically for a 
woman’s provisions.424 The language is as stock as any. The following examples are from Greek 
marriage agreements or contracts unless otherwise stated: 
1 PSI 6 601. 12 (Middle of 3rd BCE), letter about a married slave 
 The letter asks that the married παιδίσκη...ἔχηι τὰ δέοντα425 
 
2 P. Cair. Zen. 3 59378. 7-8 (257 BCE), letter about married slave  
περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἱματισμοῦ…ὅσον δεῖ δοθῆναι 
 
3 P. Giess. 2. 16-17 (173 BCE) 
 (παρεχέτω) τὰ δὲ δέοντα]...καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν426 
 
4 P. Gen. 21. 1, 9-10 (2nd BCE) 
(παρεχέτω) [τ]α [δὲ δέοντα πάντα καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν…]427 
ἐὰν δέ τι τούτων ἐπιδειχθῆι ποιῶν ἤ τὰ δέοντα ἤ τὸν ἱματισμὸν...μὴ παρέχηι 
 
5 P. Tebt. 3.2 974. 3 (200-176 BCE) 
τὰ δέοντα...τὸν ἱματισμὸν428 
 
6 M. Chr. 284. 2 (2nd BCE)  
τὰ δὲ δέοντα πάντα καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν καὶ τὰ [[ἄ]]λλα ὅσα προσήκει γυναικὶ429 
 
 
                                                          
423 Paul, Studies in the Book, 59. 
424 ἱματισμός is an established term in contracts regarding a money allowance for clothing (Westermann, Upon Slavery, 
56). Swete labels this word as particularly Egyptian/Alexandrian as seen in the papyri (Introduction, 292). Note that περιβόλαιον 
translates תוסכ in 22.27, so it should not be argued that Ex “had to” translate with ἱματισμός here.  
425 Cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 86. 
426 Reconstruction by Wolff, Written and Unwritten, 9. 
427 Reconstruction from ibid., 9, for first line. 
428 Reconstructed based on line 8 and P. Tebt. 1.104. 
429 For this reading see Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 238. 
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7 P. Tebt. 1.104. 16 (92 BCE) 
 τὰ δὲ [δ]έοντα π[ά]ντα καὶ τὸν [ἱμ]ατισμὸν430 
 
8 BGU 4.1051. 15-16 (30-14 BCE)  
χορηγεῖν αὐτὸν τῇ Λυκαίνῃ τὰ δέοντα πάντα καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν ὡς γυναικὶ 
 
9 BGU 4.1052. 13-14 (13BCE) 
τὰ δέοντα πάντα καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν ὡς γυναικὶ 
 
It is possible that Ex’s translation is a coincidence, but the fact that τὰ δέοντα and 
ἱματισμός are frequently found first in the provisions lists and are a trait of Greek contracts for 
hundreds of years suggests that Ex has harmonized the law in Exodus with the surrounding 
Greek laws. It is a small change that would have the effect of both mimicking Greek legal 
parlance while also equalizing the requirements for female divorce among Jews and Greeks. P. 
Giess. 2, P. Gen. 21 and P. Tebt. 1. 104, according to Wolff, “show provisions which would 
belong to a free marriage.”431 Ex may in fact be pointing towards a greater level of care here than 
would be normal for a servant wife. This may also indicate another reason for the employment of 
the οἰκ- root previously discussed. If slaves of the οἰκ- status were treated with greater rights and 
dignities than others of lower classes, then this law in 21.10 represents some of these rights by its 
inclusion of provisions associated with a free marriage. Finally, it is probably in imitation of 
Greek legal language and in conformity to good Greek style in general that Ex chose to include 
the possessive pronoun with only the final noun in the list (τὴν ὁμιλίαν αὐτῆς).432 This imitation 
is seen by the fact that τὰ δέοντα and ἱματισμός do not usually have personal pronouns following 
them.  
 
                                                          
430 Cf. line 24. 
431 Written and Unwritten, 30.   
432 Sollamo, Repetition of the Possessive, 43-44, gives no reason for the personal pronoun occurring on the last 
coordinate item.  
79 
 
ἀποστερήσει. This verb is employed only here in Ex. The verbs ἀφαιρέω (5.8, 11) and ἀπολείπω 
(5.19) translate ערג before this. Either of those verbs would make sense in 21.10. Once again, the 
papyri show that Ex probably chose ἀποστερέω to match the legal language of the day. The word 
appears frequently in the petition papyri of the third century (e.g., P. Enteux.), and notably is 
used when a ἱματίον (compare to ἱματισμός in Ex) was wrongly held back in P. Sorb. 3 111. 7, 
10 (224-218 BCE). Even more interesting is the use of this term in P. Tebt. 3.1 776. 16, 29 (200-
176 BCE) which has a woman complaining about her husband “defrauding” (ἀποστερέω) her of 
what he agreed to give her in marriage. In a non-marital context, the verb is used in UPZ 1 42. 
35-36 (162-161 BCE) with τὰ δέοντα as the designation for the items held back.433  
3.5. Verses 12-17: Laws Concerning the Death Penalty and its Reinterpretation 
3.5.1. Introduction: the Shift to Apodictic Law 
In the Hebrew text the most severe cases regarding the death penalty are produced first 
(vv. 12-17) and are followed by laws with lesser punishments (vv. 18-36).434 This distinction is 
lost in Ex because the translator makes changes to some of the laws prescribing capital 
punishment (see below). The Hebrew text demonstrates a shift in syntax at v. 12. Propp 
comments on this, stating,  “The participle…replaces the ‘if’ clause only for ten capital offenses: 
adultery (Gen. 26.11), sacrilege (Ex. 19.12), murder (21.12; cf. Lev. 24.17-21), kidnapping 
(21.16), filial impiety (21.15, 17), sorcery (22.17), bestiality (22.18), apostasy (22.19), Sabbath 
violation (31.14-15) and blasphemy (Lev. 24.16).”435 This shift may “create...a most shocking 
effect after the preceding legalese” and demonstrate “’the pathos of outrage.’”436 If this 
emotional appeal is present in the Hebrew, Ex’s continuance of the casuistic style has 
                                                          
433 Cf. line 13. 
434 Durham, Exodus, 322. 
435 Propp, Exodus, 204. 
436 Ibid., citing another; Durham, Exodus, 322, marks the same effect. 
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disregarded it in v. 12. The change in syntax to come will instead serve the opposite effect in that 
Ex seeks to lower the intensity of certain offenses. 
3.5.2. V. 12: On Homicide 
 
Ἐὰν δὲ πατάξῃ τίς τινα, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ, θανάτῳ θανατούσθω· 
תמוי תומ תמו שיא הכמ 
Ἐὰν δὲ πατάξῃ. As noted above in 3.4.2., the use of δέ here is outside typical compositional 
Greek casuistic standards. The postpositive δέ is generally not used to introduce new topics in 
these contexts in compositional Greek casuistry.  
 Appendix II provides a list of all the translations of the Hebrew participle in Septuagint 
Exodus. Additionally, it notes the use of aspect in each of these translations. There are only a 
couple instances of the participle translated as aorist, most of them in laws like chapter 21, with 
one or two outside of legal materials. The far-and-away norm is to translate with an element of 
imperfective aspect. In a desire to replicate typical compositional casuistic syntax and continue 
the pattern established so far, Ex disregards the Hebrew syntax. By not changing the syntax to 
formally represent the Hebrew, Ex seems to be intentionally separating v. 12 from what follows. 
See the commentary on v. 15 below for further discussion on this matter. 
 
τίς τινα. The position of these indefinite pronouns in compositional casuistic law depends on 
various factors. Their placement is based on the finer points of the Greek language, in that the 
verbs used, the modifiers surrounding the indefinite pronouns, and the combination of these 
elements together determine how the indefinite pronouns are arranged. Where they are placed 
does not seem to affect the meaning of the law. The following examples show different 
arrangements of these pronouns: 
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1 Rechtshilfevertrag zwischen Stymphalos und Demetrias (303-300 BCE)437 
εἰ] δὲ τίς τινα ἄγηι [τ]ῶ[ν] ψευδομαρτυρούντ[ων (line 2) compared to 
εἰ δέ τις φαίη τινά ἔχειν (lines 10-11) 
 
2 P. Hal. 208 (3rd BCE)438 
ἐάν δέ τίς τινα τῶν ἀρχόντ[ων π]ατάξι τάσσοντ[α 
 
2 P. Petr. 3.26. 11-12 (240 BCE)  
ἐὰν δέ τις τούτων τι ποιήσηι 
 
Only 21.12 and 21.16(17) use the nominative and accusative indefinite pronouns in the same 
law. This is caused, it seems, by the Hebrew participial structure. Typically, שיא functions as the 
subject in these casuistic laws. In 21.12 and 16(17) שיא is the object, which results in the double 
translation. The indefinite pronoun τίς is either preverbal or postverbal elsewhere, depending on 
the particular syntactical and semantic nuances of each respective verse.439  
 
θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. תמוי תומ is the underlying Hebrew for this translation. In the Hebrew תומ 
represents the emphatic use of the infinitive absolute.440 Sollamo claims it could also be used to 
give a “fullness of sound.”441 In Ex’s translation there are two primary connections to Ptolemaic 
law and diction: 1) the prefacing θανάτῳ and 2) the switch to the jussive from the typical future 
tense for the apodosis. 
 The employment of the cognate dative θανάτῳ was not the only option for Ex. An 
alternative rendering of the Hebrew infinitive absolute + cognate finite verb construction attested 
in the Septuagint (including Ex) is a Greek participle + cognate finite verb. Sollamo suggests that 
a reason that the participial form of θανατόω is not used is due to the fact that the participle 
                                                          
437 Found in Gerhard Thür, and Hans Taeuber, Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis: Arkadien (IPArk) 
(Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1994), 163. 
438 Found in Bechtel et al., Dikaiomata, 107. 
439 Preverbal: 21.7, 14, 20, 26, 33, 37(22.1); 22.6(22.7), 22.9(22.10); postverbal: 21.12, 17, 18, 35; 22.4(22.5), 
22.13(22.14), 22.15(22.16).  
440 Gesenius, Hebrew, § 113n-r; Propp, Exodus, 204. 
441 Sollamo, “The LXX Renderings,” 102, who also notes the possible emphatic use. 
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“would change the forceful sentence to death, implied in the Hebrew, to the modern principle of 
mercy killing or [it] might suggest excessive cruelty or slow killing and torture.”442 
Alternatively, the dative θανάτῳ could suggest “to die after having been sentenced to death.”443 
Sollamo also notes that θάνατος “was a terminus technicus for...[the] death penalty.”444 This 
latter reason is certainly the guiding principle for the translation choice θανάτῳ. The papyri give 
conclusive evidence that θανάτῳ + verb was a primary, if not the primary, phrase in legal 
parlence to signify the death penalty: 
1 P. Hib. 2, 1. 24 (269-268 BCE)  
θανάτωι ζημιώσ[εται/ονται445 
 
2 Aeschines 1.21 (4th BCE) 
 θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω 
 
3 P. Gen. 3 136, fr. A, v, i. 7 (2nd BCE) 
θανά]τωι ζημιωθήσεται 
 
4 P. Tebt. 3 699. 21 (135-134 BCE) 
θανάτωι ζημιοῦσθαι  
 
5 P. Teb. 700. 28 (124-123 BCE) 
θαν]άτωι ἕνεχον εἵναι.  
 
6 BGU 7 1730. 8 (50 BCE)  
θανάτωι ἔνοχος ἐσται  
 
θανάτῳ is completely idiomatic. The difference between the stock phrase and Ex is the 
accompanying verb. The papyri show that θανάτῳ was either paired with ἔνοχος + copula or a 
form of ζημιόω. Ex’s use of θανατόω should therefore be explained by interference from the 
                                                          
442 Ibid., 108. Sollamo does not elaborate as to why the participial translation could connote this. Emmanuel Tov, 
“Rendering of Combinations of the Infinitive Absolute and Finite Verbs in the LXX—Their Nature and Distribution,” in Studien 
Zur Septuaginta - Robert Hanhart Zu Ehren (ed. Fraenkel Detlef, Udo Quast, and John William Wevers; Göttingen: 
Vandenboeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 64-73, here 71, comments that the noun form of the infinitive absolute is commonly used with 
passive verbs, since it was less syntactically complex. 
443 Sollamo, “The LXX Renderings,” 107. 
444 Ibid., 108.  
445 Cf. Lenger, Corpus, 23. 
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source text’s lexeme.446 Ex is straddling the line between reflecting official Ptolemaic language 
and a faithful representation of the source text.  
 The significance of the rendering θανατούσθω is more challenging to interpret. Like Ex, 
Lev and Num only use the jussive in the apodoses of casuistic laws involving the death 
penalty.447 Otherwise, the future tense is used. Dt does not show the same patterns. Sollamo 
comments that Lev may have been influenced by Ex, and was in fact translated later.448 Dt has 
long been considered to be a translation that was independent of the other four Pentateuchal 
books, so it will not be considered in the present argumentation.449 Wevers claims that the 
jussive translation results from the Hebrew cognate free infinitive in these legal texts.450 If no 
infinitive absolute is paired with a verb in the Hebrew, a Greek future tense is used for the 
translation.451 This is an understandable theory from a linguistic point of view, but it does not 
provide any explanation as to why a jussive would be better suited than a future in the apodosis. 
Moreover, Wevers neglects to cite 21.22, which does have the cognate free infinitive, yet 
translates with the future passive. On this same topic Tjen comments, “This interesting situation 
[of the use of the jussive in this context which predominantly features future tense apodoses] 
deserves a detailed study on its own, to examine usage in different genres.”452 It is precisely 
genre which explains this idiosyncrasy. 
                                                          
446 Tjen, On Conditionals, 195, concludes the same. 
447 Barring only Lev. 27.14 and Num. 35.31, which both refer to the inability to ransom a life sentenced to death. Ex 
uses the future, too, in contexts with the death sentence and ransom (21.29-30). See the commentary on those verses. More verbs 
than θανατόω are also used to signify the death penalty.  
448 Repetition of the Possessive, 88. 
449 Cf. Blank, “The LXX Renderings,” 267. Given that Dt does not replicate the jussive pattern, it could be that this is 
an indication that the Deuteronomy translator was not as concerned with Ptolemaic legal interference. Discerning the intentions 
of that translator falls outside the scope of this study.  
450 Text History, 229. 
451 He cites v. 21 as an example. 
452 On Conditionals, 193, emphasis mine. 
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In 2.2. an argument was made that Ptolemaic Egypt was governed by three main levels of 
authority, namely, royal decree, civic law, and native law. The first of these had the most sway 
and authority. In 2.4.1. it was documented that, in conditional clauses of royal decrees, the verb 
of the apodosis is always in the same form in each individual document,453 whether it is the 
future tense or the jussive.454 In contrast to this, civic law does not employ the future tense in the 
apodoses of casuistic laws, but instead uses the jussive.455 If Ex’s laws were read as though they 
were royal decrees, it is very likely that the sudden switch in apodotic tense forms would have 
been jarring, and, it is suggested, would have served to direct the reader to the legal sphere in 
which these laws were to be read—namely, civic law whose legal authority was subordinate to 
that of royal decrees.456 
Therefore, it seems that Ex has intentionally categorized these instances of the death 
penalty in a different sphere of authority, namely, that of civic law. This, in effect, refers the 
ruling presented in these texts to a higher authority, namely, the official Ptolemaic government 
                                                          
453 “Individual document” refers to a set of laws or royal correspondence in its original form. Some of the documentary 
sources include multiple royal decrees under one title. This is because royal decrees were sometimes joined together with other 
decrees of similar topic, or for ease of reference, at a later date.  
454 The fluctuating element in apodoses is the infinitive, which is employed with either the future or the jussive. 
Westermann notes the importance of this rare distinction (Upon Slavery, 30). There are, in my findings, three exceptions to the 
future-jussive rule: P. Paris 62, 5.12, 15 (204-202 BCE), which is too fragmented to know what exactly is being discussed; P. 
Rev. 49. 16-21 (259 BCE), which is cited by Tjen (On Conditionals, 192-193), but he does not recognize that the future here is a 
stock phrase that always occurs in the future when referring to the king’s verdict (it is always ὁ βασιλεὺς διαγνώσεται: P. Amh. 2 
29. 3, 18-19 [250-249 BCE]; P. Petr. 3 42, F fr. C, 15 [mid 3rd BCE]; P. Petr. 3 43, fr. 2, r 1. 27 [245-240 BCE]; P. Rev. 49.17, 
21; 93.6; 97.2). The other futures in P. Rev. (3.2; 46.9-10; 53.17-25; 54.20; 56.14-15) are all used to speak to officials about a 
one-time event that needs to happen, whether it be setting up a role or sending an official somewhere. These futures are not part 
of the laws. The only exception I can find in P. Rev. is 13.12; 14.13; 15.1, 9, which all refer to the same people in the same 
section. According to Bagnall and Derow (The Hellenistic Period, 182), the people spoken of here are all high officials. It may be 
that the future is functioning like the former examples as a one-time event. The text is quite fragmentary, so it is hard to know. 
Lastly, C. Ord. Ptol. 8, 7.5 compared to 7.7-8 (245BCE), has the future used of an official who has stolen from the treasury and 
will be exacted (ε[ἰσπ]ρ̣[α]χ[θ]ήσεται) fivefold. The jussive that follows is not directed towards that thief, but to anyone who was 
involved in the past, and exhorts them to receive their due. The difference here is that the jussive sets up an abiding standard from 
then on, whereas the future is referring to a specific incident with a leader. These are the only mixes of the future-jussive found in 
all the Ptolemaic decrees. It can be said quite confidently that “regular” Alexandrians would be acquainted with the norms of how 
laws and decrees were written, not with these rare forms found in orders given to higher commanders.  
455 The jussive in civic law is still a full-on command, not a recommendation. The jussive can be traced back into 4th 
century law, too: Aeschines, 1.21, says he is citing directly from a law book and writes: ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ ταῦτα ποιῇ... 
θανάτῳ ζημιούσθω. 
456 See 3.2. 
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and its declarative statements. In so doing, Ex has removed the text from an unmitigated or 
unalterable call to capital punishment, since the decision on the matter could be referred to a 
higher Ptolemaic court. It is a brilliant way of ‘softening’ the force of the Hebrew source text 
with respect to what it unequivocally demands by directing the reader to a higher authority on the 
matter. This makes sense for a few reasons. First, the death penalty as a punishment for homicide 
was not at all common in earlier periods of the ancient Near East.457 After 350 BCE Athenians 
were required to gain approval from the court (δικαστήριον) before cases involving capital 
punishment were brought to completion.458 This also seems to be the case in Ptolemaic Egypt.459 
While “the papyri do not give positive information about the kind of punishment meted out in 
homicide cases,”460 it can be deduced that the death penalty was not the only punishment (if even 
one at all) for this crime. In cases of premeditated murder there was a “public penalty” which 
acted as a principal or additional punishment.461 P. Tebt. 14 (114-113 BCE), by indicating an 
inventory of the murderer’s goods, likely suggests that the Attic law regarding confiscation of a 
guilty party’s property was still in effect.462 Athenian law used exile as punishment for 
homicide.463 This is also shown in Demosthenes.464 In the Ptolemaic period P. Koeln. 6 272. 16-
17 (250-201 BCE) speaks of a victim’s mother dying after being struck. The petitioner, in 
retribution, only states that the accused ἔνοχος γένηται περὶ τοῦ φόν[ο]υ (“might be guilty 
concerning the murder”) but does not lay claim to the death penalty for the guilty party. That is 
                                                          
457 Paul, Studies in the Book, 61-62; Propp, Exodus, 205. 
458 Hansen, The Sovereignty, 15, 20. 
459 Cf. P. Hib. 2, 1. 24 (269-268 BCE); Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 481-482. 
460 Ibid., 432. 
461 Ibid. 
462 Ibid. 
463 Arnaoutoglou, Ancient Greek Laws, 54. 
464 23.53 (4th BCE). 
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left to the officials. All of this information regarding homicide, therefore, suggests that capital 
punishment was not normally a punishment for that crime in Ptolemaic Egypt.  
This claim is further substantiated by looking at which crimes were liable to capital 
punishment. For what is known about crimes that were capitally punished, homicide or violence 
is not on that list. The following are the known items listed as punishable by death: changing 
one’s name and native town,465 violation of asylum,466 disobedience regarding gymnasiarch 
responsibilities,467 delicts against monopoly,468 and breaking grain distribution rules.469 This last 
example was probably case-specific.470 This shows that the death penalty was flexible in its 
application and the high Ptolemaic courts chose who deserved it. Finally, “In criminal 
cases…where members of various nationalities were involved, it was the Greek law that 
exclusively applied.”471 This is yet another reason for Ex to tone down the unabashed call for 
death, since Greek law would take priority over and against Jewish law in cases of homicide.472  
All this data indicates that a law about homicide requiring the death penalty would have been 
quite foreign and presumptuous in the Ptolemaic legal context. 
A few caveats need to be issued about this jussive explanation. The jussive is not used in 
texts referring to capital punishment where options other than the death of the culprit are 
                                                          
465 BGU 1250. 11 (2nd BCE); Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 476, 554; however, see the provision in BGU 1213 
(2nd BCE).  
466 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 554, citing W. Chr. 70. 17-19.  
467 P. Tebt. 700. 49 (124-123 BCE); ibid. 
468 P. Cair. Zen. 2 59202. 7ff. (254-253 BCE); ibid., 554. But see E.G. Turner, “The ‘Hanging’ of a Brewer: P. Cairo 
Zenon II 59202,” in American Studies in Papyrology, Vol. 1, Essays in Honor of C. Bradford Wells (New Haven: The American 
Society of Papyrologists, 1966), 79-86, for an alternate reading of this law.  
469 P. Tebt. 703. 80 (210-209 BCE); ibid., 631. 
470 As per M. I. Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World, vol. 2, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1941), 909. 
471 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 20; see Wolff, (“Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 75-76), who argues instead that a 
judge could decide which law to use. 
472 If Jewish law was in fact used in litigation at the time.  
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presented, such as a ransom (vv. 29-30; 22.2[3]).473 Outside of the Covenant Code, Ex uses the 
future passive θανατωθήσεται in 31.14-15 where the law of sabbath observance is articulated.474 
The future tense in the apodosis does not have the same significance in terms of referring the 
reader to royal legislative authority as is claimed above for the laws with a jussive verb in the 
apodosis found in the Covenant Code. There are two possible reasons for this. One is that the 
genre of 31.14-15 has switched from law back into narrative. It could be that such a text was 
viewed through a historical lens. Ex does in fact seem to distinguish between laws that were 
intended to be practiced and laws that were regarded to contain only a historical record.475 It is 
more likely, however, that the Sabbath law, which is cultic in nature, could not be applied to 
anyone outside of Israel. It could not be used in litigation. If the function of the Covenant Code 
was to be actual δικαιώματα Jews could claim in court (as suggested above), then Ex may have 
formulated these laws with more precision because non-Jewish—indeed Ptolemaic and official—
eyes would be upon them. 
 
 
 
                                                          
473 In 22.2(3) the alternative penalty for the thief is πραθήτω. The jussive here is also due to Ptolemaic legal 
interference, since exactly who could be sold into slavery as a punishment was strictly enforced and judged. This can be seen in 
part by the fact that an Alexandrian was not permitted to enslave another Alexandrian (Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 598-
599 and Westermann, Upon Slavery, 50). 22.17(18) and 19(20) do not read as the death penalty in the Greek text due to the verbs 
employed. Likewise, Ex changes the formulaic θανάτῳ θανατούσθω in 22.18(19) to θανάτῳ ἀποκτενεῖτε αὐτούς. While it could 
be argued this is done to prescribe death to both the bestiality participant and the animal, the change is conspicuous. The gender 
of the object is masculine, with the subject being neuter. The neuter gender is not the norm for πᾶς at the beginning of laws, 
which is usually masculine when referring to humans (12.19, 43, 48; 19.12; 29.37; 31.14-15). Smyth (Grammar, 271, § 1013), 
shows that gender is flexible according to the sense of the passage, but also shows that the neuter substantive πᾶν would refer to 
“things in general” (273, § 1023). There is clearly something going on here beyond the simple Hebrew. These changes leave 
open at least that the law be ambiguous. Further work needs to be done on this verse in later research.  
474 τελευτάτω is used in the same context of Sabbath-breaking in 35.2. Perkins’ translation, “Let everyone who does 
work in it die!” in A New English Translation of the Septuagint: And the Other Greek Translations Traditionally Included Under 
That Title, ed. Albert Pietersma, and Benjamin G. Wright, Exodus (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 77, rightly 
conveys the imprecatory curse language intended in that passage. For cursing in the apodosis, see the next section below.  
475 See 3.7.2 and the comments on δίδραχμα as compared to the transliterated σίκλοι. 
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3.5.3. V. 13: On Unintentional Manslaughter 
ὁ δὲ οὐχ ἑκών, ἀλλὰ ὁ θεὸς παρέδωκεν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, δώσω σοι τόπον, οὗ φεύξεται ἐκεῖ ὁ 
φονεύσας. 
 ודיל הנא םיהלאהו הדצ אל רשאוהמש סוני רשא םוקמ ךל יתמשו  
ἑκών. The perfect verb הדצ (“lie in wait”)476 becomes an adjective with this translation.477 A 
perfect verb translated with an adjective only occurs in instructional materials in the Greek text, 
and all but one of these adjectival translations are inside the Covenant Code.478 Perhaps this is a 
sign of greater compositional fluidity in these chapters. The verb הדצ finds parallels in 1 Sam. 
24.12 and potentially Lam. 4.18. Num. 35.20, and 22 also use the cognate noun. Num employs a 
more direct translation with ἔνεδρον (“ambush”) which shows that the rare verb הדצ was not 
misunderstood at that time.  
 Ptolemaic and native Egyptian law both distinguish between premeditated and 
unpremeditated murder.479 The word ἑκών is often a legal term referring to the willful or the 
premeditated nature of a crime. For example:  
1 P. Enteux. 81 (220 BCE) 
[ἐ]πάτ[αξε   ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣  ̣ ξύλ]ωι ἑκὼν 
 He struck…with a club intentionally 
 
2 SB 8 9899, b. 5 (125-100 BCE)  
τῶν φόν[[οι]]ς ἑκουσίοις480…συνεχομένων 
 Of those engaged in intentional murders 
 
3 P. Cair. Goodsp. 6. 2 (129-128 BCE) 
ὁμολογία ἣν ἑκὼν…συνχωρήσας 
A contractual oath which (he) willingly granted 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
476 For this definition see Brown et al, Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 841; Propp, Exodus, 26. 
477 This contrasts with 21.8, which has an adjective become a verb.  
478 21.13, 19; 22.9(10); 28.35(31). The exceptions have misreading issues which caused the adjective to appear (2.14; 
23.29; 33.4), or are part of relative clauses which creates an adverbial phrase (22.15(16); 32.20). 
479 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 431. For Egyptian law, e.g., εἰ δέ τις ἑκουσίως ἀποκτείνει (Diodorus 1.77.6 
[1st BCE]). 
480 This is another form of ἑκών. 
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4 Demosthenes 23.48 (4th BCE) 
ἐάν τις ἀποκτείνῃ, ἄκων ἢ ἑκών 
 If someone might kill, unintentionally or intentionally 
 
The choice of this word might be inspired by Greek law.481 The adjective ἑκών in 21.13 has the 
effect of generalizing the law so that it could refer to any premeditated attack. This is a practical 
translation that would help those using the law in litigation.  
Büchner argues that Ex here “interprets from the explicit to the general, in order to make 
allowance for a broader halakhic category as found also in Mekilta’s Commentary.”482 The 
implication is that the translation is exegetically motivated by halakhic hermeneutics. It is just as 
likely, however, that Ex is dependent on Greek legal language and concepts, and is attempting to 
create a text that is more in line with as well as is more practicable within that system of thought. 
Up to this point this has been a consistent underlying theme of the translation. Therefore, at least 
with respect to chapter 21, I do not agree with Büchner’s statement that “it is…obvious from 
what I have shown that [the translator] knew his Jewish sources and Jewish theology too, and 
incorporated them into his translation.”483 If Ex is as influenced by Ptolemaic standards as this 
thesis claims, the use of ἑκών should be understood as coming from those resources, as an 
exchange of Hebrew idiom484 for Greek idiom.485 Of course, it is possible that the halakhic and 
Ptolemaic legal traditions coincided on certain matters, or that early Rabbinic hermeneutics were 
informed by Hellenistic influence. However, more data needs to be presented to demonstrate the 
origins and dissemination of halakhic interpretative methods before they can be claimed to have 
influenced Ex. As it stands, such interpretations seem anachronistic. 
                                                          
481 ἀγνοήματα or ἁμαρτήματα are the more common terms for unintentional or intentional harm (Taubenschlag, Law of 
Greco-Roman, 430; cf. P. Tebt. 124. 24 [118-117 BCE]; BGU 4 1185, 1. 7 [61-60 BCE]). 
482 Büchner, “On the Relationship,” 414.  
483 Ibid., 420. 
484 Cf. Propp, Exodus, 26, commenting on הדצ as essentially meaning “premeditation/willful action.” 
485 As is common in ch. 21 (cf. 3.6.1. [ἀθῷος ἔσται]).  
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τόπον. A Ptolemaic inscription486 demonstrates that Lagidic kings “granted to some synagogues 
the same right of asylum as was commonly granted to Egyptian temples.”487 At what point this 
right was initially given is difficult to ascertain since “under the early Ptolemies a few 
sanctuaries of high reputation possessed the right of asylia…but this right of asylia, though 
recognized by the government, was gradually restricted by several royal edicts.”488 Rostovtzeff 
only cites evidence from the second century onward for this restriction of rights, so some 
synagogues potentially held this status in the third century. Rajak notes that a few references 
exist from a Roman decree in the Augustan era which might use the term τόπος for a 
synagogue.489 However, if that designation existed in the time of the translator, it is hard to prove 
that it was on Ex’s mind here, since τόπος is the main translation equivalent for םוקמ.490 It must 
remain only a slight possibility that at the time of the translation τόπος was understood to be a 
synagogal asylum rather than a city or the like.  
 
ὁ φονεύσας. Tov claims that this is not a plus but a translation of חצרה which was harmonized 
from Num. 35.6 in Ex’s Vorlage.491 Appendix I shows that Ex frequently adds the subject to 
clauses in which the subject is implied and obscure. This is seen nearby in chapter 21 at v. 19 
with ὁ ἄνθρωπος (which Tov does not comment on).492 Tov’s assumption is therefore 
unneccesary. Ex is instead creating concise and clear laws.  
 
                                                          
486 OGIS 129 (1st BCE).  
487 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 8, 125. Cf. Kasher, The Jews, 110. 
488 Rostovtzeff, Social and Economic, 899. 
489 “Synagogue and Community,” 29. Cf. Josephus, Ant. 14.235 and 260. 
490 Except 23.20. 
491 “Textual Harmonization,” 11. 
492 Another example is 22.16 where ἀνανεύω is added for greater clarity (cf. Zipora Talshir, “Double Translations in 
the Septuagint” in VI Congress of the International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies 23 (ed. Claude E. Cox; 
Jerusalem, 1986), 21-63, here 33). 
 
91 
 
3.5.4. V. 14: On Premeditated Homicide and Refuge 
Ἐὰν δέ τις ἐπιθῆται τῷ πλησίον ἀποκτεῖναι αὐτὸν δόλῳ, καὶ καταφύγῃ, ἀπὸ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου 
μου λήμψῃ αὐτὸν θανατῶσαι. 
תומל ונחקת יחבזמ םעמ המרעב וגרהל והער־לע שיא דזי־יכו 
ἐπιτίθημι. Translating דיז, “to be presumptuous” or “to be arrogant,”493 Ex has represented the 
verb based on a contextual rendering rather than choosing a semantic equivalent to דיז.494 Ex uses 
המרעב וגרהל to inform what choice of verb would be suitable, namely, one that speaks about an 
attack (גרה)495 with guile or craftiness (המרע).496 The verb ἐπιτίθημι is used in the papyri for a 
similar kind of premeditated attack, with no connotation of to anything like arrogance:497 
1 BGU 6 1215 (3rd BCE) 
[τοὺ]ς̣ φύλα[κ]ας ἐπιθεμένων τῶν Αἰγυ[π]τίων καὶ ἐνεδρ[ε]υσάντων ἐπὶ τὸ φρουρίον 
The Egyptians made an attempt on the guards and set an ambush at the garrison 
 
2 P. Petr. 3 28 R (e), verso a. 1 (224-218 BCE) 
Βερενίκη ἐπ[ιθέσ]εως ληιστῶν 
Berenice, concerning an attempt of robbers 
❖ Note that the stock phrase introducing the petitioned item is ἐπιθέσεως, which 
suggests this is a categorical term for this kind of attack. 
  
3 SB 8 9792 (162-161 BCE) 
ληστηρίου ἡμῖν ἐπιθεμένου κάθοδον ωἴχεσθαι 
A band of robbers made an attempt upon us as we descended 
 
4 P. Heid. 9 428 (158 BCE) 
ἐπιθεμένους τινὰ[ς…ἐπὶ τὸ προωνομ]ασ̣μένον πλ[οῖον 
Certain individuals made an attempt upon the aforementioned ship 
❖ This example is in a context where the thieves were waiting to rob the ship, i.e., it 
was a premeditated crime. 
 
The Greek translation shows a concern for clarity instead of an exact representation of the 
Hebrew. The meaning of the Hebrew is maintained but the way Ex gets there is different. With 
                                                          
493 David J. A. Clines, The Dictionary of Classical Hebrew, vol. 6 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix Press, 2007), 101; cf. 
Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 267 
494 Unless דיז is a synonym to הדצ as Propp claims (Exodus, 206). 
495 Though this term more precisely refers to murder. 
496 המרעב could also indicate premeditation (ibid., 208).  
497 Cf. LSJ, ἐπιτίθημι.  
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this rendering Ex draws on a common term for premeditated attack so that the readers can 
categorize the law more efficiently within the classifications of the day.  
 
καὶ καταφύγῃ. The root καταφυγ- is used frequently in petitions to royal authorities to indicate 
one’s “fleeing for refuge or mercy” for justice.498 It is a technical term that spans centuries, 
usually with a preceding ἐπι + a second person personal pronoun to indicate who is being asked 
to give refuge.499 Ptolemaic Egypt was known for the prevalence500 and abuse501 of the refuge 
system.502 There is one instance recorded in Ptolemaic Egypt of a syngagogue being awarded the 
legal status of “refuge.”503 The translation does not say anything more than the Hebrew about 
where the fleeing would occur. All that the plus καὶ καταφύγῃ shows is that the translator is 
aware of the technical term and practice. But is this all that the translation reveals? No. The next 
items may say more. 
 
λήμψῃ…θανατῶσαι. In Ptolemaic law the death penalty was assigned to those who violated the 
right of asylum.504 In fact, “the offender could not forcibly be removed; the State had, therefore, 
to wait until he had left the asylum.”505 Ex’s source text flatly contradicts this in that it says to 
take the person from the altar of refuge and kill them. This would run contrary to Greek law. 
                                                          
498 P. Enteux. 2. 11 (218 BCE); P. Enteux. 12. 7 (244 BCE); P. Enteux. 13. 8 (222 BCE); P. Enteux. 14. 10 (222 BCE); 
P. Enteux. 15. 10 (218 BCE); P. Enteux. 24. 6 (221 BCE); P. Enteux. 26. 15 (221 BCE); P. Heid. 6. 376. 17 (220-219 BCE); P. 
Hib. 2.238. 10 (246-221 BCE), etc. 
499 This specific idiom is not used here because this is not a formal petition. The cognate noun καταφυγή is used in 
17.15. 
500 See P. Fuad Univ. 3-4 (246-222 BCE) in Bagnall, The Hellenistic Period, 145-146. 
501 See Francoise Dunand, “Droit D’asile et Refuge Dans Les Temples en Égypte Lagide,” in Hommages à la Mémoire 
de Serge Sauneron (Bibliothèque D’étude 2) (Paris: Institut Français D'archéologie Orientale du Caire Cairo, 1979), 77-97. 
502 Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 217-218 make these connections as well.  
503 CIJ II no. 1449, IV.3 in Williams, The Jews, 87. It is uncertain if this dedication dates to Ptolemy III euergetes I 
(246-222 BCE) or Ptolemy VIII euergetes II Physkon (145-116 BCE) (cf. ibid., 190). Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 218, 
note this reference, too. Another question that this translation evokes is “Where would the Ptolemaic reader situate ἀπὸ τοῦ 
θυσιαστηρίου μου?” It really depends on whether Yahweh’s “altar” was conceived of more broadly than just within a temple at 
the time. There were temples in the Ptolemaic period in Leontopolis and Hierapolis, but it is uncertain whether the translator had 
something like these in mind.  
504 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 477, citing W. Chr. 70. 17-19. 
505 Ibid., 552.  
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When Ex’s infinitive is compared to standard language for the death penalty in the papyri, a 
marked contrast can be seen: 
5 Fragment from Cyprian Ptolemaic edict in Lenger506 
θανά]τωι ζημιοῦσθαι  
   
6 P. Tebt. 3 699. 21 (135-134 BCE) 
θανάτωι ζημιοῦσθαι  
 
7 P. Tebt. 1 5, 4. 92 (118 BCE) 
θαν[άτωι ζ]ημιοῦσθαι 
 
8 Fragment from prostagma (118 BCE) in Lenger507  
θανάτωι] ζημιοῦσ[θαι 
 
 Note that in every instance the infinitive signalling the death penalty is in the present tense.508 It 
is idiomatically and ubiquitously written like this in the papyri. However, the literary texts show 
that the aorist infinitive can also be used: 
9 Aristotle, Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία 29.5.1 (4th BCE) 
 θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι 
❖ This is the apodosis of a casuistic conditional clause, though not a formal law code.  
 
10 Dinarchus, In Demosthenem 6.10 (4th-3rd BCE) 
 θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι 
 
There are many other examples of the aorist used in this phrase, though not in cauistic legal 
contexts.509 Because these literary examples either come before the Ptolemaic period or are not 
formal legal texts themselves creates a problem: it is difficult to discern whether the present 
infinitive is the only way the death penalty is spoken of in formal, Ptolemaic casuistic law. The 
present tense infinitive may function that way in that context. It is lamentable that more casuistic 
                                                          
506 Corpus, 98, line 14. 
507 Corpus, 168. Also found in Arangio-Ruiz, Pubblicazioni della Societa Italiana per la Ricerca dei Papyri Greci e 
Latini in Egitto, XIV, ed. Vittorio Bartolleti (Florence: Le Monier, 1957), num. 1401, line 20. 
508 In a narrative context θανατῶσαι is used in Aristotle, Oeconomica 1347b.33 (4th BCE). Temporally, this is the 
closest text to Ex.  
509 E.g., Xenophon, Hellenica 1.7.10.2 (5th-4th BCE); Demosthenes, In Midiam 182.3 (4th BCE); Aeschines, In 
Ctesiphontem 224.3 (4th BCE), etc.  
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laws representing this context from the earlier periods do not survive. Therefore, even though all 
examples of the death penalty in the formal Ptolemaic legal texts use the present tense infinitive, 
it is hard to state with confidence that this is not merely due to a historical accident and because 
we lack more documentation.  
 If, for the sake of argument, it is assumed the present tense infinitive is the only way that 
the death penalty is formulated in Ptolemaic legal documents, how would this reflect on Ex’s text 
and argument? First, if Ex had used the present infinitive, unlike the present jussive, there would 
be no way to indicate whether Ex was subordinating or downgrading this instance of the death 
penalty like the rest. The infinitive functions and looks the same way in both royal decrees and 
civic law, and is used interchangeably with either the future or the jussive. There is no way to 
make a contrast as it is made with the jussive. Moreover, the tense of a complementary infinitive 
is drawn from the verb it supports.510 In this instance λήμψῃ, as a future,511 would imbue 
θανατοῦν with its aspect.512 This is doubly problematic since it makes θανατοῦν essentially 
futural in aspect. This would violate Ex’s death penalty principle, namely, that capital 
punishment is prescribed with a jussive. The best solution, besides changing the syntax of the 
source text, would be for Ex to use the aorist infinitive. The aorist is unidiomatic when compared 
to the apodotic infinitive in legal prescriptions for the death penalty, which leads the reader to 
look for the intent behind θανατῶσαι from the broader context. Its intent can easily be found in 
the previous and following laws’ use of the less-authoritative jussive. The law can in this way 
                                                          
510 K. L. McKay, “Aspect in Imperatival Constructions in New Testament Greek,” Novum Testamentum 27, no. 3 
(1985): 201-26, here 222. In compositional law the infinitive functions to command without a helping verb (Smyth, Grammar, 
448). Ex is bound to a source text, so this norm is broken. 
511 It should be noted that the second person imperative is generally unidiomatic in legislation, so it was not a good 
option.  
512 It is inconsequential for this argument whether the future represents an incomplete or complete aspect. This is 
debated among Greek scholars.  
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maintain the same interpretation set up everywhere else for the death penalty, as well as be 
faithful to the syntactic structure of the source language.  
 If, instead, the aorist infinitive is a normal means of speaking of the death penalty in 
Ptolemaic legal diction, then the aorist should probably indicate a perfective or punctiliar aspect, 
in that the only thing being stated by the aspect is that the action is to occur and be completed. In 
this way, the reader is bound to the surrounding context to understand that Ex does not want to 
make absolutely authoritative statements about the death penalty (as signaled with the jussive).  
3.5.5. V. 15: On Striking Parents 
 
Ὃς τύπτει πατέρα αὐτοῦ ἢ μητέρα αὐτοῦ, θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. 
 תמוי תומ ומאו ויבא הכמו   
 
Ὃς τύπτει. Verse 12 is syntactically almost the same as v. 15 in Hebrew. Why does Ex change 
the translation syntax here from the typical ἐάν δέ + aorist subjunctive + pre or post-verbal τίς? 
Ex does not care to match the Hebrew participial structure in v. 12, so it is unlikely that the new 
structure here is solely caused by the constraints of Hebrew syntax. Given v. 12, the expected 
translation is *ἐὰν δὲ πατάξῃ πατέρα αὐτοῦ ἢ μητέρα αὐτοῦ. Ex could also add τίς as he does in 
the casuistic law of 12.48. In fact, the translator has, in effect, maintained τίς since ὅς in the 
protasis of a conditional clause is equal to εἴ τις.513 The phrase εἴ τις marks a general condition 
that “expresses a customary…or repeated act…or a general truth.”514 
 In contrast, 21.12 has ἐὰν δὲ πατάξῃ which marks a punctiliar or completed action in a 
future more vivid construction.515 If Ex’s present tense τύπτει in 21.15516 were changed to a 
future more vivid conditional clause (e.g., *ἐὰν δὲ τυπτῃ), the imperfective aspect of the present 
                                                          
513 Smyth, Grammar, 576, § 2560. 
514 Ibid., 527, § 2336. 
515 Ibid., 524, § 2325. 
516 In Attic and the LXX, πατάσσω supplies the future and aorist forms for τύπτω. See LSJ, τύπτω, I.1.  
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tense in that construction could signal either a habitual action or an action in progress (as the 
present tense striking verbs do in vv. 18, 22). The change in syntax here broadens the aspectual 
scope of τύπτει into the realm of maxim or habitual action with less likelihood that the verb will 
be read as an action in progress (like vv. 18, 22).517 This is demonstrable by an aspectual analysis 
of τύπτει. That τύπτει is habitual or iterative is shown in Campbell’s Aktionsart category 
“iterative.”518 A verbal usage within this category is defined by imperfective aspect, a punctiliar 
or non-stative verb, and a context that allows repetition.519 This can be claimed of Ex because the 
translator’s use of verbal aspect is within the general norms of compositional Greek. Evans 
summarizes this, commenting, “The use of aspect, tense, and mood in the Greek Pentateuch 
represents essentially idiomatic Greek, in accord with the usage of the early Koine 
vernacular…interference is mainly manifested through the feature of frequency of 
occurrence.”520 Further, in the Septuagint Pentateuch Ex is the “most free” with respect to 
utilizing Greek aspectual variations.521 This is not insignificant. It is part and parcel of Ex’s 
interpretation of the verse. This focus on the habitual striking of parents rather than a singular 
infraction can be accounted for by looking at Greek standards and laws regarding the harm of 
parental figures.  
 Unfortunately, there are no Ptolemaic laws or documents on the topic of physical parental 
abuse. There are laws from just a few years prior, however, that demonstrate the Greek ideas on 
this subject. As noted in 3.2., Athenian law had a strong influence on Ptolemaic Egypt. For this 
                                                          
517 Intervening between 2.11 and 2.13 is the use of πατάσσω in 2.12. That context is referring to the Hebrew hitting and 
killing his kin. When multiple, non-lethal blows are spoken of, τύπτω is used. 
518 Constantine Campbell, Basics of Verbal Aspect in Biblical Greek (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 65. 
519 Ibid. 
520 Evans, Verbal Aspect, 259; Cf. Takamitsu Muraoka, “The Infinitive in the Septuagint,” in VIII Congress of the 
International Organization for Septuagint and Cognate Studies, Paris 1992 (ed. Leonard Greenspood and Olivier Munnich; 
SBLSCS 41; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1992), 259-271, here 266-267. 
521 Anssi Voitila, “What the Translation of Tenses Tells About the Septuagint Translators,” Scandinavian Journal of 
the Old Testament 10, no. 2 (1996): 183-196, here 195. 
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reason it is possible to at least make suggestions about norms that may have continued into the 
Ptolemaic era. These laws contain remarkable correspondences to 21.15: 
1 Lysias 13.91 (4th BCE) 
ὅστις…πατέρα τὸν αὑτοῦ ἔτυπτε καὶ οὐδὲν παρεῖχε τῶν ἐπιτηδείων… κατὰ 
τὸν τῆς κακώσεως νόμον ἄξιός ἐστι θανάτῳ ζημιωθῆναι 
Whoever…has been striking his father and providing nothing of his necessities (to 
live)…is worthy to suffer the penalty of death according to the law of mistreatment. 
 
2 Aeschines 1.28 (4th BCE) 
ἐάν τις λέγῃ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ τὸν πατέρα τύπτων ἢ τὴν μητέρα, ἢ μὴ τρέφων, ἢ μὴ παρέχων 
οἴκησιν:’ τοῦτον οὐκ ἐᾷ λέγειν. 
‘If any one attempts to speak before the people who beats his father or mother, or fails to 
support them or to provide a home for them.’ Such a man, then, he forbids to speak.522 
❖ It is uncertain if further penalty would be given in this situation. Aeschines is only 
referring to the removal of public rights of specific political leaders here. 
 
3 Demosthenes 24.60, 102 (4th BCE), punishes maltreatment of parents with imprisonment 
and the penalties received for treason.  
 
Note that Lysias references a law (τὸν τῆς κακώσεως νόμον) that expected the death sentence for 
habitually beating parents (ἔτυπτε). Both Lysias and Aeschines focus on the person who 
iteratively harms their parents. These items, particularly the law in Lysias, suggest that the death 
sentence may have been acceptable in Ptolemaic law for those habitually guilty of this act. It 
seems as though Ex has translated the law in a way that fits this principle most accurately.  
 
θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. See 3.5.2.  
3.5.6. V. 17(16): On Cursing Parents 
 
ὁ κακολογῶν πατέρα αὐτοῦ ἢ μητέρα αὐτοῦ θανάτῳ τελευτάτω. 
תמוי תומ ומאו ויבא ללקמו 
ὁ κακολογῶν. Whether ללק means merely “to speak ill of” or more severely “to curse with 
imprecation” is not consequential for interpreting the Septuagint translation here.523 The verb 
                                                          
522 Translation from Adams, Aeschines, online at http://www. perseus.tufts.edu. 
523 Herbert Chanan Brichto, The Problem of “Curse” in the Hebrew Bible (Philadelphia: Society of Biblical Literature, 
1984), 132-135; Durham, Exodus, 323; Paul, Studies in the Book, 66; Propp, Exodus, 214. 
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chosen (κακολογέω) is plain in its meaning. Horsley notes that κακολογέω is primarily found in 
contexts of litigation in both the literary and papyrological documentary sources outside of the 
NT, and labels its usage as “fairly standard.”524 For example, Lysias 8.5 titles a legal section 
“Κατηγορία πρὸς τοὺς συνουσιαστὰς κακολογιῶν,” and within the legal dispute uses the verb in 
the sense of “defaming.”525 
The Greek participle ὁ κακολογῶν represents the Hebrew participle ללקמ. When referring 
to the subject and verbal agents in these laws Ex’s default tense is the aorist for the participle (cf. 
21.12, 16[17], 19; 22.6[7], 9[10]). It could be significant that the protases of both laws 
concerning attacks on parents express the verbal actions in the present tense, whereas in the 
surrounding context the verbs in the protases are predominantly aorist. One argument for the 
intentional use of tense forms with an imperfective aspect here would be that Ex could have 
removed any aspectual denotation in this verse with a translation like that found in 22.17(18). 
There the Hebrew participle הפשכמ is translated by the Greek noun φαρμάκους which has no 
aspectual denotation. One could equally imagine 21.17(16) translated as *κακολογητής526 (τοῦ 
πατρός…). Translating with a noun like this would remove any additional information 
contributed from verbal aspect. On the other hand, it could be argued that 21.17(16) needed to be 
translated with a participle because of the two objects in the Hebrew (i.e., “father or mother”). 
The Greek participle allows for the direct objects to remain and a greater semblance to the 
Hebrew parent text to stay intact.527 Moreover, φαρμακός represents an occupation, whereas 
κακολογέω an action. Therefore, the translation with a participle may have been necessary.  
                                                          
524 Greg H. R. Horsley, New Documents Illustrating Early Christianity, vol. 2, (North Ryde: Ancient History 
Documentary Research Centre, 2007), 88. 
525 I rely here on Lamb, Lysias. Cf. Demosthenes 1.94.8 (4th BCE).  
526 This word is not attested in the lexicons and is manufactured for the purpose of the argument. Ex has no problem 
creating neologisms like this as is done in 21.29 with κερατιστής.  
527 This way there is also more direct parallelism with v. 15. 
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Recent scholarship on verbal aspect suggests that substantive present participles (e.g., 
κακολογῶν) do in fact have an aspectual sense.528 There are two aspectual categories that 
Campbell describes which could fit the participle here in 21.17(16): 1) contemporaneous 
timeframe with respect to the context as a whole; 2) a description or state.529 The first option 
does not fit since the casuistic context requires that τελευτάτω be viewed as a consequence and 
an event subsequent to the action of the one who insults (ὁ κακολογῶν). It makes the most sense 
for the aspect of this participle to be understood as belonging to category 2. The present 
participle represents a description or characteristic of the offender (i.e., a state), rather than 
focusing on a particular set of iterative actions. In contrast to present imperfective aspect, 
according to Campbell, an aorist participle is frequently used to denote an action that has 
occurred in the past, i.e., “the one who cursed father and mother” (cf. v. 13 with ὁ φονεύσας, 
“the one who murdered”).530 This is not an interpretive option for κακολογῶν. Why does it 
matter that ὁ κακολογῶν describes a state? The answer is to be found in the choice of verbal 
lexeme in the apodosis. 
 
θανάτῳ τελευτάτω. There are three reasons why it appears that this expression does not mean the 
same thing as θανάτῳ θανατούσθω in vv. 12 and 15:531  
1) the change in voice 
2) the change in lexeme 
3) the absurdity of the Hebrew law considering Ptolemaic standards. Ex has instead 
created a law with an imprecatory curse in the apodosis (“let him come to an end!”) 
which is in line with Greek legal standards. 
 
                                                          
528 Campbell, Basics, 122. 
529 Ibid., 122-123. 
530 Cf. Campbell, Basics, 123-124. Though see Smyth, Grammar, §1851 and §1872, who argues that the participal is, 
by itself, timeless.  
531 תמוי תומ stands behind both. Wevers, (Notes, 330) claims synonymy, but this assessment does not stand up to 
scrutiny.  
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 The first change, namely, the switch from the medio-passive θανατούσθω in 21.12 to the 
active τελευτάτω is not insignificant. The medio-passive θανατούσθω indicates that someone 
else is performing the killing (the implied passive agent) whereas τελευτάτω indicates some sort 
of active involvement on the part of perpetrator, who has now become the subject and agent of 
the verb. This is not normal. As was demonstrated, the death penalty is normally written with the 
passive. The active τελευτάτω would not be understood that way. 
 The difference between θανατούσθω and τελευτάτω grows wider when the lexemes are 
examined. The verb θανατόω was discussed above with respect to its legal meaning “to put to 
death.” However, τελευτάω does not have this meaning in Ex. Everywhere it means “to come to 
an end,” usually conveying the notion “to come to the end of life,” i.e., “to die.” Only a few 
verses away in 21.35 it also has that meaning. Likewise, in the literary and papyrological 
sources, τελευτάω means simply “to die.”532 This is still the case with the preceding θανάτῳ: 
1 Dinarchus, In Demosthenem, 6.8 (4th-3rd BCE) 
βιαίῳ θανάτῳ τετελευτηκόσι βοηθῆσαι, τοὺς δὲ παράνομόν τι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει 
διαπεπραγμένους ἐκβαλεῖν ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιῶσαι 
To take up the cause of those who have met a violent end and banish or execute any in 
the city who have broken the law533 
❖ θανάτῳ τετελευτηκόσι is immediately followed by the death penalty (θανάτῳ 
ζημιῶσαι), showing that the former combination of lexemes does not generally refer 
to capital punishment.  
 
Note the following example that contains similar phraseology to Ex while using a near synonym 
(ἀποθνήσκω). 
 
2 Demosthenes 23.83 (4th BCE) 
ἐάν τις βιαίῳ θανάτῳ ἀποθάνῃ 
If someone might die a violent death  
 
                                                          
532 Cf. LSJ, τελευτάω, I.2-3b. I.3b comments that a supplied ὑπό is required if the agency of another is involved. For 
the papyri see e.g., UPZ 1 162, 7. 11-13 (2nd BCE); BGU 4 1185, 2. 16 (60 BCE; see the translation in Lenger [Corpus, 200]); for 
a nominal form see UPZ 1 162, 9. 17-18 (2nd BCE).  
533 Translation by J. O. Burtt, Minor Attic Orators: In Two Volumes (vol. 2; London: William Heinemann, 1962), 
online at http://www. perseus.tufts.edu. 
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Therefore, if τελευτάτω simply means “let him come to an end (of life),” why did Ex make this 
change? There are two probable answers when the Ptolemaic context is consulted. 
 The primary solution to this problem is to recognize that while maltreatment of parents 
was a worse offence than maltreatment of anyone else in the Hellenistic world, still “Greek 
society did not carry such respect to the point of serious irrationality.”534 The “irrationality” here 
is, of course, from a Hellenistic perspective. Dover lists the Greek texts that speak about 
disrespect of parents and none of them come close to prescribing the death penalty for speaking 
ill of them.535 The papyri infer this as well. P. Eleph. 2, plate 7 (284 BCE) speaks of a contract 
which issues the penalty of a thousand drachmas and the process of requisition for a son who 
abandons his parents in their debt, support, and burial. This is much worse than ill-speech, but no 
death is required. Likewise, P. Enteux. 26 (221 BCE) speaks of a father complaining that his 
grown daughter is not providing for him in his old age as she ought, and pleads that she pay him 
what she owes. Her disrespect deserves payment not death.536 These items suggest that Ex is 
once again altering the text to fit with Ptolemaic standards. What is more, this rendering is not 
obscure. It fits into a category of Greek casuistic law of its own. 
 Arnautoglu notes a kind of Greek law whereby “no penalty is provided either for the 
offenders or officials; only curses are pronounced.”537 He cites SEG 33.679 (3rd-2nd BCE): “If 
anyone has abused or erased or tampered with any of the entries in the existing archive…let him 
perish.”538 This is not an isolated incident: 
 
                                                          
534 Kenneth James Dover, Greek Popular Morality in the Time of Plato and Aristotle (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2008), 
275; cf. 273. 
535 Ibid., 275.  
536 Cf. Bagnall and Derow, The Hellenistic, 245. 
537 Ancient Greek, 115. 
538 The Greek text of this law was only available at a high monetary cost, and for this reason has not been reproduced. 
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3 IPArk 24. 14 (273 BCE)539  
εἰ δέ τις...ποίη...κάταρος ἔστω 
If someone…might do (this)…let him be accursed 
 
This apodotic cursing tradition is attested before the Ptolemies as well: 
 
4 Aeschines 3.122 (4th BCE) 
 ‘ἥτις δ᾽ ἂν μὴ παρῇ πόλις…ἔσται καὶ τῇ ἀρᾷ ἔνοχος 
 Whichever city might not come out…will be guilty with respect to the curse 
 
This data suggests that Ex is not prescribing the death penalty but is instead pronouncing a curse. 
Ex has maintained fidelity to the source text’s root (תומ and τελευτάω both conveying the basic 
idea of “death”) while simultaneously creating a new meaning for the text—a meaning in line 
with Ptolemaic standards in that it does not suggest the death penalty but does implicate those 
who disrespect their parents.540 There are no Ptolemaic texts that equate ill-speaking with cursing 
so it must be assumed that defaming language was less punishable than not providing for one’s 
parents, or else this punishment would be insufficient in the Ptolemaic context. Lastly, the use of 
the jussive implies a less severe pronouncement than would the future tense so that the reader 
does not in any way assume that the text refers to the death penalty (even though τελευτάω is not 
commonly used this way). The jussive also serves to direct the reader to the Ptolemaic authorities 
for final arbitration, if penalties are sought by the offended party.  
Finally, the separation between the grammar of 21.15 and 21.17(16) implies that Ex did 
not want these laws to be read in parallel. By not using *ὅς κακολόγει the laws are less likely to 
be mutually interpreted by each other. This makes great sense if the first law does in fact require 
the death penalty but the second does not. Perhaps this could also explain the change in verse 
ordering as compared to MT. In MT, v. 16 is a law about kidnapping (v. 17 in Ex) which is 
                                                          
539 Taken from Gerhard Thür, and Hans Taeuber, “Rechtshilfevertrag zwischen Stymphalos und Demetrias (273 BCE)” 
in Prozessrechtliche Inschriften der griechischen Poleis: Arkadien (IPArk) (Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der 
Wissenschaften, 1994), 163. 
540 See Lev. 24.16 for another example of a death penalty apodosis being changed to a curse.  
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followed by this law about the cursing of parents. If Ex is the one who has placed these laws side 
by side, the translator may be highlighting the intended contrast between them, which may act as 
another safeguard against reading v. 17(16) as having the same punitive force as v. 15. Of 
course, this argumentation is predicated upon the assumption that bringing two laws like these 
together would have been done to heighten contrast rather than similarity. If they were brought 
together for similarity’s sake and the apodoses were considered merely synonyms, then why 
would Ex not variegate the apodosis’ verb in other laws of similar content like v. 12 and 14? 
3.5.7. V. 16(17): On Kidnapping Israelites 
 
Ὃς ἂν κλέψῃ τίς τινα τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, καὶ καταδυναστεύσας αὐτὸν ἀποδῶται, καὶ εὑρεθῇ ἐν 
αὐτῷ, θανάτῳ τελευτάτω. 
 תומ ודיב אצמנו ורכמו שיא בנגותמוי  
Ὃς ἂν. This phrase is used in six other places.541 Each of these instances have different Hebrew 
syntax.542 It has been argued that Ex aspectually and syntactically marks out vv. 15-17 from the 
rest of the text. Ex makes a break from the rhythmic and stock phraseology in the rest of the 
casuistic laws (ἐάν δέ τις + aorist verb). This syntactic change has the effect of making the reader 
pay closer attention to the distinctives in these verses and is probably the reason v. 16(17) begins 
with ὃς ἄν.543 While maintaining this syntactic distinction, ὃς ἄν is a formulaic way of creating 
the future more vivid construction—featuring a subjunctive verb in the protasis and the future 
indicative in the apodosis—a construction that is comparable to the one with ἐάν τις in the 
protasis and that predominates elsewhere in this chapter.544 It also makes the case more generic 
in its application, i.e., “whoever.” This generic subject may be included to coincide with the 
                                                          
541 12.15, 19; 21.17(16); 30.33(2x), 38. 
542 Note that ו is not represented in this phrase. 
543 21.37(22.1) has almost the exact same Hebrew syntax but translates with the stock ἐὰν δέ τις. Alternatively, Ex’s 
rendering could be random.  
544 Smyth, Grammar, 576, § 2561. For this construction in the legal papyri see e.g., P. Hib. 2, 1. 9 (269-298 BCE) or 
for legal literary sources see e.g., Demosthenes 23.62 (4th BCE).  
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generic punishment (see below). Since ὃς ἂν acts to inform the subject of the verb, likely the 
redundant τίς is included to be consistent with the previous rendering in v. 12 that has similar 
syntax to this verse.  
 
τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, καὶ καταδυναστεύσας αὐτὸν. There are two options for this plus: Ex had a 
Vorlage with וב רמעתהו לארשי ינבמ similar to Dt. 24.7 here, and translated a pre-harmonized text; 
or Ex harmonized the Greek text with the Greek version of Deuteronomy (or vice-versa).545 This 
latter view explains the exact same wording of the two. The answer, as Aejmelaeus has rightly 
deduced, is probably the influence of the Exodus translation on the Deuteronomy translation. 546 
The reason for this deduction is based on the two rare words found in both Ex and Dt, namely, 
ἀθετέω (in the parallel laws of Ex. 21.8 and Dt. 21.14) and καταδυνατεύω (in the parallel laws of 
Ex. 21.16[17] and Dt. 24.7). Both ἀθετέω and καταδυνατεύω rightly translate their different 
Hebrew counterparts in Ex (assuming, of course, Ex had a Hebrew Vorlage with רמעתה).547 In 
contrast to this is Dt, where within contexts that are representative of almost the same laws as 
Ex, the difficult548 רמעתה is rendered by both ἀθετέω and καταδυνατεύω in the contexts where Ex 
employs these terms. The strong suggestion is that Dt looked to Ex for help with רמעתה—without 
any recourse to the Hebrew of Exodus—and borrowed the two Greek words according to each 
separate context.549 Had the Deuteronomy translator been looking at the Hebrew of Exodus, Dt 
would have noticed that different Hebrew terms from that of Deuteronomy were being translated 
                                                          
545 It is also possible that Ex is aware of a tradition that expands the interpretation for this verse and decides to reflect 
this in his translation to remove ambiguity. 
546 Cf. Aejemeleaus, “What Can We Know,” 108-110.  
547 דגב = ἀθετέω in 21.8 and (the suggested) רמעתהו = καὶ καταδυναστεύσας in 21.16(17).  
548 The difficulty in translating this word would be due to its rarity.  
549 I am indebted to Aejmelaeus, “What Can We Know,” for this argument; Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 218, 
reach the same conclusion. Cf. Paul, Studies in the Book, 65; Propp, Exodus, 120. 
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in the parallel passages here. Therefore, Ex should probably be considered the original rendering. 
Ex translates from a Vorlage that had been harmonized with Hebrew Deuteronomy. 
 Why is this conclusion important? The primary reason, for the purposes of this study, is 
because of the intertextual connection with the verb καταδυναστεύω and its relation to the curse 
apodosis. The only other place in Ex where this rare verb is found in 1.13.550 It describes the kind 
of subjugation that ancient and unrighteous Egypt imposed on the Israelites. Anyone who would 
read this law with the whole context of Greek Exodus in mind would immediately make a 
connection between the enslavement of the Israelites in Egypt in centuries past and the potential 
repetition of that enslavement when Jews would subsequently be subjugated. This is a point that 
needs to be stressed, though the argumentation that follows stands alone (without the intertextual 
connection) with respect to its validity for interpreting this verse. 
 Ptolemaic Egypt in the early third century (or potentially even from 320 BCE onward) 
experienced a significant population increase as a result of the influx of captured 
Syrian/Palestinian551 peoples.552 This is probably the reason that this law ends with a curse rather 
than the death penalty. There were many Jews who had been captured and sold into slavery as 
prisoners of war in the preceding years (maybe at the very time of the translation!) and to create 
legislation calling those captors to account would be tantamount to inciting rebellion.553 This is 
because the sale of prisoners of war was by official order of the king.554 Again, it was not a small 
number of Jews who had been taken by force to Egypt. At the turn of the third century there was 
                                                          
550 Rare in Ex and the literary sources (only Xenophon, Symposium, 5.9.1 [5th-4th BCE]). It is a common term for 
unwilling detainment in the papyri: P. Lond. 7 2039. 11 (275-226 BCE); P. Koeln.13.516. 3 (225-176 BCE); P. Tarich. 1. 10, 26 
(188-187 BCE); P. Tebt.3.2.953. 7 (181-180 BCE). 
551 “Syrian” was a designation for Jewish people at that time in Egypt, as a distinction was rarely made between the 
Jews and Syrians. See Tcherikover, The Jews, 4-5. 
552 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 74; Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 2, 4; idem., Hellenistic Civilization, 273; cf. Kasher, The 
Jews, 39-40; Westermann, Upon Slavery, 57; Aristeas, 12-14. 
553 I presuppose here a mid to early third century date for the Greek Pentateuch.  
554 Cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 71. 
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a massive displacement that all, both Jews and Greeks, would have been keenly aware of. If the 
Covenant Code was meant to be translated as a law for the Jews to refer to in their new Egyptian 
context, this law in its original Hebrew meaning would have caused problems when a Greek 
official saw it. It would also include an implicit call for the death of the king himself. Had Ex’s 
source text not had לארשי ינבמ, it is very likely that θανατούσθω would have been employed and 
not τελευτάτω.555 Greek law did, for that matter, universally condemn stealing free persons and 
prescribed the death penalty for it.556  
Now it could be argued that τελευτάτω does still, though with less directness, contain ill 
will towards those who captured Israelites or even possibly the king. This is true, but the 
difference between what is stated with θανατούσθω, namely, that the God of Israel tells his 
people to kill those who have captured them, as compared to what is stated by τελευτάτω, that is, 
that Israelites may hold a negative disposition towards those who have captured them, is a stark 
change in outcome. One could imagine that a Ptolemaic official would care little if an Israelite 
was indignant towards their actions against Israel provided that such indignation was not going 
to be acted upon. Additionally, the use of the jussive here also implies that this apodotic curse is 
not the last word on the matter. The authority of the law has been relegated to civic law and as 
such another royal decree could override its contents. This is another way of circumventing an 
absolute statement against the Ptolemaic authorities.  
 
                                                          
555 This contextual switching between τελευτάτω and θανατούσθω seems to be present in Lev. 24.16 as well. When the 
law condemns foreigners for blaspheming God’s name, the text switches from θανατούσθω to τελευτάτω. In this way the text 
does not call for the death of foreigners for speaking God’s name.  
556 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 72; Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization, 69; cf. P. Tebt. 3 765. 12 (153 BCE); 
Aeschines 1.91 (4th BCE); and Aristotle, Athenian Constitution, 52.1 (4th BCE), which all prescribe the death sentence. 
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καὶ εὑρεθῇ ἐν αὐτῷ. The Hebrew ודיב אצמנו is notoriously ambiguous.557 Ex seems to have 
intentionally not translated ἐν τῇ χειρὶ αὐτοῦ given that just a few verses earlier a similar phrase 
was rendered εἰς τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῦ (v. 13; cf. v. 20). Ex variously translates די phrases, sometimes 
with prepositions558 or by including a form of χείρ. Only here is ἐν αὐτῷ used.559 The entire 
phrase εὑρεθῇ ἐν αὐτῷ is completely ambiguous with respect to the subject of the verb and the 
referent of αὐτῷ. Ex usually disambiguates a law in his translation. This translation likely has to 
do with the curse apodosis. There is no here-and-now consequence of the apodosis so Ex has 
translated in a way that allows for the following interpretive options: the captor is found with the 
captive; the captive is found with the captor; the theft is found out with respect to560 the captive 
(e.g., the captive is somehow recovered); theft is found out with respect to the captor (e.g., the 
captor is somehow implicated), etc. The interpretations are numerous and all conclude with a 
curse. 
 
θανάτῳ τελευτάτω. See notes on 3.5.6. (θανάτῳ τελευτάτω).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
557 Cf. Propp, Exodus, 212-213, for options. For a potential ancient reading see S. Iwry, “אצמנה – a Striking Variant 
Reading in 1QIsa,” Textus 5 (1966): 34-43, here 37. 
558 As only a few examples: 2.5, 19; 9.35; 10.25; 16.3. 
559 Other completely reworked phrases: 23.1 and a group of texts all translating a similar Hebrew expression (4.13; 
22.7(8); 24.11).  
560 “With respect to” being the translation of ἐν αὐτῷ as a dative of respect. 
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3.6. Verses 18-27: Laws Concerning Striking 
 
3.6.1. VV. 18-19: Of Free Persons without Fatality 
 
Ἐὰν δὲ λοιδορῶνται δύο ἄνδρες, καὶ πατάξῃ τις τὸν πλησίον λίθῳ ἢ πυγμῇ, καὶ μὴ ἀποθάνῃ, 
κατακλιθῇ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν κοίτην, ἐὰν ἐξαναστὰς ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιπατήσῃ ἔξω ἐπὶ ῥάβδου, ἀθῷος 
ἔσται ὁ πατάξας· πλὴν τῆς ἀργίας αὐτοῦ ἀποτείσει καὶ τὰ ἰατρεῖα. 
בכשמל לפנו תומי אלו ףרגאב וא ןבאב והער־תא שיא־הכהו םישנא ןבירי־יכו 
םוקי־םא אפרי אפרו ןתי ותבש קר הכמה הקנו ותנעשמ־לע ץוחב ךלהתהו  
 
λοιδορῶνται. The verb ביר means “to quarrel verbally.”561 In the Hebrew context a physical fight 
is in view. Propp surmises that, “Either ביר euphemistically connotes a physical fight, or else we 
are to imagine a verbal quarrel that breaks into violence. By the latter reading, the text is 
elliptical, merely implying a brawl.”562 The term λοιδορέω is used in the legal papyri in nearly 
the same way. The nominal form λοιδορίας is the term used to describe “verbal abuse” before a 
fight τῶν πληγῶν (“of blows”).563 Moreover, the verb is also found in the same context.564 This 
lexeme is ubiquitously used this way.  
The present tense in casuistic law is the “marked” tense with the aorist as the default.565 
The use of the present subjunctive “views an act as continuing (not completed), whereas the 
aorist subjunctive views it as simply occurring (completed).”566 For this reason λοιδορῶνται is 
the action in progress when the strike occurs. This fits Campbell’s Aktionsart category of 
“progressive” which is formed by imperfective aspect, a non-punctiliar or non-stative verb, and a 
context that allows progression.567 
                                                          
561 Paul, Studies in the Book, 67; Carmichael, The Origins, 115. 
562 Exodus, 214; cf. Brown et al, Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 936, which designate only this verse for physical 
fighting. 
563 E.g., P. Enteux. 74. 5 (221 BCE); P. Petr. 2 18. 8-10 (220 BCE); P. Enteux. 72. 3 (218 BCE). 
564 P. Tebt. 3 765. 4, 10 (153 BCE); BGU 6 1247 (137-136 BCE). 
565 Tjen, On Conditionals, 121-122. 
566 Smyth, 524, § 2325. 
567 Campbell, Basics, 63; cf. 68-69. 
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All the present tense subjunctive verbs in chapters 21-23 (not including copula) are in the 
middle voice (21.18, 22, 23, 29, 36; 22.16[17]). Is the middle employed in Ex to invoke an 
element of self-involvement, whether reflexive or reciprocal?568 Appendix III lists all the middle 
voice verbs in Ex and shows that only on one occasion does Ex use the middle voice without a 
documented middle definition (19.23). That is the only context where an interpretive element of 
self-involvement could potentially be discerned.  
 
ὁ ἄνθρωπος. This is a plus to clarify the subject. See Appendix I.  
 
ἀθῷος ἔσται. The Niphal perfect 3ms verb הקנ is represented by Ex with a predicate adjective 
and copula. Ex does not translate finite verbs as ‘item (noun or the like) + copula’ as a general 
rule. This pattern only occurs in laws (12.4; 21.8; 21.19; 21.36).569 The reason the common 
apodotic future verb is not used (ostensibly *ἀθῳωθήσεται here)570 is because guilt or innocence 
in a legal claim is idiomatically spoken of using a noun or substantive adjective + a mode of 
predication (usually involving a copula): 
1 P. Koeln. 6 272. 16-17 (250-201 BCE) 
  ἔνοχος γένηται περὶ τοῦ φ̣όν[ο]υ 
 
2 P. Hib. 2, 1. 26 (269-268 BCE)  
ἀθῶιοι ἔστωσαν 
 
3 SB 8008, 1. 4-6, 26-27 (260 BCE) 
ἐὰν [δ]έ τινε[ς μή ποιῶ]σιν...στε[ρηθήσονται καὶ ἔνοχοι] ἔσονται…571 
ἐὰν δέ τινες μὴ ποιῶσιν τι...ἔνοχοι ἔ[σ]ονται  
 
                                                          
568 For functions of the middle see Smyth, Grammar, 390.  
569 The only exception is when Ex circumvents a physical description of the divine presence (33.16; 34.9).  
570 Though another more idiomatic verb could have been used. This root does not often become a verb.  
571 Cf. Lenger, Corpus, 39-40, for reconstruction. 
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Ex’s use of ἔνοχός ἐστιν for ול םימד in 22.2(3) again shows a desire to match legal language 
rather than to keep formal translation equivalencies. This, too, points to potential ‘on the ground’ 
use of these laws. 
 
ἀργίας. A few examples of this term in the Ptolmaic papyri with a similar meaning and context to 
this verse are found.572 It refers to time lost from a worker’s wage or production. According to 
Wevers, the use of the genitive indicates reimbursement for this time lost and is probably also 
reflective of contemporary idiom.573  
 
ἀποτείσει. Ex lexically flattens ןתנ (21.19) and לקש (22.16[17]) into ἀποτίνω, the typical 
rendering of םלש.574 This is explainable by the fact that ἀποτίνω appears everywhere in legal 
casuistic law.575 It is the most common verb in the apodosis for restitution and a “forensic term 
which means to pay a penalty.”576 The object of the verb expresses the penalty. 
 
τὰ ἰατρεῖα. This is the only place where Ex translates an infinitive absolute + finite verb without 
a verbal element.577 The reason seems to be based in keeping ἀποτίνω as the main verb. Had 
אפרי אפרו been maintained as verbal, perhaps another apodotic future would obscure the 
outcome—*καὶ ἰατρεύσει (or something like it) could imply that the striker had to do the 
healing, and an additional pronoun would probably be needed (αὐτόν). A passive like 
                                                          
572 See SB 22.15762. 41 (210-209 BCE) and PSI 4.371 (250-249 BCE) for the same use of this word as 21.19 (PSI 
4.371 is a more general use). See P. Enteux. 72. 8 (218-217 BCE); SB 20 15001. 17-20 (217-216 BCE); P. Hels. 1.2. 21-25 (195-
192 BCE) for cases involving the subject. 
573 Wevers, Notes, 332. 
574 E.g., 21.34, 36, 37; 22.3(4), 4(5), 5(6), 6(7), 8(9), 10(11), 11(12), 12(13), 13(14), 14(15). 
575 E.g., as a very small sample, P. Cair. Zen. 3 59343 (246 BCE); P. Enteux. 12 (244-243 BCE); UPZ 1 127 (135-134 
BCE). 
576 E. J. Bickerman, “Two Legal Interpretations of the Septuagint,” in Studies in Jewish and Christian History (Bosten: 
Brill Leiden, 2007), 195-217, here 212. 
577 Cf. Tjen, On Conditionals, 201-202, enumerates the other occurrences in the Pentateuch: Gen. 13.9(2x); 18.30, 32; 
30.31; Ex. 21.19; Lev. 27.10. Tov, “Renderings,” 72, connects Greek Exodus and Isaiah as the only books showing concerted 
effort to translate the infinitive absolute + finite as a single word. This is a sign of their translational freedom.  
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*ἰατρευθήσεται would also not make clear that the striker must pay for the healing process. As 
has been seen, Ex is almost always prone to make a law more specific than ambiguous. The 
intent is a “pragmatic functional agreement” rather than a “mechanical translation equivalent.”578 
The use of the accusative furthers this end as its use with ἀποτίνω indicates direct costs.579 
 Another reason for the more specific τὰ ἰατρεῖα is probably due to Ex’s desire to reflect 
Ptolemaic Greek norms.580 There are Greek laws on this subject.581 Legal medical issues were 
directed towards the courts (the δικαστήριον in P. Enteux. 69. 9 [218BCE]). There was a medical 
tax (P. Tebt. 3.1 746. 23 [243-242 BCE]) and the private medical fees as represented here in Ex 
would have been the responsibility of the patient.582 The lexeme ἰατρεῖον (“surgery”)583 would be 
practiced at authorized clinics.584 The use of ἰατρεῖον suggests that Ex is positioning the law 
within a Greek medical framework.585 This is because predominantly Egyptian cities and their 
physicians did not charge for medical services.586 In a chiefly Greek city like Alexandria private 
physicians worked for private fees, much as is the case in the modern world.587 This suggests that 
the translation was made in a thoroughly Greek city. The translation τὰ ἰατρεῖα would not have 
made sense in the Chora or smaller-scale, largely Egyptian cities. In those cities, a more formally 
representative translation would have been suitable, such as “and they will be healed,” because 
there would be no medical fee to be paid. 
                                                          
578 Rajak, Translation and Survival, 130. 
579 So Wevers, Notes, 332.  
580 This is not to say, “doctor’s fee” is not the meaning of the Hebrew. See Harry A. Hoffner, Piotr Michalowski, and 
Martha T. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 2009), 66 and Eshnunna 47-47a; 
122 and Hammurapi 206-208; 219-219, 234 and Hittite Laws 10, 174; Paul, Studies in the Book, 69; Propp, Exodus, 217. 
581 Cf. Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 439; See P. Hal. 1. 203ff. (3rd BCE); P. Enteux. 72 (218 BCE); P. Enteux 
81; P. Tebt. 3 798 (2nd BCE); P. Tebt. 800 (mid 2nd BCE); P. Tebt. 44 (114 BCE); P. Ryl. 2 68 (1st BCE). The compensation and 
justice given for battery seems to have been given through the court (P. Enteux. 81. 24 [221-220 BCE]). P. Enteux. 74 (221 BCE) 
and. P. Enteux. 79 (218 BCE) show that the amount to be repaid was decided by Ptolemaic officials. 
582 Ibid., 633; P. Tebt. 112 (112 BCE). 
583 This is the translation of Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 357. 
584 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 2, 526; cf. Aeschines 1.40 (4th BCE).  
585 Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 219, conclude similarly.  
586 Fraser, Ptolemaic, vol. 1, 373. No documentation on Jewish physicians exists, to this author’s knowledge.   
587 Ibid., 374. 
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3.6.2. VV. 20-21: Of Slaves with Fatality  
 
Ἐὰν δέ τις πατάξῃ τὸν παῖδα αὐτοῦ ἢ τὴν παιδίσκην αὐτοῦ ἐν ῥάβδῳ, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ ὑπὸ τὰς 
χεῖρας αὐτοῦ, δίκῃ ἐκδικηθήτω.  ἐὰν δὲ διαβιώσῃ ἡμέραν μίαν ἢ δύο, οὐκ ἐκδικηθήσεται· τὸ γὰρ 
ἀργύριον αὐτοῦ ἐστιν. 
םקני םקנ ודי תחת תמו טבשב ותמא־תא וא ודבע־תא שיא הכי־יכו 
אוה ופסכ יכ םקי אל דמעי םימוי וא םוי־םא ךא 
 
παῖδα/παιδίσκην. See 3.3.2. (παῖς) and 3.4.1. (οἰκέτις) for further discussion on these terms. They 
are generic terms for slavery. See also vv. 26-27 for specific slave class distinctions. 
 
δίκῃ ἐκδικηθήτω. The Hebrew םקני םקנ only appears here in biblical law. Most interpreters 
regard this phrase to be equivalent to תמוי תומ.588 According to Propp, the use of םקנ instead of 
תומ may be a means of signaling that the slave had no kinsman redeemer/blood redeemer, or else 
he would have been already ransomed from slavery by his kinsman.589 In this interpretation, 
vengeance is now the duty of the community or God (instead of the kinsman).590 Another option 
is that םקני םקנ refers to criminal prosecution and it would be up to the judge to decide if the 
death penalty or another punishment were needed.591 Ex understands the text in the latter way (or 
willfully alters what he thinks the Hebrew actually means for his own purposes). This needs to 
be further discussed. 
 The term δίκη is used technically in Greek law to refer to a “suit”592 or “case.”593 It is 
defined as a “claim to proceed against a person or to seize a thing, [that] might arise out of a 
situation.”594 The use of δίκη therefore suggests a formal legal suit (e.g. P. Rev. 33.16 [259-258 
BCE]). It is in a δίκη (“a legal case”) that one would bring δικαιώματα as evidence for 
                                                          
588 Propp, Exodus, 219. SamP, in fact, reads תמוי תומ here. 
589 Ibid. 
590 Paul, Studies in the Book, 70; Propp, Exodus, 219. 
591 Houtman and Woudstra, Exodus, 157-159; cf. Propp, Exodus, 219. 
592 For this translation see Bangall and Derow, The Hellenistic, 187, 236, etc. 
593 For this translation see Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 152-155. 
594 Wolff, “Law in Ptolemaic Egypt,” 73; for more examples see e.g., P. Gurob. 2. 26, 31, 40, 49 (226-225 BCE); P. 
Gurob. 10. 12 (300-201 BCE). 
 
113 
 
vindication.595 Why does Ex choose this rendering instead of ἐκδίκησις, the cognate for 
ἐκδικηθήτω? The noun ἐκδίκησις is used in 7.4 and 12.12 as “vengeance,” particularly for the 
mistreated ‘slave’ Israel. It is attested elsewhere as well.596 It would not be misunderstood in this 
context. Equally, or possibly more suitable, would be καταδίκη (“punishment/fine”) as seen in P. 
Hal. 1. 52 (3rd BCE) and P. Hib. 1 32. 7-8 (245-244 BCE). The problem with either ἐκδίκησις or 
καταδίκη is that the phrases *ἐκδικήσει ἐκδικηθήσεται (“with vengeance he will suffer 
vengeance”) or *καταδίκηι ἐκδικηθήσεται (“with a punishment he will suffer vengeance”), given 
the laws that punished homicide with death just prior (e.g., v. 12), would likely be read as 
parallels to the death penalty. It has already been argued that this translator tries to avoid 
unmitigated calls for capital punishment. Considering these options, it would seem that δίκῃ is a 
particularly intentional choice. Ex uses the term to direct anyone in the situation described by the 
law to the nearest tribunal for further judicial process.  
This is further suggested by the jussive ἐκδικηθήτω (“let him (the murderer) suffer 
vengeance”).597 Both in the Hebrew and in Ex’s version ἐκδικηθήτω suggests the death 
penalty.598 This is due to v. 12, which prescribes capital punishment to anyone who strikes 
another human and kills them. It is for this reason that it also is in the jussive.599 Like 
                                                          
595 Cf. τὰ δικαιώ[μα]τα τῆ[[ς]] δίκης (P. Hal. 2. 38 [3rd BCE]), “the proof-texts of a case” (Bagnall and Derow, The 
Hellenistic, 207); τὰ δὲ δικαιώ[μα]τα τῆς δίκης ἐφʼ ἧς ἄν τις μαρτυρίας ἐπιλάβη[τα]ι (P. Hal. 1. 38 [3rd BCE]), “the justifications 
of the legal trial on the basis of which someone might receive legal recourse.” 
596 Aesopus, Fabulae 3.2.20 and 246.11 (both in the dative); 3γ.7 (6th BCE); Quintus Fabius Pictor, Fragmenta 18.35 
(3rd BCE); Polybius, Historiae, 3.8.10.6 (3rd-2nd BCE). In the papyri: P. Strasb. 1 79. 7 (16-15 BCE). 
597 That the murderer is the subject in Hebrew is documented in Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 668. 
Given the parallelism to the death penalty laws in Ex (vv. 12, 15), this jussive/passive would be read with the murderer as the 
subject.  
598 The verb is only found in the papyri in P.Tor. Choach. 12 6. 8 (117-116 BCE) as ἐ[[κ]]δικήσαντες (τὴν κρίσιν), 
translated as “defend (the case)” by Bagnall and Derow, The Hellenistic, 222. In Ex, it should probably be read as “Let him be 
defended with a trial,” with the implication of a trial that leads to punishment via the death penalty. The text would be understood 
as referring to the death penalty based on the context and not strictly through the lexical definitions of ἐκδικέω. 
599 The aorist, when written in legal style and the apodosis, represents a command that is only referring to a specific 
situation and not to a universal prescription/customary imperative as the present entails (see Westermann, Upon Slavery, 37 and 
Mayser, Grammatik, vol. 2, 150 § b1.) 
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θανατούσθω, the authority of the statement is deferred to another source.600 This also implies 
why δίκῃ was used. By telling the reader to go to the nearest tribunal for trial the verdict of the 
death sentence would already lie in the hands of the Ptolemaic authorities. Ex’s translation 
maintains fidelity to the source text’s root word, while at the same time finds a way to redirect 
the reader to the Ptolemaic judicial system. It can be concluded, then, that both δίκῃ and the 
jussive function to direct persons in this situation to find a solution outside of the text, as it does 
not prescribe a concrete punishment.  
 
ἐκδικηθήσεται. The jussive is not used here because there is no action to be taken in this 
apodosis. If the slave lives for awhile following a blow, then no action is required.601 The jussive 
is not used because there is no prescription for the death penalty.  
3.6.3. VV. 22-23: Of a Pregnant Woman 
Ἐὰν δὲ μάχωνται δύο ἄνδρες καὶ πατάξωσιν γυναῖκα ἐν γαστρὶ ἔχουσαν, καὶ ἐξέλθῃ τὸ παιδίον 
αὐτῆς μὴ ἐξεικονισμένον, ἐπιζήμιον ζημιωθήσεται· καθότι ἂν ἐπιβάλῃ ὁ ἀνὴρ τῆς γυναικός, 
δώσει μετὰ ἀξιώματος· ἐὰν δὲ ἐξεικονισμένον ᾖ, δώσει ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς, 
םיללפב ןתנו השאה לעב וילע תישי רשאכ שנעי שונע ןוסא היהי אלו הידלי ואציו הרה השא ופגנו םישנא וצני־יכו 
שפנ תחת שפנ התתנו היהי ןוסא־םאו 
 
μάχωνται. See 3.6.1. (λοιδορῶνται) for the present tense. 
 
πατάξωσιν. Eveline van Staalduine-Sulman argues that ףגנ in this legal context (as compared to 
the typical הכנ) is a term used to specify an unintended strike.602 Ex resorts to semantic leveling 
with his choice of πατάσσω to render the two Hebrew lexemes. The intentionality of a crime 
would be determined by the government official in Ptolemaic times. However, this should not be 
                                                          
600 See 3.5.2. 
601 Remember that the victim or their representative would have to bring a case to the Ptolemaic court. The Ptolemies 
would not actively seek the case out.  
602 Cf. Eveline Van Staalduine-Sulman, “Between Legislative and Linguistic Parallels: Exodus 21:22-25 in its 
Context,” in The Interpretation of Exodus: Studies in Honour of Cornelis Houtman, ed. Riemer Roukema (Leuven: Peters, 2006), 
207-224, here 217; contra Carmichael, Origins, 121-122. 
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pressed as Ex’s intent in the flattened translation. Ex’s rendering creates a more generally 
applicable law and changing the pervasive striking verb could confuse the reader at this point. 
 
μὴ ἐξεικονισμένον. This phrase translates ןוסא היהי אלו.603 Ex’s translation “not fully-formed”604 
either stems from a misunderstanding or ignorance with respect to the Hebrew term ןוסא, or it is 
an interpretive gloss. The noun ןוסא likely means something more than simply “death” since no 
form of תומ is used here. If the purpose of vv. 22-25 is to present paradigmatic cases of “harm” 
caused to third parties, then this term needs to be broadened to include death and damage to an 
eye, tooth, arm, leg, burn, a wound, or a stripe.605 The Arabic cognate ̉asiya means “be 
distressed” which also fits the idea of various causes of “harm.”606 If Ex understood this term as 
“harm,” then the interpretation seems to be that a non-formed fetus being aborted is not a case of 
“harm” because it is not a full-fledged life.607 
With respect to the entire phrase ןוסא היהי אלו, had it been rendered stiltedly as in καὶ ὀυκ 
ἔστιν [ןוסא], the subject of ἔστιν could be either the mother or the child which is a major 
interpretive ambiguity of the Hebrew in the first place. The use of the participium coniunctum 
(μὴ ἐξεικονισμένον) instead of *καὶ ὀυκ ἔστιν [ןוסא] is a “very Greek” way of composing the 
                                                          
603 See Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 61-62; Propp, Exodus, 222; Staalduine, “Between Legislative,” 
220, for options on ןוסא. Each conclude with the general translation “harm” (in line with the Arabic cognate ’asiya). See 
Josephus, Ant. 4.8.278, Mek. de-R. Ishmael, Neziqin 8, and Aharon Shemesh, “4Q251: Midrash Mishpatim” Dead Sea 
Discoveries 12, no. 3 (2005): 280-302, here 286, for “fatality.” Le Boulluec and Sandevoir, L’Exode, 219 connect Ex’s rendering 
to the rabbinic Niddah 24b. Less plausible is her homophonic connection of ןוסא to ασῶμα- (220). While Ex makes some 
interesting exegetical decisions based off a word’s root, there are no indications that those interpretations leave behind semantics 
completely.  
604 The reference is either purely physical or else it entertains the theological idea of “fully-formed (in the image of 
God)” (cf. Lust, Greek-English, 212). Perhaps the perfect tense is used to connote stativity. 
605 Cf. Propp, Exodus, 222; Staalduine, “Between Legislative,” 220. 
606 Propp, Exodus, 222; cf. Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 61-62, with “sorrow.” Josephus, Ant. 4.8.278 
takes this word as “fatality” with respect to the woman. This is also the opinion of the rabbis (Mek. de-R. Ishmael. Neziqin 8; see 
Shemesh, “4Q251,” 286). 
607 The same logic applies if Ex understood ןוסא to mean “fatality.” See the previous footnote. 
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sentence, and this construction better reveals the exegetical decisions of the translator.608 There 
are no Ptolemaic documents informing the exegetical decision here. Perhaps Ex’s specificity 
implies that the translator was more concerned with a law that could be narrowly exacted and 
practiced than one that could be polyvalent (as the translation καὶ ὀυκ ἔστιν [ןוסא] would be), as 
functionality and practice seem to be at the forefront of the translation.  
 
ἐπιζήμιον ζημιωθήσεται. The Hebrew root שנע refers not only to monetary compensation but to 
punishment in general.609 There are nine other occasions in the Septuagint Pentateuch in which 
an infinitive absolute with a finite verb has the infinitive absolute rendered as an accusative.610 
The consistent rendering of the שנע word group is the ζημι- selection.611 Why did Ex not simply 
use ζημία here (so Prov. 27.12)? 
The reason that ἐπιζήμιον is used instead of ζημία is because the latter, while often 
referring to a monetary penalty in Ptolemaic legislation (e.g. P. Hal. 1. 195 [3rd BCE]; P. Lille 1 
29, 2. 10, 20 [3rd BCE]), has a much larger semantic range in legal materials. The noun ζημία can 
even be used to refer to the death penalty612 and is often used synonymously with τιμωρία 
(“vengeance” or “penalty”).613 Ex does not want to connote the death penalty or vengeance in 
general. Further, Ex uses the neuter ἐπιζήμιον when the masculine was also available. Why? It is 
probably because the neuter is specifically a “fine” whereas the masculine can also mean the 
                                                          
608 Cf. Anneli Aejmelaeus, “Participium coniunctum as a criterion of translation technique,” Vetus Testamentum 32, no. 
4 (October 1982): 385-393, particularly 388 and 393; Tjen, On Conditionals, 131. It is also the only time Ex ignores a non-
idiomatic היה in the book. Cf. Evans, Verbal Syntax, 243, who comments on the periphrastic construction in the following verse 
which he claims is “not specifically motivated by the underlying text.” 
609 Brown et al., Enhanced Brown-Driver-Briggs, 778; Propp, Exodus, 223. 
610 Gen. 50.15; Ex. 21.22; 22.25; Lev. 5.19; Num. 27.7; Dt. 14.22(21); 15.8, 10, 14; see Sollamo, “The LXX 
Renderings,” 105. 
611 Dt. 22.19; 2 Kgs. 23.33; Prov. 17.26; 21.11; 22.3. 
612 Cf. LSJ, II.2. 
613 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 438; cf. P. Enteux. 79. 13 (218 BCE) compared to P. Enteux. 77. 6 (221-220 
BCE).  
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more generic “loss” like ζημία.614 The necessity of the neuter case ending is also why the dative 
was not employed. The focus on monetary compensation makes sense given that was the primary 
means of justice assigned by Ptolemaic officials,615 and more ancient talionic punishments616 
show little sign of being practiced. Finally, the ζημι- root is used in the legal papyri to refer to 
civic penalties so Ex’s “fine” here should be further defined as “governmental fine.”617 The 
Greek text therefore only prescribes a monetary penalty, commissioned and assessed by the 
government, for the loss of the pregnancy. This punitive measure (i.e., monetary compensation) 
is directly in line with the Ptolemaic legal process. Furthermore, in legal papyri dealing with 
three cases of a pregnant woman being injured, the compensation for the injury is put into the 
hands of the government official who would customarily assign a monetary fee.618 
 
μετὰ ἀξιώματος. The meaning of the expression םיללפב is frequently debated among scholars.619 
The two main interpretations are 1) “with estimation or reckoning,” whether that be monetary 
reckoning or alternatively an estimation of the fetus’s age;620 2) “with intercession or 
                                                          
614 See the difference noted in LSJ I.1 compared to 2. The specific monetary aspect of this word is noted in Shemesh’s 
commentary on it (“4Q251,” 286); for casuistic uses see the neuter in IG V,2 6. 36 (4th BCE Tegea), τῶ ἐπιζαμίω, and line 43, τὰ 
ἐπιζάμια ἀπυτειέτω in Friedrich Hiller von Gaertringen, ed., in Inscriptiones Graecae, Inscriptiones Arcadiae, vol. 2, (Berlin, 
1913); and IG V,1 1498. 10-11 (2nd BCE Messenia), τὸ ἐπιζάμιον, Walter Kolbe, ed., in Inscriptiones Graecae, Inscriptiones 
Laconiae et Messeniae, vol. 1 (Berlin, 1913). 
615 See next note. 
616 E.g., Middle Assyrian Laws A 50a or the Greek Locri colony (7th BCE) as found in Propp, Exodus, 227-228; cf. 
Paul, Studies in the Book, 75-77. 
617 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 557. 
618 See P. Tebt. 3.1 800 (150 BCE), lines 35-39, and particularly line 33; P. Ryl. 2.68 (89 BCE), lines 22-26, which 
mention specific fines set up by the government for this legal situation. Note that the women involved in P. Tebt. were Jewish 
(Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 246). PSI 3.167 (118 BCE) is seemingly damaged in the portion referring to compensation, though 
the text does refer to the case being directed towards government officials (lines 2-3).  
619 See Durham, Exodus, 312 and Propp, Exodus, 223 for options. 
620 See Paul, Studies in the Book, 72; E. A. Speiser, “Stem pll in Hebrew,” Journal Of Biblical Literature 82, no. 3 
(September 1963): 301-306, here 303. Staalduine comments, “The preposition ב after ןתנ is most probably a ב praetii that refers 
to the level of the fine” (“Between Legislative,” 221). This suggests against “judges.” 
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arbitration,”621 which comes by understanding the plural to be abstract in meaning or to refer to 
judges.622  
Ex certainly translates in light of the latter option. The noun ἀξιώμα in the legal papyri 
“means that the court will evaluate the damages and exact compensation from the assailant 
accordingly.”623 The epigraphical data also shows the meaning of a “petition” or “request 
preferred before a higher tribunal.”624 The reason that the term should be taken in its legal and 
papyrological sense is due, in part, to ἐπιζήμιον being defined as “governmental fine”—with 
emphasis being on the requirement to go to Ptolemaic officials for the fine’s imposition—and in 
part to the formal position and role ἀξιώμα has in the papyri. Note the following examples: 
1 P. Enteux. 17. 9-10 (217-218 BCE), in the closing line of the petition 
τούτου γὰρ γενομένου, τεύξομαι, βασιλεῦ, τοῦ ἀξι[ώμα]τος 
 For when this happens, I beg, O king, for a judicial assessment 
 
2 P. Sorb. 3 128. 15 (219-218 BCE), in the closing line of the petition 
τούτου γὰρ γενομένου, διὰ σέ, β̣ασιλεῦ…τεύξομαι τοῦ ἀξιώματος 
 For when this happens, on account of you, O king…I beg for a judicial assessment 
 
Since these examples are found in the stock and formulaic endings of these petitions to the king, 
they signify that Ex is drawing on very common language used when addressing Ptolemaic royal 
authorities. While it would not be wise to draw too great of an inference, the fact that Ex chose a 
word so closely associated with Ptolemaic legal process and appeal suggests an implicit approval 
of that very system. If Ex did not want the readers to make an immediate connection to that legal 
system and court, a word less formulaic and recognizable could have been used. This argument 
                                                          
621 Cf. Durham, Exodus, 323; Propp, Exodus, 223. 
622 Gesenius, Hebrew, 124g. 
623 Shemesh, “4Q251,” 284. 
624 Deissmann, Bible Studies, 93, emphasis mine. Le Boulluec and Sandevoir suggest (in this line of interpretation) the 
translation, “avec le concours d’un dignitaire” (“with the support of a dignitary/official”; L’Exode, 220). 
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is even more persuasive when it is recognized that there was likely no legally authoritative 
council of Jewish elders at this time in Ptolemaic Egypt.625 Where else were Jews to go? 626 
 
δώσει (v. 23). The verb ἀποτίνω is not employed due to the non-colloquial object ψυχὴν.627 This 
verb does not take objects like this.628 The change from the second person singular in Hebrew to 
the third person in Greek suggests Ex was more concerned with a straightforward reading than 
matching the Hebrew precisely.629 The switch also brings the final clause into parallel with the 
preceding clause in v. 22.  
 
ψυχὴν ἀντὶ ψυχῆς. Perhaps the focus on governmental intermediation inherent in ἐπιζήμιον and 
ἀξιώμα is also meant to inform the talionic principles that follow in the case of a “formed” infant 
dying. As was noted above in the case of the death penalty, Ptolemaic authorities would need to 
be consulted for that punishment to take effect. Here, too, these talionic punishments would have 
to go through the authorities with the potential of the proposed punishment being disallowed. 
The papyri, however, show beatings being prescribed for those who have unlawfully struck 
another,630 but this study found no instances of a limb or the like being lost in talionic fashion.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
625 Tcherikover et al., Corpus, 9; idem., Hellenistic Civilization, 302. 
626 A final mention should be made about P. Enteux. 71. 6 (222BCE), which connects injured intrauterine life with the 
price called “ἀξία (δραχμῶν).” 
627 Cf. Lev. 24.18 which does not follow this practice. Ex uses δώσει in v. 23 to keep maintain comprehensibility.  
628 See the comments on v. 19.  
629 For other changes of 2nd person Hebrew verbs see: 1.16; 5.5, 7; 6.1; 10.11; 15.21; 16.25; 18.22; 20.25; 23.31; 24.1; 
25.19(18); 26.30. It is notable that the change in person may change the subject of the Hebrew (the second person being the 
community or family of the victim [Staalduine, “Between Legislative”, 213-214]). 
630 See Bechtel et al., Dikaiomata, 107. 
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3.6.4. VV. 26-27: Of Slaves Leading to Manumission 
 
Ἐὰν δέ τις πατάξῃ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τοῦ οἰκέτου αὐτοῦ ἢ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τῆς θεραπαίνης αὐτοῦ, καὶ 
ἐκτυφλώσῃ, ἐλευθέρους ἐξαποστελεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ αὐτῶν. 
Ἐὰν δὲ τὸν ὀδόντα τοῦ οἰκέτου ἢ τὸν ὀδόντα τῆς θεραπαίνης αὐτοῦ ἐκκόψῃ, ἐλευθέρους 
ἐξαποστελεῖ αὐτοὺς ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀδόντος αὐτῶν. 
וניע תחת ונחלשי ישפחל התחשו ותמא ןיע־תא־וא ודבע ןיע־תא שיא הכי־יכו 
ונש תחת ונחלשי ישפחל ליפי ותמא ןש־וא ודבע ןש־םאו 
 
οἰκέτου…θεραπαίνης.631 These terms are idiomatically paired together to designate male and 
female houseslaves in Greek composition.632 The same argumentation applies as in 3.3.2. (παῖς), 
as well as in 3.4.1. (οἰκέτις). When compared to Ptolemaic norms these laws in vv. 26-27 are 
overly punitive when it comes to a slave’s abuse. Greek and Roman slaves were frequently 
tortured to make them speak truthfully.633 Likewise, it was considered normal to starve, chain, or 
beat them.634 It may be the case that the law in Hebrew Exodus was seen as overly soft when it 
came to slave abuse. Since, if torturing and beating them on occasion was permissible and 
normal, how could a mere strike to the face with minor damage be worthy of manumission? This 
would be even more the case for an agricultural slave, since, as a general rule, “agricultural 
slaves were far less likely to win their freedom.”635 Moreover, Bechtel includes a few laws from 
Ptolemaic Egypt in which the compensation varies with respect to the person being struck, with 
the price change depending on the status of the assailant and the victim.636 Slaves who strike free 
                                                          
631 θεράπαινα is elsewhere only in 11.5. The context is ambiguous as to the status of the slave there. It seems best to 
associate θεράπαινα with the term for Pharaoh’s royal servants, θεράπων, since it is the same root and is used 2 verses prior. This 
suggests a higher-class slave.  
632 Aeschines 99.6 (4th BCE); Aristoteles et Corpus Aristotelicum, Fragmenta, 8.44, frag. 547, line 59; Lycurgus 29.8; 
30.4, 7 (4th BCE). Could the reason for not pairing οἰκέτις and οἰκέτης be that they sounded too close to each other, with only a 
very slight vowel shift (ι and η were closer in sound than in the modern Erasmian pronunciation typically used in biblical 
scholarship)? 
633 Wiedemann, Greek, 167; Lysias 4.12-17 (4th BCE). 
634 Wiedemann, Greek, 173; Xenophon, Memorabilia, 2, 1.15-17 (4th BCE). For beatings on slaves in the Ptolemaic 
period see P. Hal. 1. 182-192 (3rd BCE); for putting them in stocks see the example from William Linn Westermann, The Slave 
Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity (Philidelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1955), 38, who cites evidence outside 
of Egypt.  
635 Wiedemann, Greek, 133. 
636 Dikaiomata, 107. 
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people owe twice what a free person owe and are liable to beatings themselves.637 These cultural 
mores suggest Ex uses the terms for the highest status slaves in vv. 26-27 as it would have 
seemed more reasonable.  
 
ἐλευθέρους ἐξαποστελεῖ αὐτοὺς. For the idiomatic predication with ἐλεύθερος see 3.3.2. 
(ἀπελεύσεται ἐλεύθερος). 
3.7. Verses 28-32: Laws Concerning Goring 
 
3.7.1. VV. 28-30: Of Free Persons 
 
Ἐὰν δὲ κερατίσῃ ταῦρος ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα, καὶ ἀποθάνῃ, λίθοις λιθοβοληθήσεται ὁ ταῦρος, καὶ 
οὐ βρωθήσεται τὰ κρέα αὐτοῦ· ὁ δὲ κύριος τοῦ ταύρου ἀθῷος ἔσται.  
ἐὰν δὲ ὁ ταῦρος κερατιστὴς ᾖ πρὸ τῆς ἐχθὲς καὶ πρὸ τῆς τρίτης, καὶ διαμαρτύρωνται τῷ κυρίῳ 
αὐτοῦ, καὶ μὴ ἀφανίσῃ αὐτόν, ἀνέλῃ δὲ ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα, ὁ ταῦρος λιθοβοληθήσεται, καὶ ὁ 
κύριος αὐτοῦ προσαποθανεῖται.   
ἐὰν δὲ λύτρα ἐπιβληθῇ αὐτῷ, δώσει λύτρα τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ ὅσα ἂν ἐπιβάλωσιν αὐτῷ. 
יקנ רושה לעבו ורשב־תא לכאי אלו רושה לקסי לוקס תמו השא־תא וא שיא־תא רוש חגי־יכו 
תמוי וילעב־םגו לקסי רושה השא וא שיא תימהו ונרמשי אלו וילעבב דעוהו םשלש למתמ אוה חגנ רוש םאו 
וילע תשוי־רשא לככ ושפנ ןידפ ןתנו וילע תשוי רפכ־םא 
 
ταῦρος. This is a contextual rendering of רוש. It is only used in goring contexts.638 In the laws 
that do not require a cow to be paid in compensation the most generic term βοῦς is used (20.17; 
23.4; 23.12). When a cow is part of the payment to be made in the casuistic laws μόσχος is 
rendered.639 The reason for μόσχος being employed in those texts is outside of the limits of this 
study. Perhaps it has to do with the greater value of a young calf over an older calf.640 
 
ἀθῷος ἔσται. For the uncommon addition of the copula in pure nominal clauses see the rationale 
in 3.6.1. (ἀθῷος ἔσται).  
                                                          
637 Cf. ibid., 196-209. 
638 21.28(3x), 29(2x), 32(2x), 35(3x), 36(3x). 
639 22.29 and 34.19 use it, too, but these contexts are speaking of young animals. 
640 If so, Ex could be applying an ancient version of the Qal wa Homer; the most expensive animal is used to imply all 
animals fit within the scope of the law. Or, maybe Ptolemaic Egyptians only gave μόσχος in transactions like these. Preliminary 
research suggests the latter is not the case.  
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διαμαρτύρωνται. While Ex has rendered the singular hof‘al perfect term דעוה as a plural medio-
passive verb,641 “the parallel Mesopotamian law entrusts this task to the municipal authorities, 
and similarly in Exodus, [דעוהו] may imply a formal procedure with the calling of witnesses…or 
a public remonstrance before witnesses.”642 Ptolemaic law also called for a plurality of 
witnesses.643 This connection should not be pressed too far since Ex has a habit of making 
explicit the unstated passive agents in verbs that are represented by the idiomatic singular passive 
in Hebrew (here דעוה).644 The verb διαμαρτύρωνται could be a present or aorist subjunctive 
morphologically speaking.645 Perhaps in realizing this after the fact Ex uses periphrasis in 21.36 
to demonstrate that 21.29 was in fact a present tense since these verses refer to a nearly identical 
event.646 
 
προσαποθανεῖται. Tov comments that this is a neologism. 647 The verb is probably created based 
on the assimilation of the Hebrew םג into the verbal concept (which becomes προσ-).648 See 
3.5.2. (θανατοῦσθω) for the relation of this verse to the death penalty.649 
 
ἐπιβληθῇ… ἐπιβάλωσιν. In Ex the switch between the singular passive and the plural active 
(both singular passive תשוי) may indicate a measure of intertextuality with v. 22, in which the 
                                                          
641 This thesis does not subscribe to the grammatical category of “deponency,” so διαμαρτύρωνται should be 
understood as including an element of self-involvement on the part of the subject. 
642 Propp, Exodus, 234. 
643 P. Lille 1 29. 31-32 (3rd BCE), which shows that this was true even if they were slaves. 
644 10.24, 26; 19.26; 21.29, 30, 31; 22.5(6), 18(19); 25.29(28), 31; 31.15; 35.2. Special cases may be 19.12 and 21.16. 
645 Wevers, Notes, 339; Evans, Verbal Syntax, 243. 
646 This assumes that the translator did not intend to return and revise previous work. It could be that such revisions 
were part of the project. 
647 “Compound Words in the Septuagint Representing Two or More Hebrew Words,” in The Greek and Hebrew Bible: 
Collected Essays on the Septuagint (Leiden: Brill, 1999), 131-152, here 151.  
648 This assimilation may also occur at 7.11 with συνεκάλεσαν (for םג ארקיו); Cf. 12.38 (συνανέβη for םג + הלע), though 
the Hebrew syntax here makes this more difficult to be certain of.  
649 προσαποθανεῖται is not in the jussive because another penalty is made available in the next verse. 
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husband (sg.) chooses a price (καθότι ἂν ἐπιβάλῃ) which is then adjudicated by the court (μετὰ 
ἀξιώματος, which probably implies a hearing involving multiple adjudicators). The plaintiff 
choosing a price with subsequent official ratification was in fact the practice at the time.650 Ex’s 
choice of ἐπιβάλλω is suitable to this context as the term is used in both the literary and 
papyrological sources with the meaning “to impose (a fine/penalty).”651 
 
λύτρα τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ. SB 20 14183. 10-14 (198-197 BCE) has a ταῦρος goring (κερατίζει) an 
unidentified object or person (αὐτὸν) which dies (ἀπέθανεν). The price for this death is 
ὀκτακισχιλίων (8000) of an unidentified currency. If it is drachmas, ostensibly, that price would 
be in line with the death of a person.652 If this is the case, then it is evidence that a severe penalty 
was in place for the death of a human via goring in the Ptolemaic context, but the death penalty 
was probably not. In this way, the ransom option presented in v. 30 is in line with Ptolemaic 
standards. This would be the punishment allowed by Ptolemaic judicial authorities. 
 The term λύτρον is stereotypically a plural noun (λύτρα) which is why it does not match 
both singular nouns רפכ and ןוידפ.653 LSJ documents that λύτρον is a typical term for ransom-
money in the literary sources including redemptive blood-money as in Ex.654 Therefore, it is 
probably not found in third century papyri due to lacking sources and not due to disuse.655 The 
semantic levelling of רפכ and ןוידפ is probably based out of Ex’s desire to have an easily 
understood text. Using two different words to represent these Hebrew items could cause the 
                                                          
650 Taubenschlag, Law of Greco-Roman, 438. 
651 LSJ, ἐπιβάλλω, I.2. 
652 6000 drachmas is the price enumerated for a death in Dover, Greek Popular, 290. 
653 See LSJ, λύτρον, I.1.  
654 Cf. ibid, including I.2. 
655 In the 2nd century it is found in SB 28 16855. 16, 21 (167 BCE) P.Koeln 13 524. 5 (2nd BCE); P.Lugd. Bat. 19 7 B. 
4. 4 (109 BCE); BGU 6 1260. 12 (101 BCE). All examples are in the plural.  
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reader to fail to identify the ransom imposed as the same item as the “ransom of his soul.” A 
similar levelling was noted for v. 22 with πατάξωσιν. 
3.7.2. V. 32:656 Of Slaves 
 
ἐὰν δὲ παῖδα κερατίσῃ ὁ ταῦρος ἢ παιδίσκην, ἀργυρίου τριάκοντα δίδραχμα δώσει τῷ κυρίῳ 
αὐτῶν, καὶ ὁ ταῦρος λιθοβοληθήσεται. 
לקסי רושהו וינדאל ןתי םילקש םישלש ףסכ המא וא רושה חגי דבע־םא 
παῖδα… παιδίσκην. These are general terms for “slave.” See 3.3.2. and 3.6.2. 
 
ἀργυρίου τριάκοντα δίδραχμα. According to Westermann,the price of an adult slave in the third 
century was about three hundred drachmas.657 Tcherikover, on the other hand, places the price 
for a full-grown slave in Egypt at upwards of 1000 drachmas,658 though this price may have been 
less earlier in the third century.659 This study found that in Egypt two female slaves cost two 
hundred drachmas each in one case (P. Cair. Zen. 3 59355 [257BCE]), and three hundred for one 
in another (P. Cair. Zen. 4 59606 [256-239 BCE]).  
 The Hebrew text likely refers to a gored slave who dies and is consequently priced 
according to the average value of a slave (thirty םילקש).660 While it must remain possible that Ex 
has simply represented the Hebrew text here and did not aim to interpret the text beyond its 
formal representation, it would seem best to understand that Ex either missed the implied death 
of the slave in the Hebrew text (תמו [or the like] is implied), or, due to being constrained by the 
lexemes before him, opted for a different interpretation of the verse. Ex’s price for the gored 
                                                          
656 Verse 31 has no information pertinent to this study. δικαίωμα in that context has the same meaning as discussed in 
3.1. 
657 Westermann, “Enslaved Persons,” 4. He states that these numbers are apparent from the Zenon documents, but does 
not give citations. Moreover, the price he gives may be an average between Palestinian and Egyptian prices.  
658 Mizraim, 75. 
659 Ibid., 75.  
660 Propp, Exodus, 19-40, 236, gives ancient Near Eastern parallels that would need to be slightly adjusted (upwardly) 
according to inflation: Eshnunna 55 (“If it gores a slave and thus causes his death, he shall weigh and deliver 15 shekels of 
silver”) and Hammurapi 252 (“If it is a man’s slave (who is fatally gored), he shall give 20 shekels of silver”). These translations 
are from Hoffner et al., Law Collections, 67 and 128 respectively. Cf. Paul, Studies in the Book, 83, who cites a Nuzi text pricing 
the slave also at 30 shekels. 
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slave is too low to be the actual cost of a slave in Ptolemaic Egypt. The text, instead, reads either 
as a penalty price for injury or perhaps implies that this ox had not been accustomed to gore in 
the past and thus represents a merciful ‘cut cost.’ If Ex wanted the text to speak of the slave’s 
death, the translator shows no qualms about adding in a helping verb elsewhere (καὶ καταφύγῃ in 
21.14; μὴ βούληται in 22.16[17]).  
 Ex translates לקש with δίδραχμον in places where the text makes an expectation of the 
reader, i.e., places where there are laws for the reader or community to adhere to (21.32; 
30.13(4x), 15). Within historical narrative when recounting numerical figures that are not 
prescriptive for the reader, Ex transliterates with σίκλος (30.23-24661; 38.24[39.1], 38.25-
26[39.2], 38.26[39.3], 38.28[39.6]).662 This, too, points to the intended use of this law in the 
translator’s community. 
Chapter 4: Conclusion  
 
4.1. Overview 
This thesis began by setting out a methodology that focuses on a translation-technical 
analysis of Greek Exodus 21.1-32. This analysis was to be coupled with a comparative 
examination of Greco-Egyptian Ptolemaic legal standards as they relate to the subject matter 
found in this section of Septuagint Exodus. A chapter was devoted to highlighting the legal 
authorities and structures in Ptolemaic Egypt which then focused in on the current evidence 
relating to Jewish interaction with those influences in the Ptolemaic period, specifically the third 
century BCE. The strong suggestion was that Jews were heavily influenced by Ptolemaic norms, 
potentially over and against Jewish legal norms. A parallel was also drawn between the 
                                                          
661 This law about anointing oil recounts numerical figures that Moses was to gather for that specific instance; it is only 
the recipe that was binding for the generations to come (cf. v. 31).  
662 It is possible that this translation difference is due to a different translator’s hand. However, that hand would have 
changed between 30.15 and 30.23, which seems unlikely given that the general translation technique does not change in Ex until 
the tabernacle account.  
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προστάγμα genre of royal decree and the contents and syntactic form of the juridicial legal 
materials in Septuagint Exodus.  
From here, this study demonstrated a host of translation peculiarities in chapter 4. Some 
of these were a product of Ex’s desire to maintain fidelity to the Hebrew text, while others 
represented a divergence from a strict representation of the Hebrew in favour of Greek idiom. In 
other cases it seems as though Ex intentionally altered the meaning of the Hebrew text to 
accommodate the legal norms from the broader Ptolemaic context. Some of these alterations 
were further divergences from the Hebrew text than others. Moreover, some of the potential 
changes did not have enough evidence available, or the data was insufficiently clear, so that a 
definite conclusion as to the translator’s intent in translation or exact understanding of the 
Hebrew text was not possible. 
4.2. Results 
4.2.1. Comments on Categorization 
The following list delineates the conclusions of this thesis mostly with respect to 
differences from the Hebrew text’s meaning and syntactical structures, and categorizes the 
results based on the type of translation provided.663 The results are further classified depending 
on the strength of the evidence as based on both the argumentation in the thesis and the author’s 
point of view. A very few inconsequential and tertiary results of the thesis are not included. The 
general definition of each categorization is as follows: 
❖ Significant Departure from Hebrew Meaning 
• Occasions when the translator changes the meaning of the Hebrew text, often 
intentionally, or adds an element that is distinctly not present in the original.  
❖ Similar Hebrew Meaning 
• Deals with different shades or nuances of translational differences rather than 
introducing something altogether foreign.  
                                                          
663 There is often some overlap with respect to a translation choice being, for example, both “narrowing” and 
“idiomatic,” but this list will categorize items based on the more substantial change between competing categories.  
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The following categories are subsumed into the previous two. 
 
❖ Narrowing Translation 
• Choices that disambiguate the Hebrew text or situate the translation more exactly 
within the Ptolemaic legal context. Portions of a Hebrew word or phrase’s 
meaning may be drawn on.  
❖ Expansionary Translations 
• Choices that broaden the original scope of the Hebrew text’s meaning or intent. 
❖ Greek Idiom Employed 
• Choices that do not necessarily change the meaning of the Hebrew text but are 
reflective of either incongruent modes of expression between the languages or 
represent the employment of terms or phrases within the Ptolemaic legal and 
lexical register that hardly diverge from the Hebrew meaning. 
❖ Strong Interference from Hebrew 
• Confined only to areas where significant unidiomatic Greek is present when 
compared to Ptolemaic legal diction, or Hebrew interference is the best 
explanation for a translation choice.664  
 
The following category is reserved for text-critical conclusions.  
 
❖ Changes Likely Based on Variant Vorlage 
• Choices explained most credibly by a variant Hebrew source text than that which 
is represented in MT.  
 
4.2.2. Strongly Evidenced Results 
4.2.2.1. Significant Departure from Hebrew Meaning 
3.3.2. & 3.6.2. & 3.6.4.665 παῖς/οἰκετίς/οἰκετής/θεραπαίνης. While παῖς represents the Hebrew 
text well in that it reflects the generic term for “slave” in the Ptolemaic context, it is not 
synonymous with οἰκετίς(-τής)/θεραπαίνης, which probably reflect a higher class of slave. This 
class distinction is not present in the Hebrew and has been artificially created by the translator to 
create more harmony between Ptolemaic legal slave treatment and the translation.  
 
                                                          
664 Given the nature of Greek Exodus being a translation there are many dependencies on the Hebrew text which, while 
interfering, remain comprehensible and passable within Greek diction. These interferences are not included. Not including some 
of these elements are in part the subjective choice of this author.  
665 These enumerations represent the sections of chapter 3 in which the issues are discussed.  
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3.3.6.2. plus of τὸ κριτήριον. This plus is probably added because slavery was highly regulated 
in Ptolemaic law and τὸ κριτήριον would direct the reader to the nearest local Ptolemaic office 
for registration. Other contexts in Greek Exodus including laws that were not regulated like 
slavery do not receive this plus. These items all suggest that Ex’s laws were translated in view of 
maintaining cordiality with Ptolemaic legal norms, and that these precepts were potentially going 
to be used in juridicial matters. In other words, had Ex not included this plus here, the translated 
law would be in direct opposition to Ptolemaic law.  
 
3.4.1. οἰκέτιν…αἱ δοῦλαι. Ptolemaic law often delineates these two roots as distinctly different 
classes of slaves. The οἰκ- class seems to be given a higher status and rights. This distinction 
seems to be represented in Ex and is not present in the Hebrew. Ex has changed the Hebrew so 
that the rights granted in the law fit more readily with the rights given to the respective slave 
class.  
 
3.5.2./3.5.5. θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. Ex’s switch in apodotic syntax reflects an intentional desire to 
situate laws with the jussive within a different sphere of authority. Jussive apodoses reflect civic 
laws rather than royal decrees which have future apodoses. The former were subject to the latter 
in Ptolemaic Egypt. Whether or not the death penalty was prescribed was a matter reserved for 
Ptolemaic authorities to decide. Ex directs the reader to those authorities by downgrading the 
authority of the death sentence statement. Moreover, homicide (v. 12) did not always warrant 
capital punishment in Ptolemaic Egypt, so the punishment in the Hebrew text would have been 
on the fringe of Ptolemaic practice. Likewise, the parental striking in v. 15 was also only 
sometimes punishable by death. Because of this, Ex keeps the verb θανατόω (but does not in v. 
16[17]/17[16]). 
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3.5.6. & 3.5.7. θανάτῳ τελευτάτω. Ex changes the verbal lexeme and grammatical voice of the 
apodosis though the Hebrew text’s apodosis is identical to the other texts on capital punishment. 
The law’s punishment instead becomes an imprecatory curse which is a trait found in other 
Greek laws. This change in v. 17(16) is due to the crime (cursing of parents) not being punished 
by the death penalty in Ptolemaic law. In v. 16(17), Ex could not translate a law that implicated 
with death those who kidnapped Jewish people. This is because producing such a law would be 
tantamount to raising a fist at the Ptolemaic government, who had in fact recently taken many 
Jewish people from Palestine and migrated them to Egypt for slavery.  
 
3.6.2. δίκῃ ἐκδικηθήτω. While the Hebrew text’s םקני םקנ is probably equivalent to תומ תמוי , Ex 
departs from this meaning by instead directing the case of a killed slave to Ptolemaic court. This 
is signalled using δίκῃ (“with a trial”), as well as by the jussive, which is a means of directing 
the, here implied, death sentence to Ptolemaic officials for ratification or dismissal.  
 
3.6.4. οἰκέτου…θεραπαίνης. The same argumentation from 3.3.2. & 3.6.2. παῖς/οἰκετίς, as well 
as 3.4.1. οἰκέτιν…αἱ δοῦλαι applies here. Ex uses these terms for a higher class of slave in vv. 
26-27 because these laws on manumission would be excessively lenient to be applied to all 
slaves in the Ptolemaic period. Beating slaves was considered a norm and the emancipation of 
agricultural slaves was less common. Ex therefore relegates manumission in these instances to 
household slaves. 
4.2.2.2. Similar Hebrew Meaning 
4.2.2.2.1. Narrowing Translations 
3.2. (& 3.4.3.) δικαιώματα. This term represents a close association with the courtroom and 
legally binding decrees. It is less malleable than טפשמ as found in chapter 21.  
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3.2. παραθήσεις. In combination with δικαίωμα this lexical choice creates a connection to the 
courtroom. 
 
3.3.3. Non-use of *ὁ κύριος τοῦ γυναίκος. This phrase referred primarily to a woman’s guardian 
in Ptolemaic legal language. Ex probably avoids the phrase due to this. This suggests a desire to 
situate this law within a Ptolemaic legal framework rather than a strictly Jewish one.  
 
3.3.6.1. προσάξει. In combination with the plus τὸ κριτήριον and the slavery context, this word is 
chosen to match Ptolemaic legal diction. It is used there for bringing a slave to be registered 
which matches Ex’s context. 
 
3.4.2. ὅτι. This is the only translation of inseparable ב like this in the translation. Ex avoids an 
infinitive phrase because the temporality of the following clause would be ambiguous. 
 
3.5.4. ἐπιτίθημι. Ex employs a term specifically used for premeditated attack in Ptolemaic law. 
  
3.5.4. καὶ καταφύγῃ. This plus demonstrates Ex is acquainted with the technical legal language 
of  “fleeing for (legal) refuge.” It also clarifies the implied action in the Hebrew text. 
  
3.5.3. ὁ φονεύσας. This plus clarifies the Hebrew’s obscure subject. Ex will sometimes add a 
subject to the text when it is unclear who the subject is. 
 
3.5.5. Ὃς τύπτει. The use of the imperfective aspect makes only repeated or habitual infractions 
regarding parental violence punishable by death. The use of the aorist subjunctive would have 
indicated a singular infraction. Ex differentiates the syntax and aspect here from v. 12, which 
speaks only of a singular strike. The Hebrew for both verses is, however, the same.  
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3.5.6. ὁ κακολογῶν. Ex employs a common legal term for “defaming.” The choice of the present 
participle stands out, potentially in contrast to the previous verse’s iterative action (ὅς τύπτει). 
The participle seems to highlight instead a characteristic or state of the offender rather than a set 
of repeated actions. This is important considering the apodosis which only prescribes a curse as 
punishment rather than the death penalty, as in v. 15.  
 
3.6.1. ὁ ἄνθρωπος. This is a plus to clarify the subject that shows Ex is not afraid to add to the 
text for the sake of clarity.  
 
3.6.1. ἀποτείσει. Ex uses a particularly forensic term which is the most common verb for penalty 
payment in Ptolemaic law. Ex flattens Hebrew lexemes together (e.g., 21.19; 22.16[17]) to create 
this parallel. This creates a greater connection to Ptolemaic legal formulations.  
 
3.6.1. τὰ ἰατρεῖα. Ex breaks typical translation protocol for an infinitive absolute + finite verb of 
the same root. This translation avoids the various pitfalls a formal and verbal representation of 
this Hebrew construction would cause here, while at the same time indicates the Greek context of 
the translation due to private surgical costs only being a factor in Greek cities.  
 
3.6.3. μὴ ἐξεικονισμένον. This translation of ןוסא היהי אלו removes many of the ambiguities that a 
more formal representation of the phrase like *καὶ ὀυκ ἔστιν [ןוסא] would create. 
Comprehensibility and practicability seem to be at the forefront of the translator’s mind.  
 
3.6.3. ἐπιζήμιον ζημιωθήσεται. The reason Ex does not employ the more common ζημία here is 
due to its associations with the death penalty and with broader categories of punishment beyond 
monetary fines. The neuter ἐπιζήμιον refers specifically to a governmental monetary fine. Ex 
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avoids the dative case in order to fully represent the neuter noun and this specific interpretation. 
Once again, the implication is that Ptolemaic officials are to be called upon for assessment. 
 
3.6.3. μετὰ ἀξιώματος. The term ἀξιώμα is used in the legal papyri in formulaic petitionary 
phrases to the king. Ex could have chosen many other terms not associated with this process. 
Combined with the use of ἐπιζήμιον (“governmental fine”) this lexeme should be taken in its 
well-attested sense of “request preferred before a higher tribunal.” The translator thus directs the 
reader to be assessed by Ptolemaic officials for their case. This kind of crime would in fact be 
adjudicated by Ptolemaic authorities in Egypt.  
 
3.6.3. δώσει. The change from the Hebrew second person singular verb to the Greek third person 
singular represents Ex’s desire for a clear text above an exact representation of the Hebrew. The 
referent of the Hebrew second person is not clear. Additionally, the second person is intrusive to 
the consistent third person subject in the apodoses of these laws.  
 
3.7.1. ταῦρος. Ex contextually renders רוש. Three lexemes (ταῦρος, βοῦς, μόσχος) are used 
depending on the context. The noun μόσχος is only used in places where a law requires the 
payment of a רוש. Preliminary research suggests this choice has to do with Ptolemaic 
compensatory standards when paying with animals. 
 
3.7.1. λύτρα τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτοῦ. The lexical flattening of רפכ and ןוידפ (both λύτρα in this verse) is 
probably based in Ex’s desire to have an easily understood text as two different “ransoms” in this 
context could obscure the required payment. 
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3.7.2. δίδραχμον. Ex translates לקש with δίδραχμον in places where the text makes an 
expectation of the reader but transliterates when recounting historical figures. This probably 
points to the intended use of this law, and others, in the translator’s community. 
4.2.2.2.2. Expansionary Translations 
3.3.2. ἐάν. Though caused by linguistic incompatibilities between Greek and Hebrew conditional 
clauses, the topical subordination signaled by יכ and םא/וא is lost. Such topical subordination is 
achieved by δέ in Greek compositional law.  
 
3.4.4. τὰ δέοντα καὶ τὸν ἱματισμὸν. The Hebrew הראש (“food”) is expanded into τὰ δέοντα 
(“necessities”). This, combined with ἱματισμὸν, seems to intentionally mimic Greek marriage 
contracts in the sections involving the requirements that a husband must meet for the marriage to 
be upheld. Ex harmonizes the requirements for a Jewish woman with the Greek requirements.   
 
3.5.7. καὶ εὑρεθῇ ἐν αὐτῷ. Ex intentionally translates with ambiguity, leaving open a few ways 
of reading this condition in the kidnapping law. The reason for this is likely because of the curse 
apodosis which only generally condemns those kidnapping Israelites. There is no physical or 
substantial punishment in the law, so various interpretive possibilities of this phrase were 
acceptable.  
4.2.2.2.3. Greek Idiom Employed  
3.3.2. ἀπελεύσεται ἐλεύθερος & 3.6.4. ἐλευθέρους ἐξαποστελεῖ αὐτοὺς. Ex employs the typical 
predicative ἐλεύθερος to match a Greek emancipation idiom. This suggests that Ex desired these 
laws to parallel the Greek legal texts. This could be for literary (i.e., readability) or practical (i.e., 
use of the law in society) purposes. 
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3.3.3. Apodotic καί. Ex follows Greek standards by not translating the Hebrew apodotic ו most of 
the time. This kind of translation is a more respectable representation of typical Greek law. 
 
3.3.6.1. ו (1o not translated). Compositional Greek apodoses, especially in the Ptolemaic papyri 
and the NT, do not often include markers of the apodosis. Ex dismisses the Hebrew ו to match 
Greek idiom. 
 
3.4.2. μὴ εὐαρεστήσῃ τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτῆς. Ex avoids the miscommunication that a more stilted 
translation of the Hebrew would create. A more natural Greek expression is used, along with a 
verb that may have specific hyperbolic connotations in marital contexts. The verb choice could 
also help the reader contextualize the intent of the law.  
 
3.4.2. ἣν αὐτῷ καθωμολογήσατο. Ex creatively translates to avoid the unidiomatic *ᾧ αὐτῷ 
καθωμολογήσατο. The two pronouns would have had the same referent.  
 
3.4.4. ἀποστερήσει. Ex chooses a term from Ptolemaic legal language used in similar contexts 
rather than matching previous translations of ערג. 
 
3.5.2. θανάτῳ θανατούσθω. The dative noun θανάτῳ idiomatically precedes the verb indicating 
the death sentence in Greek compositional law. Ex mimics that feature.  
 
3.6.1. ἀθῷος ἔσται. Ex only translates finite verbs as item + copula in legal sections (12.4; 21.8; 
21.19; 21.36). Ex does not use the typical apodotic future verb (e.g., ἀθῳωθήσεται here) because 
guilt or innocence in a legal claim is idiomatically labelled in a predicative manner in Greek law. 
In 3.7.1. The phrase ἀθῷος ἔσται is used idiomatically again, with the copula being an 
uncommon addition when translating pure nominal clauses in Hebrew.   
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4.2.2.2.4. Strong Hebrew Interference 
3.3.4. δέ. Given that Ex seems to be familiar with Greek legal compositional norms, the use of δέ 
to represent ו distorts the typical function of δέ within casuistic laws, namely, to indicate the 
subordination of the following idea to the overarching topic begun by ἐάν + subjunctive. 
However, Ex does not translate with καὶ ἐάν because that construction arguably never begins any 
sentence in documented compositional Greek casuistic law. Ex’s choice to not translate καὶ ἐάν 
does represent Greek idiom in this respect.  
 
3.4.2. ἠθέτησεν ἐν αὐτῇ. The combination of ἐν + pronoun does not occur with ἀθετέω in 
compositional Greek. This is therefore a Semitism (representing ב דגב) though not 
incomprehensible.  
4.2.3. Weakly Evidenced Results 
4.2.3.1. Significant Departure from Hebrew Meaning 
3.4.2. ἔθνει ἀλλοτρίῳ. Ex may have intended this to be read as referring to “a proximally distant 
land,” which coincides with the axiomatic statement οὐ κύριός ἐστιν πωλεῖν αὐτήν. The overall 
reading of the text would then match up with the strict Ptolemaic law that slaves were not to be 
sold outside of Egypt.  
 
3.5.4. λήμψῃ…θανατῶσαι. This death penalty prescription could be understood like the 
surrounding jussives and would thus defer the decision for capital punishment to the Ptolemaic 
authorities. This would be in line with Ptolemaic law, since those who disregarded the law of 
refuge would themselves be subject to death. That Ptolemaic norm is in direct contradiction to 
this Hebrew text. 
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3.7.2. ἀργυρίου τριάκοντα δίδραχμα. This price for a slave’s life is greatly out of line with 
Ptolemaic standards. Ex’s translation is probably to be understood as representing the cost of an 
injured slave rather than a dead slave (the latter is the meaning of the Hebrew). Ex could have 
added a helping verb to clarify the death of the slave if that were the intended meaning (as, e.g., 
καὶ καταφύγῃ in 21.14, and, μὴ βούληται in 22.16[17]).  
4.2.3.2. Similar Hebrew Meaning 
4.2.3.2.1. Narrowing Translations 
3.2. ἐνώπιον. This term potentially draws on juridicial terminology highlighting the personal 
requirement of the law, or a courtroom setting.  
 
3.3.3. αὐτὸς μόνος. This Greek idiomatic rendering of the Hebrew idiom ופגב, if the Hebrew 
suggests slavery without possessions, removes that aspect of the Hebrew meaning. The Greek 
idiom specifically refers to whether a person is alone or with others. Ex may have used this 
calque because Ptolemaic slaves often owned many possessions.  
 
3.3.6.3. τότε. This plus may go hand in hand with the plus of τὸ κριτήριον. It may separate the 
event of ear-piercing from the registration of the slave, so that the ancient ceremony did not have 
to occur at τὸ κριτήριον. 
 
3.3.6.3. πρὸς τὴν θύραν ἐπὶ τὸν σταθμόν. The odd use of ἐπὶ for וא may coincide with the pluses 
of τὸ κριτήριον and τότε in that an orderliness and greater degree of precision are intended by the 
translator so that the law is more readily practicable.  
 
137 
 
3.4.4. ἄλλην. This word seems to be the way to indicate a secondary wife in Greek marriage 
contracts. Ex could have chosen ἕτερος or ἀλλός. The Hebrew is less specific in identifying this 
woman.  
 
3.5.1. Ἐὰν δὲ πατάξῃ (apodictic Hebrew syntax not followed). The syntax of the Hebrew 
changes to apodictic law, but Ex does not follow suite in this verse. If the Hebrew’s switch in 
syntax suggested a more severe and emotive tone, this nuance is not present. Ex also departs 
from the typical translation of the Hebrew participle with this rendering, probably to disassociate 
this verse from the following content.  
 
3.5.7. Ὃς ἂν. This differing syntactical introduction to the law in v.16(17) is probably due to 
Ex’s desire to distinguish this law from the rest, and to give pause to the reader, since the 
translator is distinguishing the punishment in this verse from some of the others.  
 
3.5.7. καταδυναστεύσας. Ex seems to have created an intertextual connection between the 
subjugation of Israel under Egypt in the past and the subjugation of Israelites described in this 
law.  
 
3.6.1. λοιδορῶνται. This root is used in the legal papyri to refer to the reviling before a physical 
altercation. This small difference in meaning from ביר is that the Hebrew term does not always 
imply an ensuing physical fight. The root λοιδορ- is, in contrast, consistently used this way in the 
legal papyri. Additionally, the present tense emphasizes the progressive nature of the action, 
whereas the Hebrew does not grammatically encode this distinction. The middle voice is not 
significant. 
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3.6.3. μάχωνται. The present tense of this verb grammatically encodes the progressive nature of 
the action which is only implied in the Hebrew.  
 
3.7.1. διαμαρτύρωνται. Ex translates the singular passive דעוה as plural and medio-passive. This 
makes the law binding only with a plurality of witnesses available. This is Ptolemaic custom. 
However, Ex often makes unstated passive agents in verbs explicit so this connection should not 
be pressed.  
 
3.7.2. ἐπιβληθῇ… ἐπιβάλωσιν. In Ex, the switch between the singular passive and the plural 
active (both singular passive תשוי) may indicate a measure of intertextuality with v. 22, in which 
the husband (sg.) chooses a price (καθότι ἂν ἐπιβάλῃ) which is then adjudicated by the court 
(μετὰ ἀξιώματος, which implies a plurality of adjudicators). Ptolemaic process may again be 
intimated.  
4.2.3.2.2. Expansionary Translations 
3.3.4. τὰ παιδία. The non-inclusion of the Hebrew feminine pronominal suffix from הידליו in the 
translation could be due to an intentional muting on the part of the translator. In Ptolemaic law 
slavery status is passed from mother to child. The children in this verse would not be “her 
children.” 
 
3.3.5. τὸν κύριόν μου καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα καὶ τὰ παιδία. The pronoun μου is not repeated after the 
second and third coordinate nouns. This is in contrast to similar coordinate nouns with repeated 
person pronouns like those in vv. 15.17(16), and 20. It is possible that Ex muted these pronouns 
because, like the previous example, the wife and child would belong to the master in Ptolemaic 
law. 
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3.4.2. καθωμολογήσατο. The Hebrew verb דעי probably refers to a specific kind of betrothal (i.e., 
a condition of slavery leading to marriage) whereas Ex uses a more generic term that removes 
that nuance.  
 
3.5.3. ἑκών. The verb הדצ (“to lie in wait”) is translated based on its sense with “willing.” A 
perfect verb translated into an adjective only occurs in instructional materials and all but once 
outside the Covenant Code. Perhaps this is a sign of greater compositional fluidity in these 
chapters. 
 
3.6.3. πατάξωσιν. Ex lexically flattens ףגנ and הכנ together here. If the former connotes an 
unintentional strike, Ex may have removed that aspect of the text because the intentionality of a 
crime was decided by Ptolemaic officials. This is a tenuous point, since it is more likely that Ex 
simply desired to have the same striking verb in these laws in order to mitigate 
incomprehensibility.  
4.2.3.2.3. Greek Idiom Employed  
3.3.3. Verbless Nominal Clauses. The phrase ἐὰν δὲ γυνὴ συνεισέλθῃ μετʼ αὐτοῦ in v. 3 
represents one of three examples of a verbless nominal clause being rephrased. These changed 
clauses only occur in legal texts (21.3, 8; 24.14). Whether this shows a greater concern for clarity 
in legal texts is difficult to ascertain with so few examples. 
 
3.3.5. ἀποκριθεὶς εἴπῃ. The aorist subjunctive, if it is true that speech verbs are generally 
associated with the imperfective aspect, may represent interference from the legal casuistic genre 
which defaults to ἐάν + aorist subjunctive.  
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3.4.1. ἑαυτοῦ. Against the Hebrew word order, this emphatic personal pronoun is used. Its use 
here is the way familial relationships are often stated in Ptolemaic legal texts.  
4.2.3.2.4. Strong Hebrew Interference 
3.4.2. ἐάν (no δέ). Ex has maintained fidelity to the Hebrew text (which has no ו) and translated 
without δέ. In Greek compositional casuistic law ἐάν + subjunctive indicates a new topic.  
4.2.4. Changes Likely Based on Variant Vorlage 
3.3.4. τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ. Ex probably had a reading in line with SamP.  
 
3.4.2. οὐ κύριός ἐστιν πωλεῖν αὐτήν. Ex’s Vorlage likely had ילשמ  with either an obscured or 
omitted י. 
 
3.5.7. τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ, καὶ καταδυναστεύσας αὐτὸν. Ex’s Vorlage likely had וב  לארשי ינבמ
רמעתהו (as based on Dt. 24.7).  
4.3. Comments on Results 
4.3.1. Translation Technique 
The consistent pattern represented in Septuagint Exodus 21.1-32 is a desire to draw on 
Ptolemaic legal language, their judiciary systems, and even differing content represented in 
Ptolemaic legal norms rather than the norms presented in the Hebrew text. As can be seen by the 
number of “narrowing translations” Ex is prone to disambiguate the Hebrew text both for the 
sake of clarity and practicability. Polyvalence is not something the translator valued—at least in 
this section of the text.666 A more formal analysis at the level of a verse or section’s entire 
meaning in these legal segments as compared to the narrative portions of Exodus would need to 
be undertaken to see if this trait is based in genre or in the overall translation values of Ex.  
                                                          
666 Unless polyvalence is intentional. It was argued to be, for example, in the commentary on v. 16(17) with εὑρεθῇ ἐν 
αὐτῷ. 
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 Formal Hebrew interference is also not something that is particularly prominent in this 
section. Following Hebrew word order is the only constant in this regard, and even that is not 
without exceptions. In order of prominence, the next aspect of Hebrew interference would be the 
general fidelity involving quantitative representation of each Hebrew lexeme. This is much less 
operative than following the Hebrew word order, however, and happens enough so that it can be 
said that it was not of chief concern for Ex. Even less concern is shown for a one-to-one formal 
representation of Hebrew lexemes with consistent Greek equivalents. Ex is far more prone to 
contextual renderings. Finally, there are basic translation equivalencies when it comes to Ex’s 
understanding of Hebrew syntax, though the translator is not particularly concerned with 
abberations from some of his generally established translation norms. What these factors say 
about certain methodological outlooks such as the Interlinear Paradigm has already been said by 
its proponents: this approach needs to be tempered and contextualized for each individual 
translator.667 Perhaps all that is needed, in light of this thesis, is to categorize Septuagint Exodus 
as a bit closer to the fringes of the formal translation constraints proposed in that model.  
4.3.2. Purposes Behind Ptolemaic Legal Interference 
The strong interference from Ptolemaic law, especially as seen in the syntax employed 
and the meaning changed regarding the Hebrew death penalty texts, suggests that this translation 
was made with the intent to fit it within the Ptolemaic legal context more easily than a 
straightforward representation of the Hebrew text would allow. Moreover, Ex has altered the 
meaning of the Hebrew text on various occasions when there is no warrant or inclination that the 
Hebrew would be read otherwise. This is most notable in the death penalty apodoses (which all 
have the identical תמוי תומ behind them) and in the changing of slavery terminology to represent 
                                                          
667 Scholars such as Boyd-Taylor, The Interlinear, and, Pietersma, “Beyond Literalism,” have already well-noted that 
translators can differ substantially in their degree of formal representation of the Hebrew. 
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different classes based on the content of the various laws. Other examples such as the probable 
harmonization of requirements for female divorce and the consistent redirection towards 
Ptolemaic officials for intermediation also point to Ex’s fixation with Ptolemaic norms. 
 These changes almost require that Ex translated under the assumption that those reading 
these laws were not going to make recourse to the Hebrew text. There is no doubt that to the 
Hebrew purist some of Ex’s translation choices would be borderline audacious. Perhaps some of 
these changes could be explained in other ways. Still, it is hard to imagine another argument 
based in anything other than an unseen linguistic constraint for the use of the jussive in the death 
penalty texts. That there is such a strong correspondence to Ptolemaic legal genres suggests 
either that this thesis missed a linguistic explanation, or that Ex had indeed drawn on the genres 
of royal decree and civic law. So why, then, does Ex go to these lengths to interact with 
Ptolemaic law in this legal translation? 
The consistent use of contemporary legal language and formulations could be due to Ex’s 
desire to create an ‘authentic’ sounding text. Or, perhaps it points to Ex’s desire for the text to be 
perceived on a parallel level to other legal texts and traditions circulating Egypt. Given that Ex 
has translated these casuistic laws so similarly to how Greek compositional casuistic laws were 
written, these precepts would have no trouble fitting into the Ptolemaic context all on their own. 
They truly could function in that society as individual δικαιώματα for use in the courtroom. The 
function of these laws within the translator’s society is a question that stems from the broader 
inquiry into the original purpose for the translation of the Greek Pentateuch.668  
                                                          
668 See Honigman, The Septuagint, 105-118, or Modrzejewski and Cornman, The Jews of, 100-102, for good overviews 
on this topic.  
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Recent scholars like Rajak do not believe the original intent of the translation was to be a 
“civic law of the Jews.”669 Others like Honigman claim this could have been “at least a 
derivative sphere of use.”670 This thesis provides some data to potentially move this conversation 
forward. It seems very possible, given the kinds of changes and influences that have been noted, 
that these laws were intended for ‘on the ground’ usage. Given that δικαιώματα were often taken 
from this or that legal source, drawn together by a lawyer, and subsequently used in court, it 
seems very possible that these laws could have served that same purpose. Such usage may even 
explain why Ex takes such liberties, since the laws would be further excised from their context in 
this process of becoming part of the material in the dossiers of legal experts. It would be harder 
to trace them back to their initial source. At this point, this thesis can only hope that a further 
evaluation of the rest of Ex’s legal materials will shed further light on this question.  
What can be said with a measure of confidence is that Ex is acquainted with Ptolemaic 
jurisprudence, both with respect to the kinds of texts produced within that system as well as to its 
actual laws, juridicial processes, and customs. This suggests that Ex has spent significant time 
reflecting on and learning from the Greco-Egyptian legal system. Certainly, that legal sphere 
held a great deal of sway in the mind of the translator. Whether or not this kind of knowledge 
was commonplace is another matter for investigation. Would the typical civilian know these 
terms, texts, and functions? Or does the translator’s knowledge of such things betray a close 
association with, or perhaps participation in, higher Ptolemaic legal discourses and processes? 
Has the translator spent time with Ptolemaic officials in the making of this translation? Were a 
plethora of legal texts strewn about the translator’s workplace during the translation’s creation? 
Whatever the case, the recourse to that system evidenced suggests a deep and thoroughgoing 
                                                          
669 Translation and Survival, 84-85. 
670 The Septuagint, 108, emphasis hers. 
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knowledge of its practices—however that information was gathered. Whoever the translator was, 
he undoubtedly had a great respect, and allegiance towards, the Ptolemaic legal system. This 
deference is, in part, passed on through the changes that occur in this translation. Whether the 
readers knew it or not, Ex’s goal was—to a degree—to Hellenize the Hebrew(s). 
4.3.3. Comments on Halakhic Influence 
This influence in Ptolemaic law, language, and custom, also calls certain other 
approaches to the translation technique of Ex into question. One approach that has been briefly 
interacted with in this thesis is that which sees halakhic influence in Ex’s translation choices. 
Scholars like Büchner, Frankel, and Prijs, to varying degrees, have suggested that Ex has been 
influenced by halakhic interpretations and hermeneutics.671 What constitutes a “halakhic 
interpretation” is a matter of debate. Generally, “halakhic interpretation” refers to the practice of 
expanding upon laws from the biblical text.672 The problem with drawing conclusions from the 
Rabbinic sources like these scholars do is that the source materials stem from the common era, 
and there are no definitive means of tracing them back before that time.673  
It is outside of the scope of this thesis to investigate all the Rabbinic sources. It would be 
worthwhile to see if one could find similar Rabbinic exegesis that takes a stock phrase like תומ
תמוי and willfully changes the meaning like Ex does. Such a find would be more substantial than 
the small and contestable nuances that were briefly commented on in this study.674 However, it is 
much harder to contest some of the other translation choices explained in this thesis. The use of 
the civic legal genre, for instance, is a strong indication that Ex cared more about Ptolemaic legal 
                                                          
671 Büchner, “On the Relationship,” Frankel, Ueber den Einfluss, and, Prijs. Jüdische Tradition, respectively.  
672 James D. Newsome, Greeks, Romans, Jews: Currents of Culture and Belief in the New Testament World 
(Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992), 106-107. This practice can be seen in a seminal form in Nehemiah 8 and 10 
which harmonize various legal traditions (See Lawrence Harvey Schiffman, Texts and Traditions: A Source Reader for the Study 
of Second Temple and Rabbinic Judaism [Hoboken: KTAV Publishing House, 1998], 103-105).  
673 Cf. Newsome, Greeks, Romans, 106-107; Schiffman, Texts and Traditions, 48-49. 
674 See 3.3.6.3. and πρὸς τὴν θύραν ἐπὶ τὸν σταθμόν. 
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influence than Jewish legal traditions or interpretations. The harmonization with Greek law on 
female marriage requirements is also another strong push against the halakhic approach. Perhaps, 
at this point, the best one could say is that there may be small intimations of halakhic influence. 
However, the predominant impetus for the translator is to build a bridge between the translation 
and Ptolemaic law, as best Ex could and within the confines of a translation attempting a degree 
of fidelity to the source text. At the very least, this thesis calls into question the validity and 
certainty of the halakhic approach.  
4.4. Conclusion 
This study has attempted to break into a heretofore unexplored aspect of Greek Exodus, 
namely, its potential relationship or influence involving Ptolemaic legal norms. While some of 
the conclusions have been noted as tentative and uncertain, others have provided solid new data 
to help in the interpretation and understanding of this ancient translator. If the hypothesis 
presented here is correct, in that the Exodus translator is frequently influenced by Ptolemaic 
Graeco-Egyptian legal norms, then a new facet of Second Temple Alexandrian Jewry and 
hermeneutics may in fact be on the cusp of discovery. Probing further into hermeneutics, 
especially as to whether other interpretive traditions ‘bend’ Hebrew lexical roots (e.g., תמוי תומ) 
like Ex is one of the next steps in this investigation. Further research needs to be done in the rest 
of the Covenant Code, and in the legal materials more broadly, for a clearer picture to emerge. 
This project represents the first ‘brush marks,’ so to speak, of that potentially breathtaking and 
illuminating portrait—a picture of the merging and melding Hellenistic and Jewish worlds at the 
outset of a new, Greek, epoch. 
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Appendix I: pluses in exodus 1-23 
 
 The following list does not include pronouns, divine name expansions, articles, or other 
minutiae like these.675 This is an imperfect list based on a manual evaluation of this author 
through the comparison of BHS and the Göttingen Edition. Where a significant variant exists in 
the BHS apparatus, it is noted with “(variant).” Where no variant is listed in BHS but a nearby 
context could be a source of harmonization, it is noted. While most of the harmonized texts were 
found without aid, Tov released an article near the end of the research period for this thesis 
which supplements the information gathered.676 Where Tov agrees or includes the same 
information, it is noted according to the page number in his article. There is no significant 
attempt here to differentiate between which pluses are based on a variant Vorlage and which are 
from Ex. The list is compiled to gain a general view of the differences in Ex compared to MT. 
Still, a few speculations on the Hebrew Vorlage are included. This appendix mainly supplements 
the argument in 3.3.6.2.3. b) by showing that a non-harmonizing plus like τὸ κριτήριον is not 
normal in Ex.  
Pluses: 
1.11 καὶ Ων, ἥ ἐστιν Ἡλιούπολις  
1.12 οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι 
1.12 σφοδρα  
 Based on 1.20 (Tov, 7) 
1.22 τοῖς Ἐβραίοις 
 Based on 2.6 (Tov, 11) 
2.3 ἡ μήτηρ αὐτοῦ (variant) 
 Based on v. 2 (Tov, 12) 
2.6 ἡ θυγάτηρ Φαραὼ (variant) 
 Based on v. 5 (Tov, 13) 
2.11 τοὺς υἱοὺς Ἰσραήλ 
2.11 ταῖς πολλαῖς  
 Based on v. 23 (Tov, 7) 
2.15 ἐλθὼν δὲ εἰς γῆν Μαδιὰν (variant) 
                                                          
 675 Except in ch. 21-23, where there was a vested interest to have a list of every plus. 
 676 “Textual Harmonization in Exodus 1-24,” A Journal of Biblical Textual Criticism 22 (2017): 1-16. 
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2.16 ποιμαίνουσαι τὰ πρόβατα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῶν  
τὰ πρόβατα τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτῶν is taken from the context immediately following. The 
author clarifies why the daughters “went out and drew water” beforehand by inserting 
ποιμαίνουσαι. Tov points to 4QExodb as witnessing to a Hebrew text with this phrase 
included (6). Only the first verb תוער  survives, but it is enough to indicate that this was in 
fact a Hebrew reading. This should absolutely be accepted.  
2.21 γυναῖκα (variant) 
2.22 ἐν γαστρὶ δὲ λαβοῦσα ἡ γυνὴ (variant) 
 Based on 2.2 (Tov, 11) 
2.22 Μωυσῆς 
 Based on v. 13 (Tov, 11) 
3.7 πρὸς Μωυσῆν 
3:8 καὶ Γεργεσαίων (cf. v. 17; 23:23) 
Based on Deut 7:1. These two peoples do not appear together in the Torah before this 
verse in Deuteronomy. Same in 13:5 below (Tov, 12). 
3.10 βασιλέα Αἰγύπτου 
 Based on 2.23 (Tov, 11) 
3.12 ὁ θεὸς Μωυσῇ λέγων 
 Based on 3.14? 
3.16 τῶν υἱῶν (variant) 
3.16 καὶ θεὸς Ισαακ καὶ θεὸς Ιακωβ (Tov, 7) 
4.1 ὁ θεός, τί ἐρῶ πρὸς αὐτούς 
 This is not new content. τί ἐρῶ πρὸς αὐτούς is taken from 3.13, where Moses asks what 
 to respond to the Israelites disbelief.  
4.6 ἐκ τοῦ κόλπου αὐτοῦ (variant) 
4.7 εἰς τὴν χρόαν 
4.12 Μωυσῆς 
4.17 τὴν στραφεῖσαν εἰς ὄφιν 
 Based on 7.15  
4.18 μετὰ δὲ τὰς ἡμέρας τὰς πολλὰς ἐκείνας ἐτελεύτησεν ὁ βασιλεὺς Αἰγύπτου 
 Based on 2.23, and is a reminder of the timeframe and context of Moses’ return. 
4.23 τὸν λαόν μου 
  Based on 5:1; 7:16 (Tov, 10) 
4.24 ἄγγελος 
 Added to circumvent a physical description of God. 
4.31 ὁ λαός  
 Based on 31a (Tov, 11) 
5.2 τοὺς υἱούς 
 Based on the frequent expression (Tov, 7) 
5.13 ἐδίδοτο ὑμῖν (variant) 
5.14 τοῦ γένους 
 Possibly from 1.9 
5.17 καὶ οὗτοι 
 Based on 6.14 
6.20 θυγατέρα τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ 
 Text changed so that Amram takes a cousin instead of an aunt as his wife. 
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6.20 Μαριὰμ τὴν ἀδελφὴν αὐτῶν (variant) 
 Based on Num 26.59? (Tov, 6, 12) 
7.5 πάντες (variant) 
7.7 ὁ ἀδελφὸς αὐτοῦ 
 Based on v. 1 (Tov, 7) 
7.9 τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου 
7.9 ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν 
 Based on 4.3 (Tov, 10) 
7:9 σημεῖον ἢ 
 Based on v. 3 and Deut 13:2. Similarly 11:9, 10 (Tov, 7) 
7:9 καὶ ἐναντίον τῶν θεραπόντων αὐτοῦ 
 Based on v. 10. Similarly, 9:8. (Tov, 8) 
7.10 ἐναντίον Φαραώ  
 Based on v.9 (Tov, 11) 
7:10a καὶ τῶν θεραπόντων αὐτοῦ).  
 Based on v. 10b. Similarly, 14:8 (Tov, 8) 
7.11 Αἰγύπτου 
 based on 11b (cf. Tov, 8) 
7:15 αὐτὸς ἐκπορεύεται  
 Based on 4:14. Similarly 8:16 (Tov, 12) 
7.19 τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου 
8.1 τῷ ἀδελφῷ σου 
8.3 τῶν Αἰγυπτίων 
 Based on 7.11 (Tov, 11) 
8.4 περὶ ἐμοῦ  
 Based on v. 24. Similarly, 9:28. (Tov, 8) 
8.5 καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ λαοῦ σου καί 
 Based on 8.7(11) or 5 (Tov, 12, claims the latter) 
8.7 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐπαύλεων 
 Based on 8.9(13) 
8:12 τῇ χειρί 
  Based on v. 13 (Tov, 12) 
8:12 ἔν τε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετράποσιν 
 Based on v. 13 (Tov, 8) 
8:14 καί = םג 
 Based on 7:11 (Tov 10) 
8.16 ἐν τῇ ἐρήμῳ 
 Based on 7.16 
8.18 ὁ κύριος 
8.19 ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς 
 Based on 9.5 (Tov, 8) 
8.24 πρὸς κύριον 
 Based on v.25 (Tov, 8) 
8:28 καὶ οὐκ ἠθέλησεν ἐξαποστεῖλαι 
 Based on 10:27 (different Greek: καὶ οὐκ ἐβουλήθη ἐξαποστεῖλαι αὐτούς) or 9:2 (εἰ μὲν 
 οὖν μὴ βούλει ἐξαποστεῖλαι) (Tov, 10) 
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9.2 τὸν λαόν μου 
9.4 ἐν τῷ καιρῷ ἐκείνῳ (variant) 
 Based on v. 14 (cf. Tov, 8) 
9:7 ἰδὼν δέ 
  Based on v. 34 (Tov, 8) 
9:7 ὅτι 
  Based on v. 34. (Tov, 8) 
9:7 τῶν υἱῶν 
 Based on v. 6. Similarly, 12:6 (Tov, 12) 
9.9 ἔν τε τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ ἐν τοῖς τετράποσιν 
 Taken from 8.13/9.10 
9:11 γῇ  
 Based on v. 9. Similarly in 3:10, 11; 10:6; 14:11. Same in 12:40; 13:3 (Tov, 8) 
9:25b ἡ χάλαζα 
  Based on v. 25a (Tov 8) 
9.28 καὶ πῦρ 
 Probably taken from 9.23/24 
9.29 καὶ ὁ ὑετός 
 Probably taken from 9.33/34 
10.4 ταύτην τὴν ὥραν  
 Probably taken from 9.18 
10:4 πολλήν 
  Based on 10:14 (Tov, 8) 
10.5 Μωυσῆς 
10:5b τῆς γῆς 
 Based on v. 5a (Tov, 8) 
10.6 πᾶσαι 
10.8 καὶ πάντα τὸν καρπὸν τῶν ξύλων (variant) 
10:12 βοτάνην τῆς γῆς  
 Based on v. 15 (Tov, 12) 
10.13 εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν  
 Confusion with 10.21, possible (variant)  
10.18 Μωυσῆς 
10:19 γῇ 
 Based on v. 15 (Tov, 8) 
10.22 θύελλα  
 From Dt. 4.11; 5.22? 
10:24 τῷ θεῷ ὑμῶν  
 Based on v. 8 (Tov, 8) 
10:24 καὶ Ἀαρὼν  
 Based on 9:29 (Tov, 12) 
11.2 καὶ ἱματισμόν (variant) 
 Based on 12.35 (Tov 12) 
11:3a ἐναντίον 
 Based on v. 3b.  
11:3a καὶ ἐναντίον Φαραω 
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 Based on v. 3b (Tov, 8) 
11.3 ἔχρησαν αὐτοῖς (variant) 
 Based on 12.36 (Tov, 12) 
11.8 Μωυσῆς 
11.9-10 καὶ τὰ τέρατα 
 Based on 7.3 
11.10 ἐν γῇ Αἰγύπτῳ 
 Based on 11.9 (cf. Tov, 8) 
12:3 ἕκαστος 
 Based on the context (Tov, 8) 
12:3 υἱῶν  
 Based on frequent expression (Tov, 10) 
12.6 υἱῶν (variant) 
12.10 ὀστοῦν οὐ συντρίψετε ἀπʼ αὐτοῦ  
 Based on 12.46 (Tov, 3, suggests this is a true example of harmonization at the level of 
 the Greek translator, not the Vorlage) 
12.16 λατρευτὸν 
 The rewriting involves the change of the verb from 12:16 MT SP השעי to ποιήσετε in the 
 LXX, equaling ושעת in Lev 23:7 (Tov, 10) 
12:18 τοῦ πρώτου 
  Based on Lev 23:5. This verse speaks about the same festival of matzot (Tov 5) 
12.19 ἑαυτοῖς 
12:21 τῶν υἱῶν 
  Based on 4:29. Same in 3:16 (Tov, 8) 
12:30 ἐν πάσῃ γῇ 
  Based on 11:6 (Tov, 10) 
12.39 αὐτοὺς (variant) 
12.39 εἰς τὴν ὁδόν 
12.40 καὶ ἐν γῇ Χανάαν Variant 
 Based on 13.3? (Tov, 12) 
12.50 πρὸς αὐτούς 
13.5 καὶ Γεργεσαίων καὶ Φερεζαίων (variant) 
 Based on Deut 7:1. Same in 3:8, 17 above. (Tov 12) 
13.12 τὰ ἀρσενικά  
 Repeated from end of verse 
13:12b μήτραν 
 Based on v.12a (Tov, 9) 
13.12 ἁγιάσεις (variant) 
 Based on v.2 (Tov, 9) 
13.13 μήτραν (variant) 
13:14 ὅτι 
 Based on v. 9 (same phrase) (Tov, 9) 
13.19 Ἰωσὴφ (variant) 
13.20 οἱ υἱοὶ Ἰσραὴλ 
13.22 παντός 
14.2 τῆς ἐπαύλεως (variant) 
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14.3 τῷ λαῷ αὐτοῦ 
 Clarification in line with Hebrew from v.5 (cf. Tov, 9) 
14.4 πάντες 
14.5 τοὺς υἱοὺς (variant) 
14.6 Φαραὼ 
14.6 πάντα 
14.12 ταύτῃ 
 based on v. 32 (Tov, 9) 
14.13 τὴν παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ 
Circumventing a physical description of the divine presence  
14.13 χρόνον 
14.17 Φαραὼ καὶ…πάντων 
 Taken from 7.3; 9.12; 10.20 
14.18 πάντες (variant) 
14.19 τῶν υἱῶν  
14:20 καὶ ἔστη 
 Based on v. 19 (Tov, 9) 
14.20 διῆλθεν  
 Corruption?  
14.23 τεῖχος  
 Repeated from two words before  
14.25 καὶ ἐπικαλυψάτω 
 The translator adds a full clause for the first time since 1.11. If Ex had only said “the 
 waters returned upon,” or “were re-established upon” the Egyptians, as the Hebrew 
 states, the Egyptians’ fate would not be absolutely clear. This pivotal moment in the 
 redemption of Israel and their enemies’ concomitant defeat needed to be definitively 
 clear. 
15.18 ἐπʼ αἰῶνα 
15.21 λέγουσα 
15.22 τοὺς υἱοὺς 
15.22 ὥστε πιεῖν 
 Based on 15.23 (Tov, 9) 
15.23 τοῦ τόπου ἐκείνου 
 Based on 17.7? (Tov, 5) 
15.25 Μωυσῆς 
15.27 ἦσαν  
 From implied copula 
16.1 ἐστιν  
 From implied copula  
16.3 πληγέντες 
 Added to circumvent a physical description of the divine presence 
16.6 συναγωγὴν 
 Based on 16.1 or 9 (latter is Tov, 9) 
16.7 ἐσμεν  
 From implied copula 
16.8 ἐσμεν  
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 From implied copula 
16.15 αὐτὸ 
16.15 ἐστιν  
 From implied copula 
16.21 ἡνίκα 
16.23 Μωυσῆς 
16.23 τὸ ῥῆμά ἐστιν 
 Based on 16.32? 
16.25 ἔστιν  
 From implied copula 
16.27 τινες 
16.29 τοὺς οἴκους 
 Implied in Hebrew 
16.32 τοῦ μὰν (variant) 
16.33 χρυσοῦν 
Derived from the other gold elements in the tabernacle (28.30[26], 32[28]; 
39.30[36.38])? 
17.5 τούτου 
 Based on v. 4 (Tov, 9) 
17.7 ἐκείνου 
17.9 ἄνδρας δυνατούς  
 Based on 18.21, 25 
17.9 καὶ ἰδοὺ 
 Based on multiple previous occurrences (7.17; 8.21; 9.18; 10.4)? 
17:10 καὶ ἐξελθών 
 Based on v. 9 (Tov, 9) 
17.12 Μωυσῆ 
18.6 λέγοντες 
18.6 αὐτὸν (variant) 
18.8 ἐκ χειρὸς Φαραὼ καὶ ἐκ χειρὸς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων 
 Based on 18.4, 9 
18.9 καὶ ἐκ χειρὸς Φαραώ 
 Based on 18.4 
18:10 ἐξείλατο τὸν λαὸν αὐτοῦ 
 Based on v. 1 (Tov, 9) 
18.11 τούτου 
18.15 κρίσιν παρὰ 
 Added to circumvent a physical description of the divine presence 
18.15 αὐτοὺς 
18.17(18) τοῦτο 
18.18 ἀνυπομονήτῳ 
 Explication of the Hebrew verb.  
18.19 αὐτῶν (variant) 
18.20 τοῦ θεοῦ (variant) 
18.20 αὐτοῦ  
 Cf. 20.20 
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18.20 ἐν αἷς (variant) 
18.21 σεαυτῷ (variant) 
19.1 εἰς τὴν 
19.2 εἰς τὴν 
19.3 τὸ ὄρος 
Added to circumvent a physical description of the divine presence or based on 3.1 (Tov, 
10) 
19.4 ὡσεὶ 
 Clarification of analogy  
19.5 λαὸς 
 Based on Dt. 7.6; 14.2 (Tov, 10) 
19.8 καὶ ἀκουσόμεθα 
 Based on 24.7 
19.10 διαμάρτυραι  
 Based on 19.21 (Tov, 7) 
19.13 ὅταν αἱ φωναὶ καὶ αἱ σάλπιγγες καὶ ἡ νεφέλη ἀπέλθῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ ὄρους 
 All derived from 19.16 (Tov, 7) 
19:16 Σινά  
 Based on vv. 11, 18, and 20 (Tov, 9) 
19:18 ὁ λαός 
 Based on v. 16 (Tov, 9) 
19.21 λέγων 
20.10 ὁ βοῦς σου καὶ τὸ ὑποζύγιόν σου…πᾶν 
 Based on 20.17 or Dt. 5.14 (Tov, 10) 
20:10 καὶ ὁ προσήλυτος ὁ παροικῶν ἐν σοί 
 Based on Lev 16:29 (καὶ ὁ προσήλυτος ὁ προσκείμενος ἐν ὑμῖν). The borrowing did not 
 take place on the Greek level since the two texts use different terms and they also differ 
 in their singular/plural presentation of the pronoun. The plural suffix of םככותב has also 
 been reconstructed in accordance with the prevalent usage. (Tov 10) 
20:10 ἐν αὐτῇ  
 Based on Deut 5:14 (Tov, 12) 
20:11 ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ἑβδόμῃ 
 Based on v. 10 (Tov, 9) 
20.12 ἵνα εὖ σοι γένηται 
 based on Dt. 5.16 (see P. Nash.) 
20.12 τῆς ἀγαθῆς 
 Based on 3.8? 
20.17 οὔτε τὸν ἀγρὸν αὐτοῦ (variant) 
 Based on Dt. 5.21 (Tov, 12) 
20.17 κτήνους αὐτοῦ οὔτε (variant) 
 Based on 20.10 or 22.9 (latter Tov, 10) 
20.17 ἐστιν  
 From implied copula 
20.22 τῷ οἴκῳ Ἰακὼβ καὶ ἀναγγελεῖς 
 Based on 19.3 
20.24 ἐκεῖ 
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 Based on Dt. 12.5 (Tov, 12) 
21.2 ἔτει  
 Based on just prior context  
21.2 δουλεύσει σοι 
 Based on Dt. 15:22 (Tov, 12) 
21.6 τότε  
21.12 Ἐὰν 
21.13 ὀ φονεύσας 
 Based on Num 35:6 (so Tov, 11)? 
 Ex frequently adds the subject to a verse to clarify. Doesn’t need to be a Hebrew addition.  
21:14(15) καὶ καταφύγῃ  
 Based on Num 35:25 (Tov, 11) 
 No ו in Numbers, and not in the context of the altar but cities of refugee.  
21.16(17) τῶν υἱῶν Ἰσραὴλ…καὶ καταδυναστεύσας 
 Based on Dt. 24.7 (Tov, 11) 
21.19 ὁ ἄνθρωπος 
21.19 ἐστιν 
 From implied copula 
21.35 τὸν ταῦρον  
21.36 καὶ διαμεμαρτυρημένοι ὦσιν τῷ κυρίῳ αὐτοῦ 
 Based on v. 29. Potentially periphrastic to show the tense of v. 29 (morphologically 
 ambiguous)  
22.1 ἐστιν 
 From implied copula 
22.2 ἐστιν 
 From implied copula 
22.3(4) αὐτὰ 
22.4(5) ἐὰν δὲ πάντα τὸν ἀγρὸν καταβοσκήσῃ, τὰ βέλτιστα τοῦ ἀγροῦ αὐτοῦ ἢ τὰ βέλτιστα τοῦ 
ἀμπελῶνος αὐτοῦ ἀποτείσει (variant) 
22.7(8) καὶ ὀμεῖται 
 Implied in the Hebrew 
22.7(8) ὅλης 
22.9(10) γένηται  
 No implied copula 
22:13 ἢ αἰχμάλωτον γένηται 
 Based on v. 9 (Tov, 9) 
22.16(17) καὶ μὴ βούληται 
 Clarifies the previous verb. ἀνανεύω (“to throw one’s head back”) is not immediately 
 clear.  
22.16(17) γυναῖκα 
 Frequent expression (so Tov, 9)? 
22.16(17) τῷ πατρὶ 
22.16(17) ἐστὶν 
 From implied copula 
22.18(19) αὐτούς 
22.27(28) αὐτοῦ 
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22.29(30) καὶ τὸ ὑποζύγιόν σου (variant) 
23.2 κρίσιν 
 Implied in Hebrew or based on v. 6 (latter Tov, 9) 
23.4 παντὸς 
23.7 ἕνεκεν δώρων 
 Based on 23.8 
23:8 ὀφθαλμούς 
  Based on Deut 16:19 (Tov, 12) 
23:12 ἀνάπαυσις 
  Based on 35:2 (κατάπαυσις) (So Tov, 11) 
23.15 ποιεῖν 
 Based on 31.16 (Tov, 11) 
23.16 ποιήσεις 
 Instead of implied copula 
23.16 (see Tov, 11, for a confluence with 34.22) 
23.17 ὅταν γὰρ ἐκβάλω ἔθνη ἀπὸ προσώπου σου καὶ ἐμπλατύνω τὰ ὅριά σου 
 Based on 34:24. Identical, except for πλατύνω. 
23.18 ὅταν γὰρ ἐκβάλω ἔθνη ἀπὸ προσώπου σου, καὶ ἐμπλατύνω τὰ ὅριά σου  
 Based on 34.24 
23.19 εἰς 
23.23 καὶ Γεργεσαῖον (variant) 
23.25 καὶ τὸν οἶνόν σου 
23.28 καὶ τοὺς Ἀμορραίους 
 Based on 23.23 or Dt. 7.1 (Tov, 11) 
23.31 τοῦ μεγάλου ποταμοῦ Εὐφράτου 
 Based on Gen. 15:18 and Dt. 1:7. LXX Exodus is not identical to the Hebrew text of 
 either of these verses. It is closest to the LXX of Deuteronomy with an inverted sequence 
 (τοῦ ποταμοῦ τοῦ μεγάλου Εὐφράτου). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
appendix II: the Hebrew participle translated 
 
Greek Forms Employed in Translation 
 
Participle 
1.1; 2.6, 11, 13; 3.1, 8, 17; 4.19; 20; 6.7, 27; 9.9, 10, 24; 10.5, 8; 12.10, 29, 30, 49* ; 13.5; 14.9, 
19, 28, 30; 15.11(2x 1 pres.), 14, 15, 26; 16.23, 35; 18.21; 19.12*, 19, 22; 20.5(2x), 6(3x); 21.16, 
19, 34, 35, 36; 22.5, 18, 19, 24; 23.4, 5, 22, 31; 24.13, 17; 25.20(19[2x]), 32, 33, 35; 26.12(2x), 
13; 28.7; 29.22, 37; 30.14, 29; 31.13, 14; 33.3, 7, 10, 11; 34.7(3x), 12, 15; 35.2, 24; 36.4, 8, 11; 
38.8(38.26), 15(37.13), 26(39.2-3); 39.3(36.10) 
 
Verb 
2.5, 14; 3.2, 5, 9, 13; 4.14, 23; 5.8(3x), 10, 11, 13; 5.16(2x), 17(2x); 6.5, 29; 7.15, 17, 27(2x); 
8.16, 17, 18, 25; 9.2(2x), 3, 14, 17, 18; 10.4(2x), 5, 11; 11.4, 5; 12.15, 19, 33; 13.4, 15, 21; 14.3, 
8, 10, 17, 25, 27; 15.6; 16.4, 8, 29; 17.6, 9; 18.5, 14(4x), 17; 19.9; 20.12, 18; 21.12; 21.15, 17; 
22.9(10); 23.20; 25.9(8); 26.3; 30.13; 31.14, 15; 32.18; 33.12, 15; 34.10(2x), 11(2x), 12; 36.4 
 
Noun 
1.10, 15, 17, 18, 19(2x), 20, 21; 2.14, 17, 19; 3.7, 20, 22; 5.6, 10, 13, 14, 17; 7.11; 15.1, 7, 11, 
21; 16.17-18; 19.11, 15; 22.17; 23.5, 26; 26.5, 36; 27.16; 28.10, 32, 39; 29.34; 30.25, 35; 32.25; 
34.2; 36.5; 38.25(39.2) 
 
Preposition 
1.5; 26.3; 29.13 
 
Infinitive 
8.17; 35.35(2x) 
 
Adjective 
8.22; 14.8; 34.10(2x); 36.37(37.5); 39.9(36.16) 
 
Untranslated 
26.15; 35.35; 37.1; 38.8(38.26) 
 
Imperative 
26.28 
Greek Tenses Used 
 
Translated as Participle 
Present tense: 2.6, 11, 13; 3.1, 8, 17; 4.19; 20; 6.7, 27; 9.9, 10, 24; 10.5, 8; 12.10, 29 ; 13.5 ; 
14.19 ; 15.11, 14, 15, 26; 16.23, 35; 18.21 ; 19.19, 22; 20.5(2x), 6(3x); 21.16 ; 22.18, 19, 24; 
23.4, 22, 31; 24.17; 25.20(19[2x]), 32, 33, 35; 26.12, 13; 28.7; 29.22, 37; 30.14, 29; 31.13, 14; 
33.3, 7, 11; 34.7(3x), 12, 15; 35.2, 24; 36.4, 8, 11(?); 37.18(38.18); 38.8(38.26); 39.3(36.10) 
 
Aorist tense: 12.49 (law); 19.12 (law); 21.19 (law); 22.5 (law); 38.8(38.26) 
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Perfect tense: 1.1; 12.30; 14.9, 28, 30; 15.11; 21.34, 35, 36; 23.5; 24.13 
 
Translated as a Finite Verb 
Present tense: 2.14; 3.2, 9; 5.8 (2x), 10, 11, 16(2x), 17(2x); 6.5, 29; 7.15, 17, 27(2x); 8.16, 17, 
18; 9.2(2x), 3, 14, 17, 18; 10.4(2x), 11; 11.4, 5, 33; 13.4, 15; 14.3, 17, 25; 16.4, 8; 18.14(2x), 17; 
19.9; 20.12; 21.15; 23.20; 25.9(8); 26.3; 30.13; 32.18; 33.12, 15; 34.10, 11(2x), 12 
 
Aorist tense: 10.5; 12.15(law), 19(law); 14.10; 16.29(law); 18.5; 21.12(law), 17(law); 
22.9(10[law]) 
 
Aorist explanations: 
Most aorist employments occur in legal texts, showing possible interference of that genre. In 
Greek compositional casuistic laws, the default tense is aorist (predominantly in the protasis 
verb). Those not influenced by legal language follow: 
10.5: The aorist is picked up from the same word in a passive, aorist, participle just prior. 
14.10: This verb is idiomatically aorist (in LXX).  
18.5: Potentially the translator did not translate Moses’ “encamping” at the mount of God as 
imperfective because he did not think that Moses’ time there was habitual, but rather a one-time 
event. The sacred mountain was no place to live, but to encounter God. Or, perhaps like 14.10, 
“encamping,” is a punctiliar action? 
 
Translated as Infinitive 
Present: 35.35 
Aorist: 8.17677; 35.35 
 
Translated as Imperative 
Present: 26.28 
 
Comments 
Ex seems to want to maintain the verbal element of the participle, as can be seen by the 
ratio of finite verbs and participles that represent the Hebrew participles. It looks as though the 
primary tense produced in translation of Hebrew participles is the present tense, with a few 
aorists, and a few more perfects. The predominance of present tenses indicates how the translator 
viewed Hebrew participles, namely, as closely associable with the Greek present tense. When Ex 
veers from either the present or the perfect, due note should be taken. There appears to be about 
150 more participles in the Greek text than the Hebrew (477 versus 316 respectively). 
                                                          
 677 Gains verbal aspect from previous finite present verb.  
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Appendix III: attested and unattested middle voice verbs 
The following lists shows all the middle voice employments in Ex organized according to 
whether they have a medio-passive definition in LSJ. Only one verb has no attested medio-
passive definition according to LSJ.  
No Middle Attested 
19.23 ἁγίασαι678 
 
Middle Attested 
2.5 λούσασθαι  
2.5 ἀνείλατο (cf. 2.10)  
2.12 περιβλεψάμενος  
2.21 ἐξέδοτο 
3.5 λῦσαι  
3.18 εἰσακούσονταί (cf. 6.12, 30; 7.4) 
3.19 προΐημι  
4.10 ἤρξω  
4.13 προχείρισαι  
6.6 λυτρώσομαι (cf. 13.13, 15; 15.13; 34.20) 
7.15 στήσῃ 
8.9, 12 Τάξαι 
9.16 ἐνδείξωμαι  
9.28 προσθήσεσθε (cf. 34; 14.13)  
10.12 ὑπελίπετο (cf. 24, 26) 
❖ 10.24 is analogous to θανατοῦσθω in 21.12. It is the only other present and middle 
 imperative found before the laws. However, Rahlfs deems this text to read 
ὑπολίπεσθε. The pronunciation of ι and ει would have been the same at that time, so 
this difference can easily be accounted for. More importantly, within the narrative 
sections of Exodus, Ex always uses the aorist tense for middle commands (3.5; 4.13; 
8.9; 17.9; 28.1; 32.23). It makes little sense why this instance would merit a present 
middle imperative when all other narrative contexts do not employ the present 
middle. The problem remains, however, since this evidence also suggests that the 
present middle is the more difficult reading.  
11.7 καταβήσονται 
12.17, 24, 25; 13.9; 31.13, 14 φυλάξεσθε    
14.4 καταδιώξεται  
15.25 ἔθετο (cf. 32.27)  
16.34 ἀπέθετο 
17.9, 10 παράταξαι  
17.13 ἐτρέψατο  
18.4, 8, 9, 10 ἐξείλατό  
18.11 ἐπέθεντο (cf. 21.14) 
                                                          
 678 Ἀφόρισαι immediately precedes this, likely informing how the middle voice should be taken.  
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19.8 ἀκουσόμεθα 
19.12 ἁψάμενος  
19.13 ἅψεται 
19.23 Ἀφόρισαι  
21.7, 17(16), 35 ἀποδῶται  
21.7 καθωμολογήσατο  
21.12 θανατούσθω (first present, middle-passive in the book) 
❖ It is wise to assume that this verb is not reflecting any sort of typical medial self-
involvement. Ex does not use the middle this way.  θανατούσθω should be taken as 
a passive, since there is no strict middle definition for the lexeme. This conclusion 
strengthens the argument that this verb is intended to be read as a real sentencing to 
immediate death, in line with its typical use in Ptolemaic law.  
22.31 ἀπορρίψατε 
21.18 λοιδορῶνται  
23.1, 23 συγκατατίθημι  
23.7 ἀποστήσῃ  
23.21 ὑποστείληταί  
28.39(35) ἐπάξονται  
30.38 ἀπολεῖται  
32.2, 3, 24 περιέλεσθε (cf. 33.6) 
32.30 ἀναβήσομαι (cf. 34.2) 
33.5 ἀφέλεσθε 
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Appendix iv: hebrew finite verbs translated non-verbally 
 
 This appendix is included only to supplement section 3.4.2. in the argumentation 
regarding οὐ κύριός ἐστιν πωλεῖν αὐτήν. The following is a list of occasions where Ex does not 
translate a finite verb with another verbal form: 
10.22 ψηλαφητός 
 The verbal element is implied from the previous γενηθήτω 
16.3 ὄφελον.  
 The Hebrew here is an idiomatic phrase, ימןתי־  so no verbal element was needed.  
16.14 לטה תבכש לעתו  
 Not accounted for by translator. 
20.19 העמשנו  
 Not accounted for by translator. 
21.8 לשמי (see comments) 
21.13 ἑκών  
 Relative clause creates adjectival phrase.  
21.19 τὰ ἰατρεῖα 
 See comments on verse. 
22.15(16) השרא־אל רשא = ἀμνήστευτον 
 Relative clause creates adjectival phrase.  
25.15(14) ּἀκίνητοι 
 ונממ ורסי אל is rendered economically.679 
28.39(35) תצבשו = οἱ κόσυμβοι  
 Understood as a noun.680 
32.20 קד־רשא = λεπτὸν 
 Relative clause creates adjectival phrase. 
34.19 רכזת = τὰ ἀρσενικά  
 Textual corruption  
36.2 הברקל ובל ואשנ רשא לכ = πάντας τοὺς ἑκουσίως βουλομένους προσπορεύεσθαι  
 Relative clause creates adjectival phrase. 
39.23(36.31) ערקי אל = ἀδιάλυτον 
 Not rendered freely at first in 28.32(28) (ἵνα μὴ ῥαγῇ). Part of tabernacle account. 
 
Patterns 
 
1) there are no instances of a finite verb becoming anything non-verbal within Greek 
Exodus outside of the legal sections except 25.15 and 39.23(36.31).681 The latter was rendered as 
                                                          
 679 Wevers, Notes, 398 
 680 Ibid., 642.  
 681 The relative clause examples are not included because the syntax of the Hebrew sentence made the items adjectival.  
175 
 
a verb the first time the instruction was made, so its Tabernacle Account equivalent should be 
regarded as related to the freedom demonstrated in the translation technique of that section.  
2) If there were a “rule” that Ex generally follows, keeping a finite verb verbal is one of 
them. Breaking this pattern demonstrates that Ex changed this norm out of necessity. This “rule” 
suggests that 21.8 did not have a Hebrew verb in Ex’s Vorlage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
